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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
Priority No. 2 
vs. 
JACOB A. WEBB, Case Number 20061109 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant entered a conditional plea to an Amended information on the 25lh 
day of July, 2006 (See Tr. #7 pg. 6). Judgement and sentence was orally imposed and 
executed by the Trial Court on the 24th day of October, 2006 and the Commitment, 
Judgment and Order of Restitution was signed and filed by the Court on the 29th day of 
November, 2006 (See Appendix A). A Notice of Appeal was filed by the Defendant on 
the 21st day of November, 2006, with an Amended Notice of Appeal being filed by the 
Defendant on the 15th day of December, 2006 (See Appendix B.) The Appeal is from a 
criminal Judgment pursuant to the provisions of Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-L (1953 as Amended.) Jurisdiction of this 
I 
Court is pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(e). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Whether a Trailer is, pursuant to Utah Law, classified as a motor 
Vehicle or as a Vehicle or is it variously classified as both. 
II. When the same criminal conduct may be punished in two separate 
ways, is Defendant entitled to, upon Motion, endure conviction and/or 
punishment only with respect to the charge imposing the lesser 
sanction? 
HI. While the Defendant might be convicted of either crime, whether 
Defendant was entitled, as a matter of due process, to be punished as if 
he violated a Statute punishable as a Class A Misdemeanor. 
1. The standard of review on Appeal is that Defendant's challenge 
to the Trial Court's interpretation as to applicability of the punishment prescribed by Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-202 is a question of Statutory interpretation which is reviewed for 
correctness without deference to the Trial Court State vs. Hansen 63 P.3d 650 (Utah 
2002). The Defendant's challenge to the Trial Court's factual findings will not be 
disturbed on Appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. State v Peterson. 810 P.2d 421, 
425 (Utah 1991.) (Appendix C). 
2. This issue was adequately preserved by Motions to Dismiss (Appendix D) 
and Objections on basis of the evidence presented during the Preliminary Hearing (Tr. #4 
pg. 12) pursuant to the provisions of Rule 20 ol ihc Utah Rules oi Cnminal Procedure and 
by invocation of the Doctrine involving Conditional Pleas (Tr. #7 pg 2). State vs. Sery 
758 P.2d 935 (1988.) (Appendix E). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. $ 13-14-102(I4)(a) (1953 as Amended) 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-14-102(15) (1953 as Amended) 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-14-102(22) (1953 as Amended) 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-14-102(18)(a) (1953 as Amended) 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-102 (1953 as Amended) 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-13 a-1(16) [now repealed] 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-2 [now repealed] 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-106 (1953 as Amended) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201 (1953 as Amended) 
Utah Code Ann. i> 76-6-202 (1953 as Amended) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-204 (1953 as Amended) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953 as Amended) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l (1953 as Amended) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(e) (1953 as Amended) 
United States Constitution, Due Process Clause 
Untied States Constitution, 14th Amendment 
Utah Constitution, Article I Section 12 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: 
3. This Appeal is from a final Judgment. Sentence and Order of 
Restitution imposed and orally entered in the First District Court for Rich County, State 
of Utah on the 24th day of October, 2006 and signed and filed on the 29th day of 
November, 2006 for the offense of Burglary of a Dwelling, a Second Degree Felony 
reduced to a Third Degree Felony of Burglary pursuant to a negotiated settlement 
between the parties reserving the right to Appeal designated issues. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
4. The Defendant was charged in Case No. 051100067 on the 6th day of 
December, 2005 by Information with two counts of Criminal conduct, that being Burglary 
of a Dwelling in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1953 as Amended), a Second 
degree felony, said conduct having occurred on the 2 Ist day of October. 2005 and Theft in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953 as Amended), a Class A Misdemeanor, 
said conduct having also occurred on the 21st day of October, 2005, the Theft charge 
having been thereafter dismissed upon the Plea hereinabove noted. (Appendix F.) 
5. A Conditional Plea pursuant to Slate vs. Sery (supra) was entered on the 
25th day of July, 2006, whereupon the Defendant was ultimately convicted based on that 
Plea by the Court of Burglary in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202. (Tr. #7 pg. 7.) 
(The Theft charge was dismissed as part of the Plea negotiation.) 
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6. The Trial Court orally imposed Judgment and Sentence on the 24 day of 
October, 2006 (Tr. #9 pg. 5,6, and 7), whereby the Defendant was sentenced to serve an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. The prison term 
was suspended and the Defendant was placed on probation, the terms of which included 
confinement for a term of 180 days in the Rich County Jail. The Delcndant was 
sentenced upon a plea agreement the parties and thereby convicted for violation of a 3rcl 
Degree Felony. Credit was granted for 49 days time served and Defendant was Ordered 
to pay a fine in the amount of $800.00 with a surcharge of $381.08 plus interest and is, 
even now, being supervised on probation. 
7. Following a Preliminary Hearing ( Fr. #6 pg. 1) the Defendant made a 
Motion that was filed requiring that the Bindover be Quashed alleging that as a 
consequence of applicable law, that Count 1 proceed, not as a charge of Burglary of a 
dwelling, a Second Degree Felony, but as a Class A Misdemeanor, Burglary of a motor 
vehicle which Motion was denied by the Trial Court on the 1 llh day of July, 2006. (Tr. #6 
pg-5) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
8. Whether Vehicle Burglary, a Class A Misdemeanor, under the facts of the 
instant case, literally and effectively proscribes the selfsame conduct as Burglary, a 
Second Degree Felony and it is thereby required thai the Defendant be sentenced as a 
Class A Misdemeanant, the lesser of the two punishments specified for that conduct 
5 
pursuant to Utah Law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Whether a Trailer is, pursuant to Utah Law, classified as a Motor 
Vehicle or as a Vehicle or is it variously classified as both. 
9. The Officers narrative provided in discovery specifies that the Burglary was 
of a trailer. In describing the event, as *w a trailer burglary", "both trailer..."", "the gold 
trailer...", "a trailer "up PoJe Canyon".w" Pole Canyon trailer.'" The nature of the 
Burglarized enclosure was established, in reviewing the definitions of, Motor Vehicle", 
we find the following: 
10. The Utah DMV, in specifying Vehicles to be Registered, the requirement is 
extended to: 
" All cars, snowmobiles, trailers over 750 lbs., motorcycles, boats, 
trucks, campers and off highway vehicles used in the state of Utah must be 
registered. Trailers weighing 750 lbs, or less when empty do not have to be 
registered. However, any trailer may be registered for your convenience/' 
[emphasis mine] 
(See Appendix G). 
II. In U.C.A. Section 13-14-102 (i4)u0 fcW Motor vehicle"" is defined as: 
(i) a travel trailer; 
(ii) a motor vehicle as defined in Section 41-3-102; as follows: 
(19)(a)fch Motor Vehicle" means a vehicle intended primarily 
for use and operation on the highway that is: 
(i) self-propelled; or 
(ii) a trailer, travel trailer, or semitrailer, 
(iv) a trailer as defined in Section 41-1 a-102; " [emphasis mine] 
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12. In U.C.A. Section 13-14-102 (18) u Recreational Vehicle" is defined as: "a 
vehicular unit other than a mobile home, primarily designed as a temporary dwelling for 
travel, recreational, or vacation use. thai is either self-propelled or pulled by another 
vehicle." 
(b) "Recreation vehicle: includes: 
(i) a travel trailer; 
(ii) a camping trailer; [emphasis mine]. 
13. In U.C.A. Section 13-14-102 (22) the description refers to a "Travel 
trailer/" "camping trailer/" or w% fifth wheel trailer" as meaning, a portable vehicle without 
motive power, designed as a temporary dwelling for travel, recreational, or vacation use 
that does not require a special highway movement permit when drawn by a self-propelled 
motor vehicle, [emphasis mine J. 
14. In U.C.A. Section 13-14-102 (15) the description defines a : 
" New motor vehicle'" as meaning, a motor vehicle that has never been titled or registered 
and unless the motor vehicle is a trailer, travel trailer, or semitrailer, ..."" 
[emphasis mine]. 
15. All of these definitions variously define a Motor Vehicle interchangeably as 
a Vehicle and as a trailer or camp trailer and further: in this case, the official report 
describes the burglarized units as "trailers". (See Appendix H). 
16. Based on the testimony elicited in the course of the Preliminary Hearing 
held on the 25th day of April, 2006 (Tr. #4 pg. 4-17) and upon the discovery provided to 
7 
counsel the burglarized units are defined under Utah Law as vehicles (Tr. #4 pg. 13.) 
17. Interestingly, it might be impossible for the putative burglar to determine 
whether he was committing a Felony or a Misdemeanor until all of the elements of the 
crime had been satisfied by the initial unlawful entry with the requisite intent which 
situation also raises due process concerns. In audition to the Constitutional concepi that 
persons similarly situated are entitled to like application of the laws, u is also mandated 
that all persons who desire to obey the law are entitled to notice as to how they may 
conduct themselves in conformity therewith. State vs. Musser 118 UT 537, 232 P.2d 193 
(1950). (Appendix I). 
II. When the same criminal conduct may be punished in two separate 
ways is 
Defendant entitled to, upon Motion, endure conviction and/or 
punishment only with respect to the charge imposing the lesser 
sanction. 
18. The charge against the Defendant in Count 1 of the Information #66 as 
Amended (Appendix J) reads as follows: 
''BURGLARY . a third degree felony, as follows .. (lie defendant entered or 
remained unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent to 
commit: 
(a) a felony; (b) theft;" 
19. U.C.A. 76-6-201. provides, in pertinent fact: 
(1) " Building/' in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any watercraft, 
aircraft, trailer sleeping car. or other structure or vehicle adapted for 
overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business therein and 
includes: 
(a) Each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or vehicle; 
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and 
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or vehicle. 
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person 
lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present. 
20. A case of interest in Utah, while unreported, is the Utah Court of Appeals 
opinion in State v. Cates 2000 UT APP 256 # 990402CA (See Appendix K). Cates 
appealed a conviction of burglary of a dwelling, a second degree felony, which burglary 
apparently involved a trailer which had some provision for human habitation. The court 
of appeals dealing with the issue presented in that Appeal ruled that a trailer could be, 
under Utah Law a "building and dwelling" in light of the fact that the trailer relevant to 
that case was equipped for overnight accommodation and held that the second degree 
Burglary conviction was supportable. The issue Defendant presses here was not 
addressed in the Cate ruling and was not. apparently; presented during that appeal or at 
the trial court level. 
21. The issue addressed here is whether Vehicle Burglary, a class A 
Misdemeanor, under the facts of the instant case, literally and effectively proscribes the 
selfsame conduct as that which might support a charge of Burglary, a Second Degree 
Felony and it is thereby required that the Defendant be sentenced as a Class A 
Misdemeanant, the lesser of the two punishments specified for Defendant's unlawful 
conduct under Utah Law. 
22. The Defendant would invoke the doctrine which was formulated in State 
vs. Shondel at 22 Utah 2d 343. 453 P.2d U6 (1969) (Appendix L) which doctrine 
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supports Defendants contention and thereby requiring that when two different statutory 
provisions define the same offense, a defendant may avail himself (or herself) of the 
provision imposing the lesser penalty. See also State v. Green 995 P.2d 1250, 2000. Ut. 
Case # 990281- CA. (Appendix M) The Shondei case is particularly applicable in that it 
involved two Statutes enacted with respect to rhe same classification of crimes (ie 
possession of the same drug) and which Statutes were more or less enacted 
contemporaneously and focused on subject matter which had two definitions which might 
be employed interchangeably. 
23. In support of Defendant's position that this doctrine applies let us compare 
the charges one to the other: 
UCA 76-6-202, Burglary, " ....the defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit: (a) a felony; (b) theft; and 
UCA 76-6-204, Vehicle Burglary. " ... the defendant unlawfully entered any 
vehicle with intent to commit a felony or thcii. 
24. These two offenses specified definitions within the Utah Code which mirror 
each other. Compare Utah Codes 41-3-102. 13-14-102 wherein the 
definitions of a trailer suitable for habitation provide that it is. in fact, a Motor Vehicle or 
Vehicle. In light of the facts of the instant case no amount of reflection can operate to 
distinguish the elements of the two specified crimes as other than identical and the 
statutes thus proscribe the same conduct and by conviction of a miscreant of either crime, 
10 
the conviction of the other must automatically occur. 
25. The well-established rule is that a statute creating a crime should be 
sufficiently certain in order that persons of ordinary intelligence who desire to obey the 
law may know how to conduct themselves in conformity with it. A fair and logical 
concomitant of that rule is that a penal statute must be sufficiently clear, specific and 
understandable as to the penalty imposed for its violation. The esoteric question which 
might logically be suggested, that being "whether, in contemplating a misdeed, a 
miscreant really weighs such matters?" must be left for another day. 
26. Where there is doubt or uncertainty as to which of two possible 
punishments is applicable to an offense, the Shondel doctrine mandates that an accused is 
entitled to any benefit provided by the less onerous. That opinion held that the statutes of 
the State of Utah should be "construed according to the fair import of their terms with a 
view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote Justice." This holding in Shondel 
at pg. 3 was compelled by reference to the language of U.C.A. 76-1-106 1953. 
27. In the Shondel case, the Defendant was charged and convicted of violation 
of U.C.A. 58-13a-l(16) [now repealed] (See Shondel (supra)) but could have, on the s 
same facts, been convicted of violation of U.C.A. 58-33-2 [now repealed] (See Shondel 
(supra)). Due to the uncertainty created by an overlapping of the statutes the same 
11 
situation that we see in the instant case arose.1 Because there was doubt as to which of 
the two punishments was applicable to the offense, the Utah Court held that the accused 
was entitled to the benefit of the lesser and in light thereof the Court remanded the case 
for proceedings to correct the sentence imposed. 
III. While the Defendant might be convicted of either crime, whether 
Defendant was entitled, as a matter of due process, to be punished as if 
he violated a Statute punishable as a Class A Misdemeanor. 
28. One interpretation of the cases espoused by Defendant would suggest that 
the holdings only apply as a limitation on sentencing and it might be maintained that 
although the bindover was proper and that Defendant might then be required to answer to 
the felony charge at any trial but if the verdict was adverse, Defendant was nevertheless 
entitled to relief at the time that the sentence was imposed. 
29. Defendant urges that the Trial Court should have Ordered that the bindover 
be quashed and that proceedings thereafter should have been upon misdemeanor charges 
and again refers to the fundamental fairness requirements imposed on the Prosecution by 
Utah Law UCA 76-1-2 (Supra). 
30. Defendant also notes that, as a practical matter, to proceed under a felony 
charge superimposes upon any case certain impediments to a just and speedy disposition. 
The Court might consider the civil disabilities that accompany a felony indictment as well 
as impediments to the plea negotiation process and compromise of Court resources and 
1
 Apparently the drug involved in Shondels case was subject to definitions found in each statute but 
punishment prescribed in one statute varied from and was less than the penalty imposed by the other. 
12 
judicial economy. These points suggest that a prosecution proceed on Misdemeanor 
informations as opposed to achieving the same result being governed by restricrion at 
sentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
On the facts of this case the Defendant might have been interchangeably charged 
and convicted of either Burglary or Vehicle Burglary, pursuant ro iwo different but 
equally valid provisions of the criminal law, and Defendant should therefore be entitled to 
the benefit of the lesser punishment, regardless of which crime Defendant ultimately 
stands convicted and the record of conviction enter accordingly 
espectfully Submitted, 
13 
CERTIFICATE Or SERVICE 
I certify that 1 mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT, postage prepaid, to the following listed below on the^Hrday of I 
2007. d 
J. Frederic Voros Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General. State of Utah 
160 East 300 South, 6lh Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
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ADDENDUM 
(None required) 
UTAH RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 20. Conditional Pleas 
Rule 19 
Note 2 
County, 1998, 973 P.2d 927, 353 Utah Adv. Rep. 
24. Mandamus ®=> 74(1) 
Normal abuse of discretion standard for re-
viewing actions of public officials in extraordi-
nary writ proceeding in nature of mandamus 
afforded county commission little latitude in 
conforming to requirements of statute govern-
ing ballot tides for initiatives to change form of 
county government, where statute imposed ob-
jective standard requiring that ballot tide be 
accurate, and did not allow consideration of 
whether commission attempted to be fair and 
impartial. U.C.A.1953, 17-35a-204(3); Rules 
App.Proc., Rule 19; Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 65B. 
Walker v. Weber County, 1998, 973 P.2d 927, 
353 Utah Adv. Rep. 24. Mandamus ®=» 74(1) 
Firm which had sought to exchange property 
with Board of State Lands and Forestry for 
purpose of developing it lacked standing to seek 
mandamus to challenge Board's subsequent de-
cision to lease the property due to existence of 
potential plaintiffs with a more direct interest 
where firm specifically conceded that challenge 
was not based on failure to accept the proposal, 
but on procedures used. Const. Art. 5; U.C.A. 
1953, 65-1-68; Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 65B(b)(3); 
Rules App.Proc, Rule 19. Terracor v. Utah Bd. 
of State Lands & Forestry, 1986, 716 P.2d 796. 
Mandamus <&=> 23(1) 
2.5. Bankruptcy 
Utah Supreme Court's denial of motion filed 
by Chapter 13 debtor for extraordinary writ to 
compel district court to allow her to intervene 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEbinH 
in litigation involving her sister was not voii 
having been entered postpetition while auton_ 
ic stay was in effect; order was entered no?|_ 
connection with any claim against debtor, b S 
on debtor's own motion for relief in nature of 
extraordinary writ, and did not result in'anr 
judgment, fine, or other penalty against debtorf 
In re Lundahl, 2003, 307 B.R. 233. Bankruptcy 
<3=> 2395 
2.75. Dismissal of petition 
Dismissal of petitioners' petition for extraor-
dinary relief was warranted, where the petition-
ers failed to demonstrate that the city council 
acted in bad faith when it repealed an ordi-
nance that petitioners were attempting to chal-
lenge with a referendum, and then enacted four 
new ordinances pertaining to the development 
of the same tracts of land covered by the previ-
ous ordinance. Carpenter v. Riverton City, 
2004, 103 P.3d 127, 506 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 
2004 UT 68. Courts «*=> 209(2) 
3. Review 
Standard of review, in proceeding for extraor-
dinary writ to direct district court judge to 
reinstate trial de novo of a justice court convic-
tion, was limited to whether judge regularly 
exercised his authority in dismissing appeal 
from justice court. U.C.A.1953, 78-5-120; 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 65B; Rules App.Proc, 
Rule 19. Dean v. Henriod, 1999, 975 P.2d 946, 
364 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 1999 UT App 50. Crim-
inal Law <£=» 260.11(1) 
RULE 20. HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS 
(a) Application for an Original Writ; When Appropriate. If a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus is filed in the appellate court or submitted to a justice or 
judge thereof, it will be referred to the appropriate district court unless it is 
shown on the face of the petition to the satisfaction of the appellate court that 
the district court is unavailable or other exigent circumstances exist. If a 
petition is initially filed in a district court or is referred to a district court by the 
appellate court and the district court denies or dismisses the petition, a refiling 
of the petition with the appellate court is inappropriate; the proper procedure 
in such an instance is an appeal from the order of the district court. 
(b) Procedure on Original Petition. 
(1) A habeas corpus proceeding may be commenced by filing a petition with 
the clerk of the appellate court or, in emergency situations, with a justice or 
judge of the court. An original petition and seven copies shall be filed in the 
Supreme Court. An original petition and four copies shall be filed in the Court 
of Appeals. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the respondent 
pursuant to any of the methods provided for service of process in Rule 4 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure but, if imprisoned, the petitioner may mail by 
United States mail, postage prepaid, a copy of the petition to the Attorney 
110 
EXTRAORDIMARY WRITS; HABEAS CORPUS Rule 20 
General of Utah or the county attorney of the county if imprisoned in a county 
jail. Such service is in lieu of service upon the named respondent, and a 
certificate of mailing under oath that a copy was mailed to the Attorney General 
or county attorney must be filed with the clerk of the appellate court. In 
emergency situations, an order to show cause may be issued by the court, or a 
single justice or judge if the court is not available, and a stay or injunction may 
be issued to preserve the court's jurisdiction until such time as the court can 
hear argument on whether a writ should issue. 
(2) If the petition is not referred to the district court, the attorney general or 
the county attorney, as the case may be, shall answer the petition or otherwise 
plead within ten days after service of a copy of the petition. When a responsive 
pleading or motion is filed or an order to show cause is issued, the court shall 
set the case for hearing and the clerk shall give notice to the parties. 
(3) The clerk of the appellate court shall, if the petitioner is imprisoned or is 
a person otherwise in the custody of the state or any political subdivision 
thereof, give notice of the time for the filing of memoranda and for oral 
argument, to the attorney general, the county attorney, or the city attorney, 
depending on where the petitioner is held and whether the petitioner is 
detained pursuant to state, county or city law. Similar notice shall be given to 
spy other person or an association detaining the petitioner not in custody of the 
state. 
(c) Contents of Petition and Attachments. The petition shall include the 
following: 
(1) A statement of where the petitioner is detained, by whom the petitioner is 
detained, and the reason, if known, why the respondent has detained the 
petitioner. 
(2) A brief statement of the reasons why the detention is deemed unlawful. 
The petition shall state in plain and concise language: 
(A) the facts giving rise to each claim that the confinement or detention is 
in violation of a state order or judgment or a constitutional right established 
by the United States Constitution or the Constitution of the State of Utah or is 
otherwise illegal; 
(B) whether an appeal was taken from the judgment or conviction pursu-
ant to which a petitioner is incarcerated; and 
i (C) whether the allegations of illegality were raised in the appeal and 
decided by the appellate court. 
P&3) A statement indicating whether any other petition for a writ of habeas 
gfrpus based on the same or similar grounds has been filed and the reason why 
jljief was denied. 
• g ) Copies of the court order or legal process, court opinions and findings 
l^uant to which the petitioner is detained or confined, affidavits, copies of 
•BwSJ^and other supporting written documents shall be attached to the 
Bfinon or it shall be stated by petitioner why the same are not attached. 
I l l 
Rule 20 RULES OF APPELLATE PRO££QHH 
(d) Contents of Answer. The answer shall concisely set forth specific^ 
sions, denials, or affirmative defenses to the allegations of the petition and! 
state plainly and unequivocally whether the respondent has, or at any tin^j 
had, the person designated in the petition under control and restraint and;»jl 
the cause for the restraint. The answer shall not contain citations of >fej 
authority or legal argument. 
(e) Other Provisions. 
(1) If the respondent cannot be found or if the respondent does not have the 
person in custody, the writ and any other process issued may be served upon 
anyone having the petitioner in custody, in the manner and with the same effects 
as if that person had been made respondent in the action. $q 
(2) If the respondent refuses or avoids service, or attempts wrongfully t# 
carry the person imprisoned or restrained out of the county or state after 
service of the writ, the person serving the writ shall immediately arrest the 
respondent or other person so resisting, for presentation, together with the 
person designated in the writ, forthwith before the court. 
(3) At the time of the issuance of the writ, the court may, if it appears that the 
person detained will be carried out of the jurisdiction of the court or will suffer 
some irreparable injury before compliance with the writ can be enforced, cause 
a warrant to issue, reciting the facts and directing the sheriff to bring the 
detained person before the court to be dealt with according to law. 
(4) The respondent shall appear at the proper time and place with the person 
designated or show good cause for not doing so. If the person designated has 
been transferred, the respondent must state when and to whom the transfer 
was made, and the reason and authority for the transfer. The writ shall not be 
disobeyed for any defect of form or misdescription of the person restrained or 
of the respondent, if enough is stated to show the meaning and intent. 
(5) The person restrained may waive any rights to be present at the hearing, 
in which case the writ shall be modified accordingly. Pending a determination 
of the matter, the court may place such person in the custody of an individual 
or association as may be deemed proper. 
Advisory Committee Note 
The amendments make clear that an multaneously filing the same petition in 
original writ for habeas corpus should be different courts, 
filed only in the District Court. An appli-
 T h e a m e n d m e n t s s i lify ±e 
cation to an appellate court must demon- ,
 c • c •••• ^ 
A A A, £ r *u *•*• *u dures tor service or petitions upon the 
strate on the face of the petition the una- , . r . \ . 
vailability of the District Court. Petitions respondent by incarcerated petitioners, 
that do not contain such documentation A * former ™le required service by sum-
will be summarily referred to the District mons on the respondent. The amend-
Court. The clarification seeks to halt the ments allow service on the Attorney Gen-
practice by some pro se petitioners of si- eral or county attorney by mail. 
Library References 
Courts <3»209(2). Westlaw Key Number Searches: 106k209(2); 
Habeas Corpus <3=»661, 664 to 686. 197k661; 197k664 to 197k686. 
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Rule 26. Appeals 
GENERAL PROVISIONS Rule 26 
Notes of Decisions 
In general 1 probationers who are also wanted for state 
charges, matter required appointment of special 
1 In general attorney to represent United States and the 
'Where appeal from writ of habeas corpus United States District Court for the District of 
issued by federal district judge presented an U t a h a m i c u s c u n a e - u s - v- Mernman, 19^9, 
important and serious question regarding ad- 172 F.Supp. 765, vacated 267 F.2d 378, certio-
ministering of sentencing procedures with re- rari denied 80 S.Ct. 97, 361 U.S. 844, 4 L.Ed.2d 
spect to control of federal court over federal 83. Amicus Curiae ©=> 1 
RULE 26 . FILING AND SERVICE OF BRIEFS 
(a) Time for Serving and Filing Briefs. Briefs shall be deemed filed on the 
date of the postmark if first-class mail is utilized. The appellant shall serve and 
file a brief within 40 days after date of notice from the clerk of the appellate 
court pursuant to Rule 13. If a motion for summary disposition of the appeal 
or a motion to remand for determination of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
filed after the Rule 13 briefing notice is sent, service and filing of appellant's 
brief shall be within 30 days from the denial of such motion. The appellee, or 
in cases involving a cross-appeal, the appellee/cross appellant, shall serve and 
file a brief within 30 days after service of the appellant's brief. In cases 
involving cross-appeals, the appellant shall serve and file the second brief 
described in Rule 24(g) within 30 days after service of the appellee/cross-
appellant's brief. A reply brief may be served and filed by the appellant or the 
appellee/cross-appellant in cases involving cross-appeals. If a reply brief is 
filed) it shall be served and filed within 30 days after the filing and service of 
the appellee's brief or the appellant's second brief in cases involving cross-
appeals. If oral argument is scheduled fewer than 35 days after the filing of 
appellee's brief, the reply brief must be filed at least 5 days prior to oral 
argument. By stipulation filed with the court in accordance with Rule 21(a), 
Ahe parties may extend each of such periods for no more than 30 days. A 
notion for enlargement of time need not accompany the stipulation. No such 
stipulation shall be effective unless it is filed prior to the expiration of the 
Wiod sought to be extended. 
p|b) Number of Copies to Be Filed and Served. For matters pending in the 
Supreme Court, ten copies of each brief, one of which shall contain an original 
ture, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. For matters 
in the Court of Appeals, eight copies of each brief, one of which shall 
an original signature, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Couit of 
s, Two copies shall be served on counsel for each party separately 
sented. 
nsequence of Failure to File Briefs. If an appellant fails to file a brief 
Jhe time provided in this rule, or within the time as may be extended by 
ft the appellate court, an appellee may move for dismissal of the appeal. 
?J?SVee fails to file a brief within the time provided by this rule, or within 
may be extended by order of the appellate court, an appellant may 
lt*fee appellee not be heard at oral argument. 
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Rule 26 RULES OF APPELLATE*JHU 
(d) Return of Record to the Clerk. Each party, upon the filingij 
shall return the record to the clerk of the court having custody 
these rules. 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; Aprils 
November 1, 1998.] hMi 
Cross References 
Briefs, checklist, see Rules App. Proc, Form 8. 
Library References 
Appeal and Error <&=>764, 765, 769. C.J.S. Appeal and Error §§ 6zi, 624ffe 
Criminal Law <&=>\ 130(4) 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 30k764; 
30k765; 30k769; HOkl 130(4). 
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1688. 
Notes of Decisions 
Failure to file brief 2 
Informal practice 1 
1. Informal practice 
Informal practice of "lodging" of appellate 
briefs, under which brief was submitted in in-
complete form, formally filed when completed, 
and filing date was date brief was "lodged," is 
no longer permitted in Court of Appeals. 
Hausknect v. Industrial Com'n, 1994, 882 P.2d 
683, certiorari granted 892 P.2d 13, certiorari 
dismissed as improvidently granted 938 P.2d 
248. Appeal And Error <S=> 765 
2. Failure to file brief 
Where court granted request of public defend-
er to be relieved of further participation in 
defendant's appeal, after he had reviewed rec-
ord and found no error on which reversal could 
reasonably be expected, and court then in-
formed defendant that he could file his own 
brief within 30 days, appeal would be dismissed 
at expiration of such period without filing of 
brief. State v. Montez, 1966, 17 Utah 2d 299, 
410 P.2d 764. Criminal Law <3=> 1130(4) 
Where defendant who was convicted of an 
offense was represented by public defender, de-
fendant filed notice of appeal and after reading 
record public defender informed defendant that 
there was no error in record and a copy of such 
letter was sent to the Supreme Court whereup-
on defendant was advised of public defender's 
decision and notified that if defendant desired 
to file a brief he could do so within 30 < 
no brief was filed after expiration of suchl 
appeal would be dismissed. State v. Hu 
son, 1965, 17 Utah 2d 242, 408 PJ>d: 
Criminal Law <S=> 1130(4) 
Appeal of defendant who claimed that he 1 
been coerced into pleading guilty was denik& 
where counsel appointed by court to represent 
defendant on appeal examined record and) 
ported to court that they found no evidence! 
coercion and no error which presented 
able prospect for reversal, and court < 
defendant that he could proceed in his w n 
behalf and allowed him 30 days in which to fife 
a brief, and that time had expired wilihoiat i^ 
brief having been filed. State v. Alexander 
1964, 16 Utah 2d 166, 397 P.2d 299. Criminal 
Law<3=* 1130(4) 
Failure of defendant to file brief in his own 
behalf within period allowed after he w<as noti-
fied that court-appointed attorney had reported 
inability to find error in record upon which 
attorney could hope to obtain reversal of convic-
tion necessitated dismissal of appeal. State v. 
Haynes, 1964, 15 Utah 2d 408, 393 P.2d 799. 
Criminal Law <&> 1130(4) 
Supreme Court on appeal from judgment of 
conviction will, in absence of brief by respon-
dent, reverse judgment without construing law 
(Supreme Court Rule 10). Provo City v. Para-
mount Theater Co., 1930, 75 Utah 381, 285 P. 
645. Criminal Law ®» 1130(4) 
RULE 27. FORM OF BRIEFS 
(a) Paper size; printing margins. Briefs shall be typewritten, printed or 
prepared by photocopying or other duplicating or copying process that will 
produce clear, black and permanent copies equally legible to printing, on 
opaque, unglazed paper 8 1/2 inches wide and 11 inches long, and shall be 
securely bound along the left margin. Paper may be recycled paper, with or 
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UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
13-14-102 (14)(a) (1953 as Amended) 
§ ia-14-102 COMMERCE & TRADR 
(a) the manufacturer or distributor of the new motor vehicles; 
(b) an intermediate distributor; and 
(c) an agent, officer, or field or area representative of the franchisor. 
(10) "Lead" means -the^referral by a'franchisor to a franchisee of a potential custon 
whose contact information was obtained from a franchisor's program, process, or systi 
designed to generate referrals for the purchase or lease of a new motor vehicle, or for se 
work related to the franchisor's vehicles. 
(11) "Line-make" means the motor vehicles that are offered for sale, lease, or distribution 
under a common name, trademark, service mark, or brand name of the franchisor, or^  
manufacturer of the motor vehicle. 
(12) "Mile" means 5,280 feei 
(13) "Motor home" means a self-propelled vehicle, primarily designed as a temporary 
dwelling for travel, recreational, or vacation use. 
(14)(a)/'Motor vehicle" means: 
(i) a travel trailer; 
(ii) a motor vehicle as denned in Section 41-3^-102; 
(iii) a semitrailer as defined in Section 41-la-102; 
(iv) a trailer as defined in Section 41-1&-102; and 
(v) a recreational vehicle, 
(b) "Motor vehicle" does not include a motorcycle as defined in Section 41-la-102. 
(15) "New motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle as defined in Subsection (14) that has 
never been titled or registered and has been driven less than 7,500 miles, unless the motor" 
vehicle is a trailer, travel trailer, or semitrailerr in which case the mileage limit does not 
apply. 
(16) "New motor vehicle dealer" is a person who is licensed under, Subsections 
41-3-202(l)(a) to sell new motor vehicles. 
(17T "Notice" or "notify includes both traditional written communications and atf reliablfi 
forms of,de(^nict:c^hlmunica{ion unless expressly prohibited by statute or rule. -* 
(18Xa) -"ftecreationaT vehicle" means a vehicular unit other than a mobile Tiome/prm 
designed as a temporary dwelling for travel, recreational, or vacation use, that is either i 
propelled.or pulled by.another vehicle. 
v d
 * (bf ^ Rfecr^trdiiarfehicle^mcludesr 
(i) a travel trailer; 
(ii) a camping trailer; 
Ch> armotor homer 
(iv) a fifth wheelvtraileiT and 
(v> a van. 
(19Xa) "Relevant market area," except/witn respect to. recreational vehicles, means; 
(i) the county in which a dealership is to be established or relocated; and 
XiiJ^ the g^$$&&£ Jetewile^ radjus fn>in,th£ site of the new o^r ^ ocate^§ale 
(b) "Relevant market area," with respect to recreational vehiclesvmeans:<>,qaq >to*a 
(fyti^a^tyinymichth^ # (fj 
(ii) 4he area within a 35nrnile radius from the site of ^ ,new qr^ rdoc^ te^ l dea^ ersM 
-,(20) JJ^ e^ tnuisfeiVcOi; assigns 
franchise^with .aruiyithout^nsj^^ inheritance,, .gji^ e^chapH 
lease, or license. MiM 
anyrehablaformof communication. ^  
"^TCravel trailer," "camping trailer," or "fifth wheel trailer* meaW a~ portable ^ e 
v
 i^powep designed as &t§mporaryAdwelling forr/tratfefcttcreationa^^ 
• "* > a^spedal-mghway^o^ementpe^ «* -M?ti«2i^ —. 
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UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
13-14-102 (15)(1953 as Amended) 
§ia-14-102 COMMERCE & TRADE 
(a) the manufacturer or distributor of the new motor vehicles; 
(b) an intermediate distributor; and ^ f ^ % ^ ^ . 
(c) an agent, officer, or field or area representative of the franchisor. 
(10) "Lead" means-thereferral by k-francimoBtcl ^fr^tnchisee of a potential customed 
whose contact information was obtamed from a franchisor's program, process, or systeS 
designed to generate referrals for the purchase or lease of a new motor vehicle, or for servid 
work related to the franchisor's vehicles. 
(11) "Line-make" means the motor vehicles that are offered for sale, lease, or distributioj 
under a common name,, trademark, service mark, or brand name of the franchisor, or 
manufacturer of the motor vehicle. 
(12) "Mile" means 5,280 feet 
(13) "Motor home" means a self-propelled vehicle, primarily designed as a temporary 
dwelling for travel, recreational, or vacation use. 
(14)(a) "Motor vehicle" means: 
(i) a travel trailer; 
(ii) a motor vehicle as defined in Section 41-4M02; 
(iii) a semitrailer as defined in Section 41-la-102; 
(iv) a trailer as defined in Section 41-la-102; and 
(v) a recreational vehicle, 
(b) "Motor vehicle" does not include a motorcycle as defined in Section 41-la-102. 
(15) "New motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle as defined in Subsection (14) that has 
never been titled or registered and has been driven less than 7,500 miles, unless the motor 
vehicle is a trailer, travel trailer, or semitrailer, in which case the mileage limit does not 
apply. 
(16) "New motor vehicle dealer" is a person who is licensed under. Subsection 
41-3-202(l)(a) to sell new motor vehicles. 
(17) "Notice" or "notify" includes both traditional written communications and all i 
forms of electronic communication unless expressly prohibited by statute or rule. '' ^ 
(18)(a) "Recreational vehicle" means a vehicular unit other than a mobile home/pr
 v 
designed as a temporary dwelling for travel, recreational, or vacatioiruse^ that i s either & 
propettedor pulled by another vehicle. 
(by ^Bfecr^atibnal vehicle" includes: 
(i) a travel trailer; 
(ii) a camping trailer; 
(iii) a motor home; 
(iv) a fifth wheeLtrailerr and 
(v) avan. 
(19)(a) "Relevant market area," except with7respect taTecreationaliveMcles^ineansu"*" (3 
(i) the county in which a dealership is to be estabh^ed.or jelpcated^and^i^^" 
^fi^the^r^w^thinca J^-jml^nuBusJ^ 
(b) "Relevant market area," with respect to j-ecreational vehides^means: * n -q 9$^ 
(i) the county in which the dealership isJoJt>eA^ g ( r j ' 
(ii) 4he area within a 3&-mile radius fronoTthe site ^ ^ ^ n e w ^ - r ^ o c ^ g d * " 
(20) ?Sale,traiisfer,jDrasfflgiro^^^ 
franchise^with .or
 4without>4^nsidei^tio^ ihd4dm^ULj)equ^fe j^rjtance* giftyar"^*" 
lease, or license. 
m (21)r^Serve", or;"seire^ 
anyreliablfrform of communication, " 
• (22) "Travel trailer," "camping ta^^or^^fth^wn^tiraa^ mea&^laT)arM)^ 
without motive power *: designed as as temporary dwelling foix1ravd?irecr^tbnal$ro 
use that does not require a special highway movement permit when drawn* by asel£prop 
motor vehicle. 
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UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
13-14-102 (18)(a) (1953 as Amended) 
§ 13-14-102 COMMERCE &i$m 
(a) the manufacturer or distributor of the new motor vehicles; 
(b) an intermediate distributor; and 
(c) an agent, officer, or field or area representative of the franchisor. 
(10) "Lead" means-the^refernd by ^'franchisor ta a franchisee of a potential 
whose contact information was obtained from a franchisor's program, process, or$ 
designed to generate referrals for the purchase or lease of a new motor vehicle, or iof 
work related to the franchisor's vehicles. 
(11) "Line-make" means the motor vehicles that are offered for sale, lease, or dist| 
under a common name, trademark, service mark, or brand name of the franc 
manufacturer of the motor vehicle. 
(12) "Mile" means 5,280 feet 
(13) "Motor home" means a self-propelled vehicle, primarily designed as a temjij 
dwelling for travel, recreational, or vacation use. 
(14)(a) "Motor vehicle" means: 
(i) a travel trailer; 
(n) a motor vehicle as defined in Section 41-3-102; 
(Hi) a semitrailer as defined in Section 41-la-102; 
(iv) a trailer as defined in Section 41-la-102; and 
(v) a recreational vehicle, 
(b) "Motor vehicle" does not include a motorcycle as defined in Section 41-la-102.f 
(15) "New motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle as defined in Subsection (i4)TbqBl 
never been titled or registered and has been driven less than 7,500 miles, unless the tt&l 
vehicle is a trailer, travel trailer, or semitrailer^ in which case the mileage limit doeS 
apply. • . , . , < - * ' 
(16) "New motor vehicle dealer" is a person who is licensed under/t SqtjsJS 
41-3-202(l)(a) to sell new motor vehicles. 
(17) "Notice" or "notify" includes both traditional written communications andalHSffl 
forms of electronic communication unless expressly prohibited by statute or rule. 
(18Xa) "Recreational vehicjte" meansa veMcularumt other than a mobile hom§ 
designed as a temporary dweffing for travel, TOd%at&i^^ 
propelled or pulled by another vehicle. -
(b) ^Recreatf6nar5vehicfe5iichidesr 
(i) a travel trailer; 
(ii) a camping trailer; 
(iii) a motor homer 
(iv) a fifth wheel .trailer^ and 
(v) a van. 
(19)(a) "Relevant market area," except with, respect tarecreational vehicles, means; 
(i) the county in whichfa dealership is to beestabhsbed or relocated; and 
(ii) the ;tf^/witiun t^^ the new or relocateddealegfi 
(b) "Relevant market area," with respect to recreational vehicles* means: 
(ii)4he area within a 35-mile radius from the site
 wojf;the neworreloqalefl dc 
(20) "Salejtransfer^priassignmei^fTnean&any^ 
franchise^ with .oruwithoutbffl)nsideration^ mrhidinifcaribeauestfc inheritance gift^€ 
lease, or license. 
n> (21), "Se™e";or;"seryed^1inles^ by. statute ofcxuta inc® 
any rehable f^ormlolcommunicatiQn 
(22) "Travel trailer," "camping traaer^or^^fiit^wn^'txailei^ means a pbftabli 
without mothrerpowerj: designed as a: temporary ^ dwelling for travel, recreational^ oBV |is^iiiafcdo£s^otreqiri^ drawn b^ aself^ * 
motorvehicle. 
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UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
13-14-102 (22) (1953 as Amended) 
§13-14-102 COMMERCE & TRADE 
(a) the manufacturer or distributor of the new motor vehicles; 
(b) an intermediate distributor; and 
(c) an agent, officer, or field or area representative of the franchisor. 
(10) "Lead" means^the'referral by S~franchiso£ f^e a*fr&nchisee of apotential customer 
whose contact information was obtained from a franchisor's program, process, or system 
designed to generate referrals for the purchase or lease of a new motor vehicle, or for service 
work related to the franchisor's vehicles. 
(11) "Line-make" means the motor vehicles that are offered for sale, lease, or distribution 
under a common name, trademark, service mark, or brand name of the franchisor, or 
manufacturer of the motor vehicle. 
(12) "Mile" means 5,280 feet 
(13) "Motor home" means a self-propelled vehicle, primarily designed as a temporary 
dwelling for travel, recreational, or vacation use. 
(14)(a), "Motor vehicle" means: 
(i) a travel trailer; 
(ii) a motor vehicle as defined in Section 41-&-102; 
(iii) a semitrailer as defined in Section 41-la^l02; 
(iv) a trailer as defined in Section 41-la-102; and -
(v) a recreational vehicle, 
(b) "Motor vehicle" does not include a motorcycle as defined in Section 41-la-102. 
(15) "New motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle as defined in Subsection (14) that has 
never been titled or registered and has been driven less than 7,500 miles, unless the motor 
vehicle is a trailer, travel trailer, or semitrailer, in which case the mileage limit does not 
apply. 
(16) "New motor vehicle dealer" is a person who is licensed under Subsection 
41-4£-202(l)(a) to sellnew motorvehicles. 
|y%(l^ "Notice* or."notify" includes both-traditional written communications and all reliabl| 
t i -^^^jflcafiftn unless expressly prohibited by statute or rule. 
WBBUHfc&&tmk*^-^p vehicular vad\ other than'a mobile liome, prgm^nil 
rtrav^i«aieaa8nal;,or vacationause, that is dtner stelig 
IJedioncpulled byfaiiothef vehicle. ~ 
^^tib^l^eHiae^iiicliidesr 
(i}lHravel trailer? 
(ii) a camping trailer, 
Qii^  arcriotor homer a ^  & ^ ' 
(iv>^ a fifth wheeLtrailer^ and ' 
(v) a van. 
(19)(a) "Relevant market area," except with respect tarecreational vehicles, means:! 
- (i) the county in^hich a dealership is to be established or relocated; and : ow &' 
^nVJie area^tt^ajfcn^e^ thersjteof thenewor relocatedjieale 
(b) "Relevant market area," with respect to recreational yehiclesy means: > ~v^\ 9fo#| 
(ii)4he area within a 3£-mile radius from the sit4jq£the new or-relocate^ deale 
^(20) "Sale^  transfer^p^^assigm^en^means^anydis^ 
fraachiseriwith
 ri»MW^ 
lease, or license. ^ * *» .]&% 
& (21)i£Sewe^0rj;fserv^^ 
any reliable-fonnoft^mmumcation.^ to -r^n TO Jfe &zcthsuq «t ^DH^TI rtr *xr 
• (22) "Travel trailer," "camping trailer,^  or^ "fifth^  wheel trailer* means a portable^ 
without motiverpoweg^  designed as^tmpcnrary^dweDM^ 
tisc$|&^c^^ drawnsb&ai 
motor vehicle, fe» 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
41-3-102 (1953 as Amended) 
BJTORJVEHICLE BUSINESS REGULATION ACT § 41-3-102 
1^3-35, 4 1 - 3 - 3 6 . Renumbered as §§ 41-3-506, 41-3-507 by Laws 
1992, c. 234, §§ 48, 49 
7. Renumbered as § 41-3-508 by Laws 1992, c. 234, § 50 
i.3-38. Renumbered as § 41-3-305 by Laws 1992, c. 234, § 37 
p3-39. Renumbered as § 41-3-405 by Laws 1992, c. 234, § 42 
PART 1. ADMINISTRATION 
United States Code Annotated 
jHftfyfvehicles, disclosure labels, see 15 U.S.C.A. § 1231 et seq. 
1*41-3-101. Short title 
This chapter is known as the Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act. 
Laws 1992, c. 234, § 12. 
Cross References 
Interest rates, see § 59-1-402. 
jjow speed vehicle considered vehicle, see § 41-6-117.6. 
tlew Automobile Franchise Act, see § 13-14-101 et seq. 
New automobiles, sale or transfer of ownership, see § 13-14-202. 
Termination or noncontinuance of franchise, see § 13-14-301. 
§ 41-3-102 . Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Administrator" means the motor vehicle enforcement administrator. 
(2) "Agent" means a person other than a holder of any dealer's or salesper-
son's license issued under this chapter, who for salary, commission, or compen-
sation of any kind, negotiates in any way for the sale, purchase, order, or 
exchange of three or more motor vehicles for any other person in any 
12-month period. 
(3) "Auction" means a dealer engaged in the business of auctioning motor 
vehicles, either owned or consigned, to the general public. 
(4) "Board" means the advisory board created in Section 41-3-106. 
(5) "Body shop" means a business engaged in rebuilding, restoring, repair-
ing, or painting primarily the body of motor vehicles damaged by collision or 
natural disaster. 
(6) "Commission" means the State Tax Commission. 
(7) "Crusher" means a person who crushes or shreds motor vehicles subject 
to registration under Title 41, Chapter la, Motor Vehicle Act, to reduce the 
useable materials and metals to a more compact size for recycling. 
423 
§41-3-102 MOTOKrvBnn 
(8)(a) "Dealer" means a person: 
(i) whose business in whole or in part involves selling new, used, < 
and used motor vehicles or off-highway vehicles; and 
(ii) who sells, displays for sale, or offers for sale or exchange' 
more new or used motor vehicles or off-highway vehicles in any 12-ij 
period, 
(b) "Dealer" includes a representative or consignee of any dealer. 
(9)(a) "Dismantler" means a person engaged in the business of disma^ljfi 
motor vehicles subject to registration under Title 41, Chapter la, Motor Vehicle! 
Act, for the resale of parts or for salvage. 
(b) "Dismantler" includes a person who dismantles three or more 
vehicles in any 12-month period. 
(10) "Distributor" means a person who has a franchise from a mant 
of motor vehicles to distribute motor vehicles within this state and whojiJ 
whole or in part sells or distributes new motor vehicles to dealers
 v oij Mfhp 
maintains distributor representatives. , Tjpj$ S 
(11) "Distributor branch" means a branch office similarly maintained oy 1 
distributor for the same purposes a factory branch is maintained. 
(12) "Distributor representative" means a person and each officer 
ployee of the person engaged as a representative of a distributor or distri| 
branch of motor vehicles to make or promote the sale of the distributor^ 
distributor branch's motor vehicles, or for supervising or contacting deak 
prospective dealers of the distributor or the distributor branch. n\™ 
(13) "Division" means the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division 
Section 41-3-104. , „£_| j 
(14) "Factory branch" means a branch office maintained by a per§£ 
manufactures or assembles motor vehicles for sale to distributors, »l 
vehicle dealers, or who directs or supervises the factory branch's repre 
tives. \ * 
(15) "Factory representative" means a person and each officer and emr 
of the person engaged as a representative of a manufacturer of motor vfi 
or by a factory branch to make or promote the sale of the manufactured 
factory branch's motor vehicles, or for supervising or contacting the deal™ 
prospective dealers of the manufacturer or the factory branch. L " 
(16) "Franchise" means a contract or agreement between a dealer^ 
manufacturer of new motor vehicles or its distributor or factory branc 
which the dealer is authorized to sell any specified make or makesfbf 
motor vehicles. 4vtf! 
(17) "Manufacturer" means a person engaged in the business of const 
or assembling new motor vehicles, ownership of which is customarily 
ferred by a manufacturer's statement or certificate of origin, or a pergoc 
constructs three or more new motor vehicles in any 12-month periody 
(18) "Motorcycle" has the same meaning as defined in Section 41-fe^ 
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jj(a) -"Motor vehicle" means a vehicle intended primarily for use" and 
gition on the highway that is: 
&{i) self-propelled; or 
(ii) a trailer, travel trailer, or semitrailer. 
[)) "Motor vehicle" does not include: 
4,{i) mobile homes as defined in Section 41-la-102; 
l(ii) trailers of 750 pounds or less unladen weight; and 
(iii) farm tractors and other machines and tools used in the production, 
harvesting, and care of farm products. 
20) "New motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle that has never been titled 
Registered and has been driven less than 7,500 miles, unless the motor 
able is a trailer, travel trailer, or semitrailer, in which case the mileage limit 
j§^>not apply. 
f (21) "Off-highway vehicle" has the same meaning as provided in Section 
#322-2. 
?22) "Pawnbroker" means a person whose business is to lend money on 
purity of personal property deposited with him. 
(23) "Principal place of business" means a site or location in this state: 
(a) devoted exclusively to the business for which the dealer, manufacturer, 
remanufacturer, transporter, dismantler, crusher, or body shop is licensed, 
and businesses incidental to them; 
(b) sufficiently bounded by fence, chain, posts, or otherwise marked to 
definitely indicate the boundary and to admit a definite description with 
space adequate to permit the display of three or more new, or new and used, 
or used motor vehicles; and 
(c) that includes a permanent enclosed building or structure large enough 
to accommodate the office of the establishment and to provide a safe place to 
keep the books and other records of the business, at which the principal 
portion of the business is conducted and the books and records kept and 
maintained. 
(24) ' 'Remanufacturer" means a person who reconstructs used motor vehi-
cles subject to registration under Title 41, Chapter la, Motor Vehicle Act, to 
change the body style and appearance of the motor vehicle or who constructs 
or assembles motor vehicles from used or new and used motor vehicle parts, or 
who reconstructs, constructs, or assembles three or more motor vehicles in any 
12~month period. 
(25) "Salesperson" means an individual who for a salary, commission, or 
compensation of any kind, is employed either directly, indirectly, regularly, or 
occasionally by any new motor vehicle dealer or used motor vehicle dealer to 
sell, purchase, or exchange or to negotiate for the sale, purchase, or exchange 
of motor vehicles. 
& (26) "Semitrailer" has the same meaning as defined in Section 41-la-102. 
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(27) "Small trailer" means a trailer that has an unladen weight of tnfi 
750 pounds, but less than 2,000 pounds.
 tQ g 
(28) "Special equipment" includes a truck mounted crane, cher 
material lift, post hole digger, and a utility or service body. » (j 
(29) "Special equipment dealer" means a new or new and usee 
vehicle dealer engaged in the business of buying new incomplete motor V&l 
with a gross vehicle weight of 12,000 or more pounds and installing**; 
equipment on the incomplete motor vehicle. 
(30) "Trailer" has the same meaning as defined in Section 41-la-102 
(31) "Transporter" means a person engaged in the business of 
motor vehicles as described in Section 41-3-202. *& 
(32) "Travel trailer" has the same meaning as provided in, 5^ 
41-la-102. * m 
(33) "Used motor vehicle" means a vehicle that has been titled and 
tered to a purchaser other than a dealer or has been driven 7,500
 vor| 
miles, unless the vehicle is a trailer, or semitrailer, in which case thei 
limit does not apply. 
(34) "Wholesale motor vehicle auction" means a dealer primarily^er 
the business of auctioning consigned motor vehicles to dealers or 
who are licensed by this or any other jurisdiction. 
Laws 1949, c. 67, § 2; Laws 1961, c. 80, § 6; Laws 1965, c. 81, § 1; Laws 1,9 
§ 2; Laws 1981, c. 182, § 4; Laws 1987, c. 171, § 2; Laws 1990, c. 192,,' ' 
1991, c. 153, § 2; Laws 1992, c. 1, § 179; Laws 1992, c. 234, § 13; Lav 
§ 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1998, c. 165, § 1, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 1998; Wj§ 
eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2003, c. 157, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003. 
Codifications C 1943, Supp., § 57-6-12; C 1953, § 41-3-7. 
Library References 
Licenses ®=» 16(0.5). 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 238kl6(0.5). 
CJ.S. Licenses §§ 30 to 34. 
Notes of Decisions 
Dealer 1 
1. Dealer 
Where seller and another independent used 
automobile dealer occupied same business 
premises and, at request of seller, who was 
unable to finance sale, other dealer procured 
necessary loan from finance company by sign-
ing his own name on title retention contract as 
"seller-dealer", but neither buyer of such auto-
mobile nor seller expected other dealer to as-
sume responsibility of acquiring til 
bile for buyer, second dealer uf*&£! 
or "vendor" within statutes outli^ 
such person, and could not, therefoi 
of violation of such statutes, bej 
buyer, or precluded from recovc 
er's bond, for losses suffered 
dealer failed to use proceedVofr 
acquire title to automobile for 
1943, 57-6-4, 57-6-5, 57-6-7. Eff 
1952, 121 Utah 165, 239 P.2d 74] 
26 
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§ 76-3-105 CRIMINAL CODE 
§ 7 6 - 3 - 1 0 5 . Infractions 
(1) Infractions are not classified. 
(2) Any offense which is an infraction within this code is expressly designated 
and any offense defined outside this code which is not designated as a felony or 
misdemeanor and for which no penalty is specified is an infraction. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-105. 
Library References 
Criminal Law @=>28 
Westlaw Key Number Search 110k28. 
C J S Criminal Law § 9. 
United States Code Annotated 
Petty offense defined federal crimes and offenses, see 18 U S C A § 19 
PART 2. SENTENCING 
§ 76—3-201. Definitions—Sentences or combination of sentences allowed— 
Civil penalties—Hearing 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action 
arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal 
activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, 
broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and medical 
expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for 
extradition or transportation and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, 
Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(e)(i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered 
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's crimi-
nal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
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(a) to pay a fine-
fa) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(f) to death. 
(3)(a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4)(a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court 
shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for 
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow 
the criteria and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime 
Victims Restitution Act. 
(5)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall 
order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses 
if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one count) to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor: and 
(iii) convicted of a crime, 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution ot governmen-
tal transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure 
to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c)(i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsec-
tion (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each 
defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants actually 
transported in a single trip. 
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(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 
30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of 
criminal activity in the county to which he has been returned, the court may, 
in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that the defendant 
make restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity for the 
extradition. 
(6)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall 
order the defendant to pay court-ordered restitution to the county for the cost 
of incarceration in the county correctional facility before and after sentencing 
if: 
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarcer-
ation in the county correctional facility; and 
(ii)(A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correc-
tional facility through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or 
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided 
under Section 64-13c-301 if the defendant is a state prisoner housed in a 
county correctional facility as a condition of probation under Subsection 
77-18-1(8). 
(b)(i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are: 
(A) the daily core inmate incarceration costs and medical and trans-
portation costs established under Section 64-13c-302; and 
(B) the costs of transportation services and medical care that exceed 
the negotiated reimbursement rate established under Subsection 
64-13c-302(2). 
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include 
expenses incurred by the county correctional facility in providing reason-
able accommodation for an inmate qualifying as an individual with a 
disability as defined and covered by the federal Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, including medical and mental 
health treatment for the inmate's disability. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for the court-
ordered restitution under this Subsection (6), the court shall consider the 
criteria provided under Subsections 77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through (iv). 
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity 
under Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 
76-1-304, the county shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the defen-
dant paid for costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a). 
(7)(a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or present-
ing additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed with the 
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court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to the time set 
for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition 
of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in the case, 
the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports received under 
Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by the 
prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence introduced at the 
sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons 
for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated 
by the Sentencing Commission. 
(8) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping, rape 
of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a 
child, the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the 
charge is set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the 
defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be 
sentenced to the highest minimum term in state prison. This Subsection (8) 
takes precedence over any conflicting provision of law. 
Laws 1973, c 196, § 76-3-201, Laws 1979, c. 69, § 1, Laws 1981, c 59, § 1, Laws 
1983, c 85, § 1, Laws 1983, c 88, § 3, Laws 1984, c 18, § 1, Laws 1986, c 156, § 1, 
Laws 1987, c 107, § 1, Laws 1990, c 81, § 1, Laws 1992, c 142, § 1, Laws 1993, c 
17, § 1, Laws 1994, c 13, § 19, Laws 1995, c 111, § 1, eff May 1, 1995, Laws 1995, 
c 117, § 1, eff May 1, 1995, Laws 1995, c 301, § 1, eff May 1, 1995, Laws 1995, c 
337, § 1, eff May 1, 1995, Laws 1995, 1st Sp Sess , c 10, § 1, eff April 29, 1996, Laws 
1996, c 40, § 1, eff April 29, 1996, Laws 1996, c 79, § 98, eff April 29, 1996, Laws 
1996, c 2 4 1 , §§ 2, 3 , eff April 29 , 1996, Laws 1998, c 149, § 1, eff May 4, 1998, Laws 
1999, c 270 , § 15, eff M a y 3 , 1999, Laws 2 0 0 1 , c 2 0 9 , § 1, eff April 30, 2 0 0 1 , Laws 
2002 , c 35 , § 4, eff M a y 6, 2 0 0 2 , Laws 2 0 0 3 , c 280 , § 1, eff May 5, 2003 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Laws 2002 c 35, substantially rewrote this 
section that formerly provided 
"(1) As used in this section 
"(a) 'Conviction' includes a 
"(i) judgment of guilt, and 
"(n) plea of guilty 
"(b) 'Criminal activities' means any offense of 
which the defendant is convicted or any other 
criminal conduct for which the defendant ad-
mits responsibility to the sentencing court with 
or without an admission of committing the 
criminal conduct 
"(c) 'Pecuniary damages' means all special 
damages, but not general damages, which a 
person could recover against the defendant in a 
civil action arising out of the facts or events 
constituting the defendant's criminal activities 
and includes the money equivalent of property 
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, 
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and losses including earnings and medical ex-
penses 
(d) Restitution' means full partial, 01 nomi-
nal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, 
including the accrual of interest from the time 
of sentencing, insured damages, and payment 
for expenses to a governmental entity foi extra-
dition or transportation and as further defined 
in Subsection (4)(c) 
'(e)(i) 'Victim means any person who the 
court determines has suffered pecunian dam-
ages as a result of the defendant s ci lminal 
activities 
(n) 'Victim' does not include any copartici-
pant in the defendant's criminal activities 
"(2) Within the limits prescribed by this 
chapter, a court may sentence a person convict-
ed of an offense to any one of the following 
sentences or combination of them 
' (a) to pay a fine, 
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GENERAL PROVISIONS 
which section defines the word "prisoner," does 
not set forth the crime of aggravated assault; 
although reference to such section was an obvi-
ous statutory error, in that reference should 
have been to section 76-5-102, the court was 
not empowered to reform the statutory lan-
guage. U.C.A.1953, 76-1-105, 76-5-101, 
76-5-103(1), (2)(a), 77-39-4(1). State v. Archu-
letta, 1974, 526 P.2d 911. Assault And Battery 
$» 54; Constitutional Law <®=> 70.1(10) 
§ 76-1-106 
Note 3 
3. Controlled substances 
Provision of the Controlled Substances Act 
allowing the Attorney General to add or delete 
substances from the lists of controlled sub-
stances conflicts with provision of the criminal 
code abolishing common-law crimes and pro-
viding that no conduct is a crime unless made 
so by the criminal code or by other applicable 
statute or ordinance. U.C.A.1953, 58-37-3(2), 
76-1-105. State v. Gallion, 1977, 572 P.2d 683. 
Controlled Substances <&» 6 
§ 76—1-106. Strict construction rule not applicable 
The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed shall not apply to this 
code, any of its provisions, or any offense defined by the laws of this state. All 
provisions of this code and offenses defined by the laws of this state shall be 
construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and to 
effect the objects of the law and general purposes of Section 76-1-104. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-1-106. 
Cross References 
Construction of statutes, rules of equity prevail, see § 68-3-2. 
Sentencing and Punishment <s=>12 
Statutes <3»241. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 350Hkl2; 
361k241. 
Library References 
CJ.S. Criminal Law §§ 1461, 1760 
C.J.S. Statutes §§ 376, 378 to 379. 
Research References 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
1 Substantive Criminal Law § 2.2, Interpreta-
tion of Criminal Statutes. 
Wharton's Criminal Law § 12, Interpretation 
of Statutes. 
Notes of Decisions 
Io general 1 
Instructions 2 
Sentencing 3 
tV" In general 
renal statute should be construed according 
to fair import of its terms to promote justice. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-1-106. State v. Horton, 1993, 
•48 P.2d 708, certiorari denied 857 P.2d 948. 
Statutes *=» 241(1) 
tructions 
jury, after deliberating in excess of 
requested clarification of "extreme 
J>r emotional disturbance" in man-
instruction, court's statement that 
iven the meaning jurors would give 
"»on every day use and defining 
ic, "mental," and "emotional" as 
did not cause confusion or preju-
dice defendant on theory that the phrase "ex-
treme mental or emotional disturbance" is a 
term of art which derives its meaning from 
usage and not from the individual words and 
that the definitions served no useful purpose 
and obfuscated the meaning of the term. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-1-106, 76-5-205, 
76-5-205(l)(b), 77-42-1. State v. Gaxiola, 
1976, 550 P.2d 1298. Criminal Law <S=> 863(2) 
3. Sentencing 
Statute limiting consecutive sentences re-
stricts actual time served to no more than 30 
years but does not preclude imposition of con-
secutive sentences totaling more than 30 years. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-1-106, 76-3-401, 76-3-401(4). 
State v. Horton, 1993, 848 P.2d 708, certiorari 
denied 857 P.2d 948. Sentencing And Punish-
ment <s=» 545 
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76-6-202 (1953 as Amended) 
OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY § 76-6-202 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
1 Criminal Law Defenses § 110, Property In-
trusion and Destruction Offenses-Miscella-
^ neous Defenses. 
3 Substantive Criminal Law § 21.2, Criminal 
Trespass. 
Wharton's Criminal Law § 319, With Con-
sent. 
Research References 
Wharton's Criminal Law § 322, Entry by De-
fendant's Person. 
Wharton's Criminal Law § 323, Entry by In-
strument. 
Wharton's Criminal Law § 325, In General. 
Wharton's Criminal Law § 331, In General. 
Notes of Decisions 
Building 1 
Dwelling 2 
Entry 3 
1. Building 
Defendant unlawfully entered two separate 
buildings, under U.C.A.1953, 76-6-201, defining 
"building," for purposes of burglary, where 
laundry room and apartment were separately 
secured portions of apartment building and de-
fendant unlawfully entered both of them. State 
V. Porter, 1985, 705 P.2d 1174. Burglary <£=> 4 
p ^ Dwelling 
lf.fi,Cabin lived in by owner two or three days a 
* week was a "dwelling" for purposes of convic-
tn of burglary in the second degree. U.C.A 53, 76-6-201, 76-6-202, 76-6-202(2). State £QX, 1992, 826 P.2d 656. Burglary <3=* 4 t f t l l W y occupied" within statute defining 
dwelling" for purposes of burglary statute re-
fers to purpose for which structure is used, and 
if structure is one in which people typically stay 
overnight, it fits within definition of "dwelling." 
U.C.A.1953, 76-6-201, 76-6-202, 76-6-202(2). 
State v. Cox, 1992, 826 P.2d 656. Burglary <S=> 
6 
3. Entry 
Simple passage by any part of body over 
door's threshold can amount to "entry" of resi-
dence required for offense of aggravated burgla-
ry. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-201(4), 76-6-203. State 
v Peterson, 1994, 881 P.2d 965, certiorari de-
nied 890 P.2d 1034. Burglary <©=> 9(2) 
Kick to open door which had initially been 
opened by resident was sufficient to establish 
"entry" for purposes of offense of aggravated 
burglary. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-201(4), 76-6-203. 
State v. Peterson, 1994, 881 P.2d 965, certiorari 
denied 890 P.2d 1034. Burglary <S=> 9(2) 
§ 7 6 - 6 - 2 0 2 . Burglary 
- (1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit: 
* £a) a felony; 
theft; 
fc) an assault on any person; 
lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1); 
^sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3); 
lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or 
^Voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5). 
""'4*' 
is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a 
Jn which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
r?*?0n °^ ^ s s e c t * o n i s a separate offense from any of the offenses 
sections (l)(a) through (g), and which may be committed by the 
:is in the building. 
§ 76-6-202; Laws 2001, c. 359, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2001, 
'* § 2, eff. July 5, 2001; Laws 2003, c. 325, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003. 
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Evidence as to defendant's manner of entry 
into apar tment by picking lock, lateness of the 
hour, defendant's explanation to police officers 
that they had him and what could he say, and 
totality of surrounding circumstances supported 
aggravated burglary conviction. U.C.A.1953, 
76-O-203. State v. Porter, 1985, 705 P.2d 
1174. Burglary <®=* 41(1) 
Evidence, both direct and circumstantial, ad-
mitted of no reasonable hypothesis other than 
that of guilt to warrant conviction of aggravated 
burglary. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-203(l)(c). State v. 
Isaacson, 1985, 704 P.2d 555. Burglary <&> 
41(1) 
Evidence, which established that victim suf-
fered physical pain as result of defendant's at-
tack, established the requisite "physical injury" 
required in order to support conviction for ag-
gravated burglary. U.C.A. 1953, 
76-6-203(l)(a). State v. Peterson, 1984, 681 
P.2d 1210. Burglary ®=> 41(1) 
Testimony of accomplices, corroborated by 
other evidence produced at trial, was sufficient 
to sustain convictions for aggravated robbery, 
aggravated burglary and theft, though home-
owners who were robbed could not testify that 
they were entirely certain that defendant was 
one of the men who robbed them. U.C.A.1953, 
76-6-203, 76-6-302, 76-6-404. State v. 
McCullar, 1983, 674 P.2d 117. Criminal Law 
®=> 511.1(6.1); Criminal Law e » 511.1(9) 
In prosecution for aggravated burglary, evi-
dence was sufficient to sustain conviction, in 
view of evidence indicating that defendant 
struck apartment manager in the face, thereby 
stunning manager, that defendant threatened to 
kill manager if manager did not stay away, and 
that, at time defendant was fleeing scene of 
burglary, defendant was armed with knife 
which had blade four or five inches long. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-6-203. State v. Young, 1977, 
559P.2d541. Burglary ®=> 41(1) 
10. Sentencing 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
imposing consecutive sentences for defendant's 
convictions of felony murder, aggravated bur-
glary, and aggravated kidnapping, and in im-
posing maximum sentence under dangerous 
weapon enhancement statute; defendant was 
the mastermind behind scheme to burglarize 
house, he carried gun into house and fired it, he 
had a criminal history, and he showed a lack of 
remorse for crimes he committed. U.C.A.1953, 
76-3-203(1), 76-3-401(4), 76-5-203, 76-5-302, 
76-6-203. State v. Pierson, 2000, 12 P.3d 103, 
405 Utah Adv. Rep. 53, 2000 UT App 274, 
certiorari denied 20 P.3d 403. Sentencing And 
Punishment @=> 80; Sentencing And Punish-
ment <&=> 570 
11. Judgment 
Oral judgment convicting defendant of aggra-
vated burglary, a third-degree felony, was prop-
erly corrected in subsequent written judgment 
to be aggravated burglary, first-degree felony; 
aggravated burglary as a third-degree felony 
was legal impossibility under Utah law, defen-
dant was charged with "aggravated burglary," a 
first-degree felony, and jury found him guilty of 
aggravated burglary. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-203; 
U.C.A.1953, 77-35-22(e) (Repealed). Parry v. 
State, 1992, 837 P.2d 998. Criminal Law <S=> 
996(1) 
12. Review 
Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over ap-
peal from judgment and conviction of aggravat-
ed burglary, a first-degree felony, and accord-
ingly lacked jurisdiction to certify appeal to the 
Supreme Court. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-203(2), 
78-2-2(3)(i). State v. Garcia, 1991, 805 P.2d 
199. Criminal Law <S> 1019 
Defendant who was charged and convicted of 
aggravated burglary but whose motion to enter 
judgment of conviction for next lower category 
of offense was granted by court resulting in him 
being convicted of attempted aggravated battery 
and sentenced to statutory penalty for attempted 
aggravated burglary was not entitled on appeal 
to attack constitutionality of punishment for ag-
gravated burglary. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-203(1, 2), 
76-3-402(1), 76-4-102(2), 76-6-203(1 )(c) 
State v. Harding, 1978, 576 P.2d 1284. Crimi-
nal Law <£=> 1136 
§ 76—6-204. Burglary of a vehicle—Charge of other offense 
(1) Any person who unlawfully enters any vehicle with intent to commit a 
felony or theft is guilty of a burglary of a vehicle. 
(2) Burglary of a vehicle is a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) A charge against any person for a violation of Subsection (1) shall not 
preclude a charge for a commission of any other offense. 
|Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-204. 
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76-6-404 (1953 as Amended) 
§76-6-404 CRIMINAL CODE 
§ 7 6 - 6 - 4 0 4 . Theft—Elements 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-404. 
Cross References 
Motor vehicles, unauthorized control for extended time, see § 41- la -1314. 
Library References 
Larcenv <S=>1 to 16. C.J.S. Larceny §§ 1(1) to 9, 13 to 50, 79. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 234kl to 
234U6. 
Research References 
ALR Library 
2002 A.L.R5th 19, What is "Property of An-
other" Within Statute Proscribing Larceny, 
Theft, or Embezzlement of Property of An-
other 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
13 BNA Daily Tax Report H-7, 1987, Tax 
Shelters-Investment in Movie for Purchase 
of Print Held to be Sham: No Actual or 
Honest Profit Objective was Evident in 
1981 Movie Investment Resulting in Back-
dating of Interest to 1980. 
13 BNA Daily Report for Executives H-7, 
1987. Tax Shelters-Investment in Movie for 
Purchase of Print Held to be Sham: No 
Actual or Honest Profit Objective was Evi-
dent in 1981 Movie Investment Resulting in 
Backdating of Interest to 1980. 
6 BNA Daily Report for Executives H-15, 
1987, Tax Shelters-Deductions Disallowed 
for Taxpayer's Investment in Motion Pic-
ture. 
6 BNA Daily Tax Report H-15, 1987, Tax 
Shelters-Deductions Disallowed for Taxpay-
er's Investment in Motion Picture. 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
3 Substantive Criminal Law § 19.3, Larceny-
Taking and Carrying Away. 
Wharton's Criminal Law § 383, In General. 
Wharton's Criminal Law § 408, In General. 
Notes of Decisions 
In general 1 
Accomplice testimony, sufficiency of evidence 
25 
Accomplices 3 
Admissibility of evidence 20 
Asportation 4 
Automobiles, sufficiency of evidence 26 
Defenses 5 
Due process 2 
Effective assistance of counsel 8 
Elements of offense 6 
Embezzlement 7 
Embezzlement, sufficiency of evidence 27 
Identity, sufficiency of evidence 28 
Indictment or information 15 
Instructions 23 
Intent, sufficiency of evidence 29 
Larceny 9 
Lesser included offense 10 
Livestock, sufficiency of evidence 30 
Merger of offenses 11 
Multiple offenses 12 
Partnership property 13 
Plea agreement 18 
Possession, sufficiency of evidence 31 
Presumptions and burden of proof 19 
Questions for court 21 
Questions for jury 22 
Remand 34 
Review 33 
Searches and seizures 14 
Sentencing 32 
Severance 17 
Sufficiency of evidence 24-31 
In general 24 
Accomplice testimony 25 
Automobiles 26 
Embezzlement 27 
Identity 28 
Intent 29 
Livestock 30 
Possession 31 
Venue 16 
1. In general 
Under the consolidated theft statute, there is 
only one offense of theft. U.C.A.1953, 
76-6-403. State v. Bush, 2001, 47 P.3d 69, 412 
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77-18a-l (1953 as Amended) 
CHAPTER 18a 
T H E APPEAL 
lection 
7-18a-1. Appeals—When proper. 
7-l8a-2. Capital cases. 
j 77-18a— 1. Appeals—When proper 
A (J) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of the 
fdefendant; 
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review the appellate 
Durt decides the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
[(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental 
sease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution. 
An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: 
a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony informa-
tion following a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial; 
b) an order arresting judgment; 
c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double 
ipardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
l((i) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid; 
»^ e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evidence 
upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that the appeal 
lid be in the interest of justice; 
|under circumstances not amounting to a final order under Subsection 
), a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial on a felony as charged or 
etrial order dismissing or quashing in part a felony information, when 
a^ petition for review the appellate court decides that the appeal would 
le interest of justice; 
order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or 
afest; 
^finding pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 15a, Exemptions from Death 
" in Capital Cases, that a capital defendant is exempt from a sentence 
S, when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that the 
yivould be in the interest of justice; or 
ading pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 19, Part 2, Competency for 
i* that an inmate sentenced to death is incompetent to be executed. 
vZ § 10; Laws 1995, c. 65, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995, Laws 1997, c. 364, § 1, 
£97; Laws 2003, c. 11, § 10, eff. March 15, 2003; Laws 2004, c. 137, § 1, 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Due Process Clause 
Amend. XIII UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIOJ 
Amendment XIII. Slavery abolished; enforcement ^ I 
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment 
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within 
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. 
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation. 
Historical Notes 
Proposal and Ratification Louisiana, Feb. 17, 1865; Minnesota, Feb. 23, 
This amendment was proposed to the legisla- 1865; Wisconsin, Feb. 24, 1865; Vermont Mar* 
tures of the several States by the Thirty-eighth 9, 1865; Tennessee, Apr. 7 1865- Arkansas 
Congress, on January 31, 1865, and was de- Apr. 14, 1865; Connecticut, May 4,' 1865; New 
Q I T d t A m * A £ r o c l a m a t i ^ f * e
 t
S e £ r e t a 7 ° f H a m P s " * e , July 1, 1865; South Carolina, Nov. State dated December 18, 1865 to have been
 1 3 , 1 8 6 5 ; Mah D e c 2 1 8 6 5 ^ 
ratified by the legislatures of twenty-seven of the
 0 i i n a n _ d ,«,,- 0 i ~ U " , ^ 
thirty-six States. The States which ratified this ™ D e C ; *' lS65> a n d G e o r S i a ' D e c - 6 ' 1 8 6 5 ' 
amendment, and the dates of ratification, are: T h e Legislatures of the following States rati-
Illinois, Feb. 1, 1865; Rhode Island, Feb. 2, fied m i s amendment after Dec. 6, 1865; Ore-
1865; Michigan, Feb. 2, 1865; Maryland, Feb. g°n> D e c 8, 1865; California, Dec. 19, 1865; 
3, 1865; New York, Feb 3, 1865; Pennsylvania, Florida, Dec. 28, 1865 (Florida again ratified on 
Feb. 3, 1865; West Virginia, Feb. 3, 1865; Mis- June 9, 1868, upon its adoption of a new consti-
souri, Feb. 6, 1865; Maine, Feb. 7, 1865; Kan- tution); Iowa, Jan. 15, 1866; New Jersey, Jan. 
sas, Feb. 7, 1865; Massachusetts, Feb. 7, 1865; 23, 1866; Texas, Feb. 18, 1870, Delaware' Feb. 
Virginia, Feb. 9, 1865; Ohio, Feb. 10, 1865; 12,1901; Kentucky, Mar. 18, 1976, and Missis-
Indiana, Feb. 13, 1865; Nevada, Feb. 16, 1865; sippi, Mar. 16, 1995. 
Library References 
Slaves <S=>24 CJ.S. Peonage §§ 3 to 5. 
Westlaw Topic No. 356. CJ.S. Slaves § 10. 
Research References 
ALR Library Purposeful inclusion of Negroes in grand or 
Court appointment of attorney to represent, petit jury as unconstitutional discrimination 
without compensation, indigent in civil ac- justifying relief in federal court 4 A L R 
tion, 52 A.L.R.4th 1063. Fed. 449. 
Amendment XTV. Citizenship; privileges and immunities; due process; 
equal protection; apportionment of representation; disqualification of 
officers; public debt; enforcement 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any 
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a 
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State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male 
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the 
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or 
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the propor-
tion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or 
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, 
under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an 
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a 
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any 
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the 
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, 
remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by 
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services 
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither 
the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
Historical Notes 
Proposal and Ratification 
This amendment was proposed to the legisla-
tures of the several States by the Thirty-ninth 
Congress, on June 13, 1866. On July 21, 1868, 
Congress adopted and transmitted to the De-
partment of State a concurrent resolution, de-
claring that "the legislatures of the States of 
^Connecticut, Tennessee, New Jersey, Oregon, 
Vermont, New York, Ohio, Illinois, West Virgi-
tilaTlCansas, Maine, Nevada, Missouri, Indiana, 
Minnesota, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Ne-
^Jmwka, Iowa, Arkansas, Florida, North Car-
abama, South Carolina, and Louisiana, 
j | three-fourths and more of the several 
SJOf the Union, have ratified the fourteenth 
£ of amendment to the Constitution of the 
t States, duly proposed by two-thirds of 
Jouse of the Thirty-ninth Congress: 
, Resolved, That said fourteenth article 
eclared to be a part of the Constitu-
tfUnited States, and it shall be duly 
1 as such by the Secretary of State." 
of State accordingly issued a 
oxr, dated July 28, 1868, declaring 
"""jposed fourteenth amendment had 
gby the legislatures of thirty of the 
thirty-six States. The amendment was ratified 
by the State Legislatures on the following dates: 
Connecticut, June 25, 1866; New Hampshire, 
July 6, 1866; Tennessee, July 19, 1866; New 
Jersey, Sept. 11, 1866; Oregon, Sept. 19, 1866; 
Vermont, Oct. 30, 1866; Ohio, Jan. 4, 1867; 
New York, Jan. 10, 1867; Kansas, Jan. 11, 
1867; Illinois, Jan. 15, 1867; West Virginia. 
Jan. 16, 1867; Michigan, Jan. 16, 1867; Minne-
sota, Jan. 16, 1867; Maine, Jan. 19, 1867; Ne-
vada, Jan. 22, 1867; Indiana, Jan. 23, 1867; 
Missouri, Jan. 25, 1867; Rhode Island, Feb. 7. 
1867; Wisconsin, Feb. 7, 1867; Pennsylvania, 
Feb. 12, 1867; Massachusetts, Mar. 20, 1867; 
Nebraska, June 15, 1867; Iowa, Mar. 16, 1868; 
Arkansas, Apr. 6, 1868; Florida, June 9, 1868; 
North Carolina, July 4, 1868; Louisiana, July 9, 
1868; South Carolina, July 9, 1868; Alabama. 
July 13, 1868; Georgia, July 21, 1868. Subse-
quent to the proclamation the following States 
ratified this amendment: Virginia, Oct. 8, 1869; 
Mississippi, Jan. 17, 1870; Texas, Feb. 18, 
1870; Delaware, Feb. 12, 1901; Maryland, Apr. 
4, 1959; California, May 6, 1959; and Ken-
tucky, Mar. 18, 1976. 
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Amend. XIV 
The Fourteenth Amendment originally was re-
jected by Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia. 
However, the State Legislatures of the aforesaid 
States subsequently ratified the amendment on 
the dates set forth in the preceding paragraph. 
Kentucky and Maryland rejected this amend-
ment on Jan. 10, 1867 and Mar. 23, 1867, 
respectively. 
UNITED STATES CONSTTTUTIi 
The States of New Jersey, Ohio and O] 
"withdrew" their consent to the ratification o$ 
this amendment on Mar. 24, 1868, Jan.1 15-
1868, and Oct. 15, 1868, respectively. . i j N 
The State of New Jersey expressed support for 
this amendment on Nov. 12, 1980. 
'regoj 
Cross References 
Due process guarantee, see U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. V. 
Library References 
Constitutional Law <S»209 to 320.5. 
States ®=>18. 
United States ®=>7.1, 10, 79, 85. 
Wesdaw Topic Nos. 92, 360, 393. 
CJ.S. Constitutional Law §§ 455, 462 to 464, 
466 to 467, 470, 501, 503, 513, 518, 540, 
557, 576 to 581, 585, 587, 596, 612, 614 to 
618, 700 to 762, 764 to 773, 775 to 791, 793 
to 984, 986 to 1065, 1067 to 1177, 1179 to 
1208, 1210 to 1427. 
CJ.S. Right to Die § 2. 
CJ.S. States § 6. 
CJ.S. United States §§ 9, 10, 12, 120, 123. 
Research References 
ALR Library 
Action of private institution of higher edu-
cation as constituting state action, or action 
under color of law, for purposes of Four-
teenth Amendment and 42 U.S.CA. sec. 
1983. 37A.L.R. Fed. 601. 
Civil actions removable from state court to 
federal court under 28 U.S.CA. § 1443, 159 
A.L.R. Fed. 377. 
Constitutionality, construction, and applica-
tion of statute relating to dental hygienists, 
11 A.L.R.2d724. 
Constitutionality, construction, and applica-
tion of statutory provisions respecting per-
sons who may prepare tax returns for oth-
ers, 10A.L.R.2dl443. 
Constitutionality of gender-based classifica-
tions in criminal laws proscribing nonsup-
port of spouse or child, 14 A.L.R.4th 717. 
Construction and application of sec. 902 of 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.CA. sec. 
2000h-2) authorizing United States to inter-
vene in private action for relief from denial 
of equal protection of laws under Four-
teenth Amendment on account of race, col-
or, religion, sex, or national origin, 19 
A.L.R. Fed. 623. 
Court appointment of attorney to represent, 
without compensation, indigent in civil ac-
tion, 52 A.L.R.4th 1063. 
Damage to private property caused by negli-
gence of governmental agents as "taking," 
"damage," or "use" for public purposes, in 
constitutional sense, 2 A.L.R.2d 677. 
Diluting effect of minorities' votes by adop-
tion of particular election plan, or gerry-
mandering of election district, as violation 
of equal protection clause of Federal Con-
stitution, 27 A.L.R. Fed. 29. 
Effect of use, or alleged use, of internet on 
personal jurisdiction in, or venue of, federal 
court case, 155 A.L.R. Fed. 535. 
Exclusion from municipality of industrial ac-
tivities inconsistent with residential charac-
ter, 9 A.L.R.2d 683. 
Exclusion of women from employment involv-
ing risk of fetal injury as violative of Title 
VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. 
sees. 2000e et seq.), 66 A.L.R. Fed. 968. 
Garage as part of house with which it is 
physically connected within zoning regula-
tions or restrictive covenant, 7 A.L.R.2d 
593. 
Inverse condemnation state court class ac-
tions, 49 A.L.R.4th 618. 
Mandatory maternity leave rules or policies 
for public school teachers as constituting 
violation of equal protection clause of Four-
teenth Amendment to Federal Constitution, 
17 A.L.R. Fed. 768. 
Oral communications insulting to particular 
state judge, made to third party out of 
judge's physical presence, as criminal con-
tempt, 30 A.L.R.4th 155. 
Propriety of federal court's exclusion of pub-
lic from criminal or civil trial in order to 
protect trade secrets, 69 A.L.R. Fed. 892. 
Referendum relating to low-or moderate-in-
come housing projects as constituting racial 
discrimination in violation of Federal Con-
stitution, 15 A.L.R. Fed. 613. 
Refusal to hire, or dismissal from employ-
ment, on account of plaintiff's sexual life-
style or sexual preference as violation of 
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Federal Constitution or federal civil rights 
statutes, 42 A.L.R. Fed. 189. 
Regulation of practice of photography, 7 
A.L.R.2d 416. 
Restrictive covenants, conditions, or agree-
ments in respect of real property discrimi-
nating against persons on account of race, 
color, or religion, 3 A.L.R.2d 466. 
Requirement that court advise accused of, 
and make inquiry with respect to, waiver of 
right to testify, 72 A.L.R.5th 403. 
Right of jailed or imprisoned parent to visit 
from minor child, 15 A.L.R.4th 1234. 
Same-sex sexual harassment under state anti-
discrimination laws, 73 A.L.R.5th 1. 
"State-created' danger," or similar theory, as 
basis for civil rights action under 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1983, 159 A.L.R. Fed. 37. 
Tenants' rights, under due process clause of 
Federal Constitution, to notice and hearing 
1
 prior to imposition of higher rents or addi-
tional service charges for government-
owned or government-subsidized housing, 
28 A.L.R. Fed. 739. 
Validity, construction, and application of stat-
utes or ordinances involved in prosecutions 
for transmission of wagers or wagering in-
formation related to bookmaking, 53 
A.L.R.4th801. 
Validity and construction of regulations as to 
subdivision maps or plats, 11 A.L.R.2d 524. 
Validity and construction of "right-to-work" 
laws, 92 A.L.R.2d 598. 
Validity of building height regulations, 8 
A.L.R.2d 963. 
Validity of statute, ordinance, or regulation 
forbidding granting of exclusive rights or 
franchises to, or abolishing existing exclu-
sive rights secured pursuant to outstanding 
permits for, taxicab or hack stands, 8 
v,A.L.R.2d574. 
Validity of statutory classifications based on 
population-governmental employee salary 
^fior pension statutes, 96 A.L.R.3d 538. 
^fatoh'ty of statutory classifications based on 
^Population—jury 
^*A.L.R.3d 434 
selection statutes, 97 
^Validity of statutory classifications based on 
mlation—tax statutes, 98 A.L.R.3d 1083 
Validity of statutory classifications based on 
population-zoning, building, and land use 
statutes, 98 A.L.RJd 679. 
What constitutes direct evidence of age dis-
crimination in action under Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 621 et seq.)~Post-Price Waterhouse 
cases, 155 A.L.R. Fed. 283. 
What constitutes racial harassment in em-
ployment violative of Tide VII of Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et 
seq.), 156 A.L.R. Fed. 1. 
What constitutes reverse or majority gender 
discrimination against males violative of 
federal constitution or statutes—Public em-
ployment cases, 153 A.L.R. Fed. 609. 
What constitutes reverse or majority race or 
national origin discrimination violative of 
federal constitution or statutes—Nonem-
ployment cases, 152 A.L.R. Fed. 1. 
What constitutes "an opportunity for full and 
fair litigation" in state court precluding ha-
beas corpus review under 28 U.S.C.A. sec. 
2254 in federal court of state prisoner's 
Fourth Amendment claims, 75 A.L.R. Fed. 
9 
What constitutes employment discrimination 
on basis of "marital status" for purposes of 
state civil rights laws, 44 A.L.R.4th 1044. 
What constitutes such discriminatory prose-
cution or enforcement of laws as to provide 
valid defense in state criminal proceedings, 
95 A.L.R.3d 280. 
When is supervisor's hostile environment sex-
ual harassment under Title VII of Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A § 2000e et 
seq.) imputable to employer, 157 A.L.R 
Fed. 1. 
Zoning based on size of commercial or indus-
trial enterprises or units, 7 A.L.R.2d 1007 
Zoning: change in ownership of nonconform-
ing business or use as affecting right to 
continuance thereof, 9 A.L.R 2d 1039. 
Encyclopedias 
16B Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law § 745 et 
seq. 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
50 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 449, Disqualifi-
cation of Trial Judge for Cause. 
53 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 249, Proof of 
Defense of Entrapment by Estoppel. 
lament XV. Universal male suffrage 
'<*£/;!• * The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
few£kr^Sed by the United States or by any State on account of race, 
fevious condition of servitude. 
te^The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appro-
tion. 
37 
CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
14 Amendment 
Amend. XIII UNITED STATES CON! 
Amendment XIII. Slavery abolished; enforcement 
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishmc! 
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist 
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. ^ 
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate *j 
legislation. J ?1 
Historical Notes * 
Proposal and Ratification Louisiana, Feb. 17, 1865; Minnesota, Feb. 23, : 
This amendment was proposed to the legisla- 1865; Wisconsin, Feb. 24, 1865; Vermont, Mar. 
tures of the several States by the Thirty-eighth 9, 1865; Tennessee, Apr. 7, 1865; Arkansas, 
Congress, on January 31, 1865, and was de- Apr. 14, 1865; Connecticut, May 4, 1865; New 
clared, in a proclamation of the Secretary of Hampshire, July 1, 1865; South Carolina, Nov 
State, dated December 18 1865, to have been
 13> 1 8 6 5 ; Alabama, Dec. 2, 1865; North Car-
ratified by the legislatures of twenty-seven of the
 o l i n a > D e c . 4, 1865, and Georgia, Dec. 6, 1865. 
thirty-six States. The States which ratified this _, . * • , « . . , 
amendment, and the dates of ratification, are- ^ The Legislatures of the following States rati-
Illinois, Feb. 1, 1865; Rhode Island, Feb. 2, f i e d ™s amendment after Dec. 6, 1865; Ore-
1865; Michigan, Feb. 2, 1865, Maryland, Feb g° n ' D e c- 8* 1865; California, Dec. 19, 1865; 
3, 1865; New York, Feb. 3, 1865; Pennsylvania, Florida, Dec. 28, 1865 (Florida again ratified on 
Feb. 3, 1865; West Virginia, Feb. 3, 1865; Mis- June 9, 1868, upon its adoption of a new consti-
soun, Feb. 6, 1865; Maine, Feb. 7, 1865; Kan- tution); Iowa, Jan. 15, 1866; New Jersey, Jan. 
sas, Feb 7, 1865; Massachusetts, Feb. 7, 1865, 23, 1866, Texas, Feb. 18, 1870, Delaware, Feb. 
Virginia, Feb 9, 1865, Ohio, Feb 10, 1865, 12,1901; Kentucky, Mar. 18, 1976, and Missis-
Indiana, Feb 13, 1865, Nevada, Feb. 16, 1865; sippi, Mar. 16, 1995 
Library References 
Slaves <&*24 C.J S Peonage §§ 3 to 5. 
Westlaw Topic No 356. C.J.S. Slaves § 10. 
Research References 
ALR Library Purposeful inclusion of Negroes in grand or 
Court appointment of attorney to represent, petit jury as unconstitutional discrimination 
without compensation, indigent m civil ac- justifying relief in federal court, 4 A.L.R. 
tion, 52 A.L.R.4th 1063 Fed 449. 
A m e n d m e n t X I V . Citizenship; privileges and immunities; due process; 
equal protection; apportionment of representation; disqualification of 
officers; public debt; enforcement 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any 
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial ofiBcers of a 
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Stiate, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male 
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the 
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or 
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the propor-
tion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or 
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, 
under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an 
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a 
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any 
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the 
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, 
remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by 
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services 
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither 
the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
Historical Notes 
'Proposal and Ratification 
*" .This amendment was proposed to the legisla-
tures of the several States by the Thirty-ninth 
Congress, on June 13, 1866. On July 21, 1868, 
Congress adopted and transmitted to the De-
partment of State a concurrent resolution, de-
Nanng that "the legislatures of the States of 
?Gojkmecticut, Tennessee, New Jersey, Oregon, |Verjntont, New York, Ohio, Illinois, West Virgi-
fui$@Gansas, Maine, Nevada, Missouri, Indiana, 
ta, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Ne-
Iowa, Arkansas, Florida, North Car-
ia, South Carolina, and Louisiana, 
-fourths and more of the several 
le Union, have ratified the fourteenth 
amendment to the Constitution of the 
itates, duly proposed by two-thirds of 
of the Thirty-ninth Congress: 
Ived, That said fourteenth article 
to be a part of the Constitu-
nited States, and it shall be duly 
as such by the Secretary of State." 
y.'of State accordingly issued a 
dilated July 28, 1868, declaring 
*" fourteenth amendment had 
ihej legislatures of thirty of the 
bfrth  
louse 
IrJtesolv 
thirty-six States. The amendment was ratified 
by the State Legislatures on the following dates: 
Connecticut, June 25, 1866; New Hampshire. 
July 6, 1866; Tennessee, July 19, 1866; New 
Jersey, Sept. 11, 1866; Oregon, Sept. 19, 1866; 
Vermont, Oct. 30, 1866; Ohio, Jan. 4, 1867; 
New York, Jan. 10, 1867; Kansas, Jan. 11. 
1867; Illinois, Jan 15, 1867; West Virginia. 
Jan 16, 1867, Michigan, Jan. 16, 1867; Minne-
sota, Jan. 16, 1867; Maine, Jan. 19, 1867; Ne-
vada, Jan. 22, 1867; Indiana, Jan. 23, 1867; 
Missouri, Jan. 25, 1867; Rhode Island, Feb. 7. 
1867; Wisconsin, Feb. 7, 1867; Pennsylvania. 
Feb. 12, 1867; Massachusetts, Mar. 20, 1867; 
Nebraska, June 15, 1867; Iowa, Mar. 16, 1868. 
Arkansas, Apr. 6, 1868; Florida, June 9, 1868; 
North Carolina, July 4, 1868; Louisiana, July 9. 
1868; South Carolina, July 9, 1868; Alabama. 
July 13, 1868; Georgia, July 21, 1868. Subse-
quent to the proclamation the following States 
ratified this amendment: Virginia, Oct. 8, 1869. 
Mississippi, Jan. 17, 1870; Texas, Feb. IS. 
1870; Delaware, Feb. 12, 1901; Maryland, Apr. 
4, 1959; California, May 6, 1959; and Ken-
tucky, Mar. 18, 1976. 
35 
Amend. XIV UNITED STATES CONS 
The Fourteenth Amendment originally was re-
jected by Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia. 
However, the State Legislatures of the aforesaid 
States subsequently ratified the amendment on 
the dates set forth in the preceding paragraph. 
Kentucky and Maryland rejected this amend-
ment on Jan. 10, 1867 and Mar. 23, 1867, 
respectively. 
The States of New Jersey, Ohio and w ^ 
"withdrew" their consent to the ratification* 
this amendment on Mar. 24, 1868, JariM 
1868, and Oct. 15, 1868, respectively.', ^ {ft 
The State of New Jersey expressed supporffor; 
this amendment on Nov. 12, 1980. 
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M53 78-12-25.5; Const. Art 1, § 11. Klatt v. 
Somas 1990, 788 P.2d 510. Appeal And Error 
TllWl) 
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12. [Rights of accused persons] 
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
id in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
jfccusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
^confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
ggmei the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
* [by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
ive been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
u
4any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
aey,or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
Impelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
"**" ~& against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
jibe twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
(ibrethe defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
^ ^of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause 
fess otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
Seethe use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in 
arrin part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause 
raiy pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
$te discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
$9A, SJ.R. 6, § 1, adopted at election Nov. 8, 1994, eff. Jan. 1, 1995. 
* f f^ 
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APPENDIX A 
Commitment, Judgment and Order of Restitution 
FIRST DISTRICT - RICH 
RICH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACOB ALLEN WEBB, 
Defendant, 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051100067 FS 
Judge: CLINT S. JUDKINS 
Date: October 24, 2006 
PRESENT 
Clerk: beckyp 
Prosecutor: PRESTON, GEORGE W 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LAURITZEN, ARDEN W 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: October 16, 1987 
Audio 
Tape Number: 102406 
CHARGES 
1. BURGLARY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 10/24/2006 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) The 
total time suspended for this charge is day(s). 
Credit is granted for 49 day(s) previously served. 
Page 1 
Case No: 051100067 
Date: Oct 24, 2006 
$800. 
$0 
$381, 
$800, 
Plus 
,00 
,08 
,00 
Interest 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $800,00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $381.08 
Due: $800.00 
Total Fine: 
Total Suspended: 
Total Surcharge: 
Total Principal Due: 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Complete alcohol and/or drug counseling - pay all fees.and file 
notice of completion with the Court. 
Consume or possess no alcohol/drugs - frequent no places alcohol 
served or consumed including bars, parties, liquor store. 
Violate no laws-
Submit to random search and seizure. 
No association with known criminals. 
Keep Court informed of current address while on probation. 
Defendant will enter into agreement with Probation and abide by all 
terms and conditions. 
Defendant is to be profitably engaged at all times. 
Defendant to have a minimum of 2 substance abuse contacts per week 
Defendant to complete a Theft course per Probation Officer 
Defendant to pay restitutuion in the amount of $1065.00 
After Defendant has served 60 days in Jail he may have work release 
for remainder of Jail time. 
Dated this day of / 20 , 
CLINT S. JUDKINS 
District Court Judge 
Page 2 (last) 
APPENDIX B 
Amended Notice of Appeal 
A.W.LAURITZEN(1906) 
Attorney at Law / Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 753-3391 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF RICH, STATE OF UTAH 
) 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JACOB ALLEN WEBB, 
Defendant. ) 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No 051100067 FS 
Judge Clint S Judkins 
Pleat take notice that the Defendant Appeals the Judgement of conviction and Sentence 
entered in the District Court for Rich County on the 29th day of November, 2006 to the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to the Utah Rules of appellate Procedure. 
Dated the of December, 2006 
1 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, AMENDED 
NOTICE OF APPEAL, postage prepaid, to the following listed below on the of 
December, 2006. 
/l/UiW 
George Preston, Esq. 
P.O Box 402 
Randolph, UT 84064 
2 
APPENDIX C 
State vs. Peterson, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991) 
4)4/04/91 STATE UTAH v. BRYON DALE PETERSEN 
[ 1 ] SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
[2] No. 900180 
[3] 1991.UT.64 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 810 P.2d 421, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 
[4] April 4, 1991 
[5] STATE OF UTAH, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, 
v. 
BRYON DALE PETERSEN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
[6] Keith H. Chiara, Price, and Allen S. Thorpe, Castle Dale, for defendant. 
[7] R. Paul Van Dam, Dan R. Larsen, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
[8] Hall, Chief Justice. Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice, J. Daniel Stewart, Justice, 
Christine M. Durham, Justice, Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice, concur. 
[9] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hall 
[10] FACTS. - Peterson was charged with additional crimes while in a Utah prison. 
[11] PROCEEDINGS. - He filed a notice and request for Disposition of pending charges on July 
12, 1989; however, he was not tried within 120 days of filing the notice for Disposition. His 
motion to dismiss was denied, and he was convicted. He appealed. 
[12] RESULT. - Reversed and dismissed. Per Hall; all concur. 
[13] HELD. - UCA 77-29-1(1) required dismissal of the charges. Peterson did not waive his 
right to dismissal by failing to object to the trial date. Good cause lor a continuance was not 
shown. 
[14] Defendant Bryon Dale Petersen appeals his convictions of aggravated burglary, *fnl a first 
degree felony; of two counts of attempted second degree murder, *fn2 both second degree 
felonies; *fn3 and of being a habitual criminal. *fn4 
On July 6, 1989, Petersen was charged with burglarizing the home of Ms. Lola Jewkes and 
attempting to murder Ms. Jewkes and her daughter. Petersen, having been previously 
convicted and sentenced to prison lor Iclonv oi tenses, at least one ol which was a second 
degree felony, was also charged with possession ot a firearm by a prohibited person *fn5 
and with being a habitual criminal. On July 12, 1989, Petersen, who was being held at the 
Utah State Prison pending a parole revocation hearing, filed a notice and request for 
Disposition of pending charges ("notice of Disposition"), pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-
29-1 (Supp 1989). The notice of Disposition was filed with an authorized agent of the Utah 
State Prison. Section 77-29-1(2) requires that any custodial officer, upon receipt of a notice 
of Disposition, "shall immediately cause the demand to be forwarded... to the appropriate 
prosecuting attorney and court clerk." Section 77-29-1(1) states that a prisoner is "entitled 
•to have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice." 
The Emery County Attorney recened a copy of the notice of Disposition However, for 
unknown reasons, no copy ol the nonce was lound in the trial couu's file. 
On July 27, 1989, the Emery County Public Defender was appointed to represent Petersen. 
Petersen was arraigned on September 6, 1989, and at the arraignment, requested that the 
court appoint different counsel because of Petersen's dissatisfaction with the public 
defender's handling of his case. Petersen's request for new counsel was denied, and without 
objection, trial was set for February 15, 1990, 218 days after Petersen filed the notice of 
Disposition. 
On January 5, 1990, Petersen's appointed counsel sought to withdraw from the case, 
claiming that he was not able to resolve continuing conflicts with his client. On January 12, 
1990. the trial Judge denied the motion to withdraw and appointed co-counsel. When 
Petersen's new defense counsel learned that Petersen had filed a notice of Disposition, a 
motion to dismiss was filed on the ground that Petersen was not brought to trial within 120 
days of the delivery of the notice. On February 15, 1990, a hearing was held and the motion 
to dismiss was denied. 
In dismissing the motion, the trial court found- (1) The county attorney had received the 
notice of Disposition, but the court had lcccived no notice whatsoever. (2) The court asked 
Petersen whether the trial date was acceptable, and Petersen did not object to the date. (3) 
The trial date was set to allow time tor defendant and his counsel to resolve their 
differences. (4) Petersen, as a result of having his parole revoked, has been incarcerated in 
the Utah State Prison since the filing of the charges. In its Conclusions of law, the trial court 
ruled: (1) The setting of the trial date for February 15, 1990, occurred within the 120-day 
period and was for the purpose of allowing time for Petersen and his counsel to resolve their 
differences and, therefore, constituted a continuance for good cause. (2) Petersen waived 
the statutory right to a trial within 120 days by not objecting to the trial date. (3) Petersen 
had the burden of showing that the failure to try his case before the expiration of the 
statutory period resulted in prejudice to his case or tactical advantage to the prosecutor. (4) 
Petersen made no showing of prejudice or tactical advantage. (5) The delay was not caused 
by any action or inaction of the prosecutor 
[19] On February 15, 1990, the date of the trial, Petersen moved to disqualify the trial Judge on 
the ground that the Judge had previously, as a district attorney, prosecuted defendant and 
had recused himself from presiding over a trial of defendant in December of 1981. The 
court denied this motion on the ground that it was not timely made. 
[20] The aggravated burglary charge and the two attempted murder charges were tried to a jury 
on February 15 and 16. The jury returned a \cidict of guilty on all counts. Following the 
verdict, defendant waived a jury trial on the charge of being a habitual criminal. The court 
subsequently found defendant guilty of this charge. The charge of unauthorized possession 
of a handgun was dismissed. Petersen was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than five years nor more than life on each one of the four charges, such terms to run 
consecutively. 
[21] There are three issues presented on appeal. First, Petersen claims that all his convictions 
should be reversed and all charges dismissed with prejudice due to the State's failure to 
bring him to trial within 120 days of the date on which the notice of Disposition was 
delivered to the county attorney. Second. Petersen claims that if this court does not dismiss 
the charges, he is entitled to a new trial on the grounds of bias and prejudice on the part of 
the trial Judge. Third, the State, on its own motion, asserts that Petersen was improperl> 
sentenced and asks that the case be remanded for resentencing. Icfn6 
[22] Petersen's claim that his convictions should be reversed and the charges against him 
dismissed with prejudice is based on section 77-29-1, *fn7 which reads in pertinent part: 
[23] (1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison... and there is 
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and the 
prisoner shall cause to be delivered to the warden... or any appropriate agent of the same, a 
' written demand specifying the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and 
requesting Disposition of the charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge brought to trial 
within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
[24] 
[25] (3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1). the prosecuting attorney 
or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in open court, with the prisoner or his 
counsel being present, may be granted anv leasonable continuance. 
[26] (4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within such 
continuance as has been granted, and the defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the 
action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that the failure of the 
prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the time required is not supported by 
good cause, whether a previous motion for continuance was made or not. the court shall 
order the matter dismissed with prejudice. 
[27] The threshold issue, in determining whether Petersen's com ictions should be reversed 
pursuant to section 77-29-1. is whether the inal court erred in ruling that Petersen \\ai\ed 
his rights under the statute by not objecting to the tnal date. Whether criminal defendants, 
after filing notices of Disposition, are required to affirmatively assert their rights under 
section 77-29-1 is a question of statutory construction and. therefore, a question of law. 
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. *fn8 
[28] This court has held that criminal defendants have no such duty to object under Utah Code 
Ann. $§ 77-65-1 to -2 (Supp. 1953) (amended 1980), the predecessor to section 77-29-1. 
*fn9 In so holding, we stated. "It is apparent that the legislature intended to place the 
burden of complying with the statute on the prosecutor." ! fn 10 The language m section 77-
29-1 compels the same Conclusion Section 77-29-] (4) states. "If the court finds that the 
failure of the prosecuting attornej to ha\e the matter heard within the time required is not 
supported by good cause... the court shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice." *fnl 1 
This language clearly places the burden of complying with the statute on the prosecutor. 
Therefore, Petersen, after filing his notice of Disposition, was not required to object to the 
trial date in order to maintain his rights under section 77-29-1. 
[29] Since Petersen did not waive his rights, the determination of whether his convictions should 
be re\ersed is dependent on whether, m accoidance with section 77-29-1(3). a "reasonable 
continuance" was granted loi "good cause shown" or whethei. in accoi dance with section 
77-29-1(4), the trial Judge properly found that the "failure ol the prosecuting attorney to 
have the matter heard within the time required is supported by good cause." Before reaching 
these questions, however, it is important to note that we have interpreted both section 77-
29-1 and its predecessor as granting discretion to the trial court. *fnl 2 Specifically, in State 
v. Bonny *fnl3 we held that sections 77-65-1 to -2 (1953) (amended 1980) granted trial 
courts the authority to make reasonable determinations concerning the existence of good 
cause. 
[30] "For a good cause shown in open couri ine court ha\ mg jurisdiction m the matter may 
grant an) necessary or reasonable continuance " The emphasized language ol the statute 
just quoted makes it clear that if there is a reasonable basis in the record to support the 
proposition that the trial court granted a continuance "for good cause shown" it was within 
[the trial court's] discretion and authority to do so. * fill 4 
[31] In stating this standard of review7, the court relied on language that is consonant with the 
language of section 77-29-1(3); accordingly, the same standard should apply to the present 
statute. Although the predecessor to section 77-29-1 did not have a provision parallel to 
section 77-29-1(4). the decision not lo dismiss under section 77-29-1(4) is based on a 
finding of "good cause." as is the decision to giant a continuance undei section 77-29-1(3). 
Therefore, the same standard of review should be applied to both subsections 77-29-1(3) 
and (4). *fhl5 
Before reviewing the record to determine if there is a reasonable basis for the trial court's 
judgment, however, it is necessary to make primary determinations concerning the content 
of the record. It is to be noted that trial courts do not have discretion to misappK the law. 
* fill 6 Therefore, legal determinations concerning the proper interpretation of the statute 
which grants the trial court discretion aie re\ ie\\ed for correctness • tn 17 SimilarK, the trial 
court's factual determinations will not be disturbed unless clearl} erroneous. : fill8 It is only 
after these pnmar\ determinations are made that the record can be icuewed for the 
existence of a leasonable basis tor the pioposition that good cause existed toi the 
continuance or the delay 
The record supports the trial court's factual findings. In its Conclusions of law, however, the 
•trial court erred in rulings concerning the correct interpretation and application of section 
77-29-1. Specifically, the trial court ruled that under section 77-29-1. Petersen had the 
burden of pro\ ing that the delay prejudiced his case or ga\e the prosecution a tactical 
advantage. Although the fact that the delay works to the disadvantage ol a defendant may 
be a reason for not finding "good cause." nothing in section 77-29-1 its predecessor, or any 
of the case law under either statute lequires a slum ing of prejudice in order for the charges 
against a defendant to be dismissed. On the contrary section 77-29-1 clearl} pro\ides that if 
there is not good cause for the dela\. the court shall order the matter dismissed. The statute 
makes no mention of the effect of the delay. The only support the State cites for the trial 
court's position is a case dealing with the constitutional right to a speed} trial. *fnl9 
However, we have never used the same approach in cases decided under section 77-29-1 or 
its predecessor as we have used in constitutional cases. *fn20 The Conclusion that Petersen 
did not carry his burden of showing prejudice, therefore, cannot be used to support the 
finding of good cause. 
It is also to be noted that the trial court eircd in ruling that a reasonable continuance was 
granted tolling the statuton period. Section 77-29-1(3) sets out lequuements that must be 
met before trial Judges, in their discretion, ma} grant continuances that toll the time in 
which a defendant must be tried under section 77-29-1. This section pro\ides that "the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel... ma} be granted any reasonable 
continuance." It is clear from the record that neither of the attorneys nor defendant 
requested or was granted a continuance. The requirements of the statute not being met, the 
trial court erred in concluding that a continuance was granted under section 77-29-1(3). 
This fact, however, is not fatal to State's ca ,c. Section 77-29-1 (4) slates that if a motion to 
dismiss is brought, the trial court shall re\ ie\\ the proceedings. "If the court finds that the 
failure of the prosecuting attorne\ to ha\e the matter heard within the time required is not 
supported b\ good cause, whether a previous motion for continuance was made or not. the 
court shall order the matter dismissed w ith prejudice." This language makes it clear that it is 
the finding of good cause that is disposithe and not the actual granting of a continuance. 
The court did find that there was good cause for the dela> in that the trial was set to allow 
time for defendant and his counsel to resolve their differences. The finding of good cause is 
also supported by the court's Conclusion that the delay was not caused b} an action or 
inaction of the prosecutor. 
[36] As the State points out. this court has upheld trial court findings of good cause that were 
supported, at least in part, by the tact that the delay was not caused by action or inaction of 
the prosecutor ' fn21 However, this factor alone has nevei been considered dispositive. In 
the past, we have reversed a trial court's decision not to dismiss, notwithstanding the fact 
that the delay was not caused by the prosecutor. A fii22 Furthermore, in the cases cited by 
the State, there are other reasons for the finding of good cause, such as a request on the part 
of the defense for a continuance *fn23 and/or a relatively short delay caused by unforeseen 
problems arising immediately prior to trial. ' fn24 In any event, to hold that good cause is 
supported by the lone fact that the delay was not caused b> the prosecutor would contradict 
the language in section 77-29-1 (4) which places the burden of complying with the statute on 
the prosecution. 
[37] It is necessary, therefore, to examine the trial court's Conclusion that the delay was 
reasonable because it was for the specific purpose of allowing defendant and his counsel 
time to resolve their conflicts. In some encumstances, conflicts between defendants and 
their counsel may justify delay. It is to be noted, however, that in the instant case the trial 
court became aware of the problems 57 days after the notice of Disposition was filed. 
Arguably, this problem could have been resolved within the time allotted by the statute. 
Indeed, a review of the record makes it clear that the trial Judge did not feel that such a 
delay was necessary. When Petersen's counsel, due to continuing conflicts, sought to 
withdraw 34 days prior to trial, the court denied the motion, appointed co-counsel, and did 
not continue the trial. In the order appointing co-counsel, the court stated that it did "not 
wish to dela) the trial because of an) such conflict" Since a dela> was not necessar) to 
resolve the conflict 34 days before the date oi trial, a fortiori, a delay was not necessary to 
resolve the conflict approximately 63 days before the running ot the statutory period. *fn25 
[38] It should also be noted that there was a long delay inasmuch as the trial date was set for 218 
days beyond the time defendant filed the notice of Disposition. Given the fact that the 
record reveals that the trial court felt the delay was unnecessary, such a long delay cannot 
be considered reasonable. The Conclusion that the delay was for the purpose ot allowing 
time foi defendant and his counsel to icsol\c their conflicts, therctoie. cannot be used to 
support a reasonable basis foi the fmdintz oi good cause 
[39] The State contends that in State v. Bullock, ' fn26 this court upheld a finding of good cause 
under similar facts. Bullock, however, is easily distinguishable from the instant case. First, 
in Bullock the defense counsel moved for a continuance because he was ill on the date of 
trial. *fn27 In the instant case, there was no motion for a continuance and the conflict did 
not arise shortly before trial. Second, in Bullock the continuance only delayed the trial 13 
days beyond the original trial date. 'I:fn28 In the instant case, the trial was delayed over 90 
days from the running of the statutory period A review of the proceeding, therefore, does 
not reveal a reasonable basis for the finding oi good cause Accordingly, pursuant to section 
77-29-1, Petersen's convictions should be icvcrsed and the charges against him dismissed 
with prejudice 
[40] Due to our holding regarding section 77-29-1. we do not reach the other issues in the case. 
However, we feel compelled to again comment on the propriety of trial Judges' presiding 
over criminal trials when they have pre\iousl\ prosecuted the defendants. In State \ . 
Neeley. *fn29 a case that also dealt with a Judge who presided over a trial of a defendant 
whom he had previously prosecuted, we stated: 
[41 | Judge should recuse himself when nis iinparuahn" might reasonanh be questioned. Utah 
Code of Judicial Conduct 3(C)( 1 )(b) (1981) I his standard set lorth b\ the Code of Judicial 
Conduct should be given caretul consideration b\ the trial Judge. It ma) require recusal in 
instances where no actual bias is shown.... The integrity of the judicial sjstem should be 
protected against any taint of suspicion.. We recommend the practice that a Judge recuse 
himself where there is a colorable claim of bias or prejudice.... *fn30 
[42] We went on to hold that although Judges should recuse themseh es if there are colorable 
claims of bias or prejudice, absent a showing of actual bias, "failure to do so does not 
constitute reversible error as long as the leuuirements ot section 77-15-29 [current version 
at Utah R. Crim. P. 29J have been met" • ln3 I 
[43] The instant case, however, is more troubling than Neeley. In this case, the trial Judge, upon 
receiving the affidavit alleging prejudice, did not have a second Judge rule on the legal 
sufficiency of the affidavit as required by rule 29(d). but summarily dismissed the motion 
on the ground that it was untimely. We are aware of the problems that arise when motions 
to disqualify are filed the da\ of trial and stress that we are not deciding the issue of 
whether the requirements of rule 29 must be complied with under such circumstances. 
However, because the motion to disqualify was summarih dismissed, we are without a 
record sufficient to enable us to determine whether the affida\ it was filed "as soon as 
practical" and "in good faith" as required b\ uile 29(c). It is also to be observed that, 
assuming the trial Judge was aware of his prior contact with Petersen, the problem could 
have been avoided had the Judge followed our recommendation in Neeley and, on his own 
motion, recused himself due to the colorable claim of prejudice. 
[44] Pursuant to our holding regarding section 77-29-1. the convictions are re\ersed and the 
charges are dismissed with prejudice. 
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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF RICH, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
JACOB A. WEBB 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO QUASH BINDOVER 
Case No.051100066 & 67 
Judge Judkins 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In Information # 051100067 the Defendant was charged on the 6th day of 
December 2005 with two counts of Criminal conduct alleged to have occurred on the 21st day of 
October, 2005 as follows-
Count J: Burglary in violation of Utah Code Annotated 76-6-202 and 
Count 2: Theft in violation of Utah Code Annotated 76-6-404 
2. In Information # 051100066 the Defendant was charged on the 6,h da\ of 
December, 2005 with one count of Criminal conduct occurring on the 21s! day of October, 2005 
as follows: 
Count I: Vehicle Burularv in violation of Utah Code Annotated 7<>-(>-204 
3. A Preliminary Hearing was had on the 25!h day of April 2006 and the Defendant 
was bound over with regard to count one in case # 051100067; the objection to the Bindover by 
Defendant was overruled and this Motion follows. 
ISSUES 
I. Whether a Trailer is, pursuant to Utah Law, classified as a Motor Vehicle or 
as a Vehicle or is it variously classified as both. 
II. When the same criminal conduct may be punished in two separate ways is 
Defendant entitled to, upon Motion, endure conviction and punishment only 
with respect to the charge imposing the lesser sanction. 
III. Whether, at this juncture, Defendant is entitled to quashal of the bindover or 
whether Defendant might, more appropriately, reserve his claim for relief 
and present it at sentencing, if a conviction occur. 
DISCUSSION 
I. Whether a Trailer is, pursuant to Utah Law, classified as a Motor Vehicle or 
as a Vehicle or is it variously classified as both. 
4. Aside form the yet to be answered question as to which of the .specified vehicles 
are referred to in the information ending in 66 and which of the specified vehicles are referred lo 
in the information ending in 67 we note that the Officers narrative provided in discovery 
specifies that the Burglary was of a trailer variousK*. in describing the event, as *" a trailer 
burglary", "both trailer...", "the gold trailer...".bk a trailer "up Pole Canyon". ** Pole Canyon 
trailer.", in reviewing the definitions of. " Motor Vehicle", we find the following: 
5. The Utah DMV. in specifying Vehicles to be Registered, the requirement is 
extended to: 
" All cars, snowmobiles, trailers over 750 lbs., motorcycles, boats, trucks, 
campers and off highway vehicles used in the state of Utah must be registered. 
Trailers wcisihinn 750 lbs, or less when empty do not have to be registered. 
However, any trailer may be registered for your convenience."" [emphasis minej 
(See Exhibit A attached). 
6. In U.C.A. Section 13-14-102 (14)(a) " Motor vehicle" is defined as: 
(i)a travel trailer; 
(ii) a motor vehicle as defined in Section 41-3-102; as follows: 
(I9)(a) " Motor Vehicle" means a vehicle intended primarily 
for use and operation on the highway that is: 
(i) self-propelled; or 
(ii) a trailer, travel trailer, or semitrailer, 
(iv) a trailer as defined in Section 41-la-102: " and [emphasis mine] 
(A copy of the statute is attached as Exhibit B). 
7. In U.C.A. Section 13-14-102 (18)(a) " Recreational Vehicle" is defined as: tha 
vehicular unit other than a mobile home, primarily designed as a temporary dwelling for travel. 
recreational, or vacation use, that is either self-propelled or pulled by another \ehicle." 
(b) "Recreation vehicle: includes: 
(i) a travel trailer; 
(ii) a camping trailer: (emphasis mine] (A copy of the statute is attached 
as Exhibit B). 
8. In U.C.A. Section 13-14-102 (22) the description refers to a "Travel trailer/* 
"camping trailer." or " fifth wheel trailer" as meaning, a portable vehicle without motive 
power, designed as a temporal*} dwelling for travel, recreational, or vacation u.se that does not 
require a special highway movement permit when drawn by a self-propelled motor \ chicle, 
[emphasis mine] (A copy of the statute is attached as Exhibit B). 
9. In U.C.A. Section 13-14-102 (15) the description defines a : 
" New motor vehicle" as meaning, a motor vehicle that has never been titled or registered and 
unless the motor vehicle is a trailer, travel trailer, or semitrailer. ..." 
(emphasis mine| (A copy of the statute is attached as Exhibit B). 
.i 
10. All of these definitions variously define a Motor Vehicle interchangeably as a 
Vehicle and as a trailer or camp trailer and further; in this case, the official report describes the 
burglarized units as "trailers". (See copies of official narratives attached here to as Exhibit C). 
11. Based on the information provided in the course of the Preliminary Hearing the 
25th day of April and upon the discovery provided to counsel all of the burglarized units are 
defined under Utah Law as vehicles. 
11. When the same criminal conduct may be punished in two separate ways is 
Defendant entitled to, upon Motion, endure conviction and punishment only 
with respect to the charge imposing the lesser sanction. 
12. The charge against the Defendant in Count 1 of the Information ending in "67" 
is detailed as follows: 
"BURGLARY , a third degree felony, as follows ... the defendant entered or 
remained unlawfully in a building or any portion ofa building with intent to 
commit: 
(a) a felony: (b) theft;" 
13. U.C.A. 76-6-201. provides, in pertinent fact: 
(1) " Building/* in addition to its ordinary meaning, means an\ watercraft, aircraft, 
trailer, sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight 
accommodation of persons or for carrying on business therein and includes: 
(a) Each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or vehicle; and 
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structuie or vehicle. 
(2) "Dwelling** means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging 
therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present. 
14. A case of interest in Utah, while unreported, is the Utah Court o\ Appeals opinion 
in State v. Cates 2000 UT APP 256 # 990402CA (a copy ol which is attached as hxhibit D) 
Cates appealed a conviction ofhurglan ofa dwelling, a second degree felony, which burglary 
apparently involved a trailer which had some provision for human habitation. The court of 
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appeals dealing with the issue presented in that Appeal ruled that a trailer could be, under Utah 
Law a "building and dwelling1* in light of the fact that the trailer relevant to that case was 
equipped for overnight accommodation and held that the second degree Burglary conviction was 
supportable. The issue Defendant presses here was not addressed in the Cate ruling and was not, 
apparently; presented during the appeal or at the trial court level. 
15. fThe%sire*W€Wddl1gg^ere is whether Vehicle Burglary, a class A Misdemeanor, 
under the facts of the instant case, literally and effectively proscribes the selfsame conduct as 
Burglary, a Second Degree and/or Third Degree Felony and it is thereby required that the 
defendant be sentenced as a Class A Misdemeanant, the lesser of the two punishments specified 
for that conduct under Utah Law. 
16. The Shondel doctrine was formulated in State vs. Shondel at 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 
P.2d 146 (1969)tand supports Defendants contention and requires that when two different 
statutory provisions define the same offense, a defendant may avail himself (or herself) of the 
provision imposing the lesser penalty. See also State v. Green 995 P.2d 1250, 2000. Ut. Case # 
990281- CA. Copies of the Shondel and Green cases are provided herewith as Exhibit E. 
17. In support of Defendant's position that this doctrine applies we compare the 
charges one to the other: 
UCA 76-6-202, Burglary,v% ....the defendant entered or remained unlaw lull) in a building 
or any portion of a building with intent to commit: (a) a felony; (b) theft: and 
UCA 76-6-204. Vehicle Burglary. " ... the defendant unlawfully entered any vehicle with 
intent to commit a felony or theft. 
These two offenses, in light of heretofore specified definitions within the I Uah Code 
mirror each other. Compare I5tah Codes 4 W 1 0 Z 13-14-102 and 71-3-102 wherein the 
definitions of a trailer provide that it is, in fact, a Motor Vehicle or Vehicle. In light of the facts 
of the instant case no amount of reflection can operate to distinguish the elements of the two 
specified crimes as other than identical and the statutes thus proscribe the same conduct and by 
conviction of a miscreant of either, the conviction of the other must automatically occur. 
18. The well-established rule is that a statute creating a crime should be sufficiently 
certain in order that persons of ordinary intelligence who desire to obey the law may know how 
to conduct themselves in conformity with it. A fair and logical concomitant of that rule is that 
a penal statute must be similarly clear, specific and understandable as to the penalty imposed 
for its violation. The esoteric question which might logically be suggested, that being "whether, 
in contemplating a misdeed, a miscreant really weighs such matters?1' must be left for another 
day. 
19. Where there is doubt or uncertainty as to which of two possible punishments is 
applicable to an offense the Shondel doctrine mandates that an accused is entitled to any benefit 
provided by the lesser. Shondel held that the statutes of the state of Utah should be "construed 
according to the fair import ot their terms with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to 
promote Justice."* This holding was compelled by reference to the language oi U.C.A. 76-1-2, 
1953. (A copy of which statute is attached as Exhibit F). 
20. In the Shondel case, the Defendant was charged and convicted ol violation oi 
U.C.A. 58-13a-1(16) |now repealed] but could have, on the same facts, been convicted of 
violation of U.C.A. 58-33-2 |now repealed]. Due to the uncertainty created by an overlapping of 
6 
the statutes the same situation that we see in the instant case arose.1 Because there was doubt as 
to which of the two punishments was applicable to the 
offense, the Utah Court held that the accused was entitled to the benefit of the lesser and in light 
thereof the Court remanded the case for proceedings to correct the sentence imposed. 
HI. Whether, at this juncture, Defendant is entitled to quashal of the bindover or 
whether Defendant might, more appropriately, reserve his claim for relief 
and present it at sentencing, if a conviction occur. 
21. One interpretation of the cases espoused by Defendant above would suggest that 
the holding only applies as a limitation on sentencing and it might be maintained that the 
bindover was proper and that Defendant might then be required to answer to the felony charge at 
any trial; reserving his claim for relief to the time when the sentence was to be imposed. 
22. Defendant urges that the court order that the bindover be quashed and that 
proceedings hereafter be upon misdemeanor charges and again refers to the fundamental fairness 
requirements imposed by Utah Law UCA 76-1-2 (Supra). 
23. Defendant also notes that to proceed under the felony charge superimposes upon 
this case certain impediments to a just and speedy disposition of the array of charges presented in 
connection with the alleged episode (the facts, at this point are unclear as lo whether more than 
one burglary actually occurred. | Defendant notes that if common ownership ol all burglarized 
units is proven, and that the various burglaries are shown to have occurred at \ lrtually the same 
lime and place and occurred as part of a single course of conduct the holding in State vs. Crosby-
927 P.2d 638 (1986) may apply.) 
24. Notwithstanding nuances that may govern disposition of conduct w ithin the same 
Apparently the drut» involved in Shondels case was subject to defmiiions found in e.idi siatute hut 
punishment prescribed in one state \aned from and was less than the penaltx imposed b\ the nihei 
7 
criminal episode, the Court might consider the civil disabilities that accompam a felony 
indictment as well as impediments to the plea negotiation process and compromise of Court 
resources and judicial economy. These points militate quashal and suggest that the prosecution 
proceed on appropriately amended informations or, perhaps, on one amended information 
wherein all alleged criminal conduct is merged. 
CONCLUSION 
On the facts of this case the Defendant might be interchangeably charged and convicted 
of either Burglary or Vehicle Burglary, pursuant to two different but equally valid provisions 
ol the criminal law, and Defendant should therefore be entitled to the benefit ol the lesser 
punishment, regardless ol which ciimc Defendant ultimate!} stands conuctcd 
Respectfully Submitted. 
AAV LauntzeVj 
/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO QUASH BINDOVER, postage prepaid, to the following listed 
below on the \t> xday of May. 2006. 
Mtokw Wing*? 
George Preston. Esq. 
P.O. Box 402 
Randolph. Utah 
84064 
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APPENDIX E 
State vs. Sery 758 P.2d 935 (1988) 
07/27/88 STATE UTAH v. MARK JOSEPH SERY 
[1] COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
[2] No. 860333-CA 
[3] 1988.UT.182 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 758 P.2d 935, 87 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 
[4] July 27, 1988 
[5] STATE OF UTAH, PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT, 
v. 
MARK JOSEPH SERY, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
[6] Karen Stam (Argued), Joan C. Watt, Attorneys at Law, Salt Lake, City, UT 
[7] David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General. Kimberly Hornak (Argued). Asst. Attorney General 
[8] Before Judges Norman H. Jackson, Gregory K. Orme (concur) and Richard C. Davidson. 
[9] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Davidson 
[10] FACTS. - Sery arrived at Salt Lake City airport and was stopped by police. Sery's carry-on 
bag was found to contain cocaine. 
[11] PROCEEDINGS. - Sery moved to suppress, and his motion was denied. He pleaded nolo 
contendere on condition that he be able to appeal the denial of suppression. He was 
convicted of possession and appealed 
[12] RESULT. - Reversed and remanded. Per Jackson; Orme concurs; Davidson Dissents. 
[13] HELD. - Conditional plea preserved denial of suppression for appellate review, and 
conviction on the plea was a final, appealable order. Police lacked reasonable suspicion to 
stop Sery and search his baggage. 
[14] NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judge: 
[15] Defendant Mark Joseph Sery appeals his conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1986). 
We reverse the trial court's denial of defendant's suppression motion and remand for 
withdrawal of the plea of no contest underlying the judgment of conviction. 
[16] On May 22, 1986, Sery arrived at Salt Lake International Airport at I 1:05 a.m. on a Delta 
Airlines flight from Florida. He was carrying a blue suitcase with brown trim; there was 
nothing unusual about his appearance or attire. He paused momentarily in the arrival gate 
area, looked around, waited a few minutes while other passengers passed him, and then 
started along the concourse, looked around again, and entered a snack bar. In a few 
minutes, he exited the snack bar with a soft drink. He walked directly across to a bank of 
pay telephones and sat down in one of the enclosures. While holding a phone receiver, he 
twice stood up and looked over the booth's partition. Within three to five minutes, he left 
the phone booth area by a different path than the one he used to enter it, rejoining the 
concourse past several men standing near the phone booths, and proceeded in the direction 
of the baggage claim area. At that point, he was stopped by three of the men who had been 
standing outside the phone booth area after following him from the arrival gate. They 
identified themselves to Sery as police officers. One was Agent Mark Whittaker of the 
Utah Narcotics and Liquor Enforcement Bureau; one was Sergeant William Pearson of the 
Miami, Florida Police Department. 
[17] The day Sery arrived, Sergeant Pearson was conducting a drug courier seminar for Salt 
Lake City police. The training session for twenty to twenty-five officers had moved out of 
the classroom and into the airport concourses for practical application. Approximately six 
officers were watching the deplaning of Sery's flight from Florida, including Pearson and 
Whittaker. As soon as Sery entered the terminal and looked around. Pearson said to trainee 
Whittaker, "Let's follow him" or "Let's lake a look at him." When Sen emerged from the 
snack bar, Pearson was ten to fifteen Jeei away from him. While Sery was in the phone 
booth area, Pearson and several of the trainees stood watchnvj him. some within five feet. 
[18] When Sery was first stopped for questioning by Pearson, Whittaker, and another trainee, 
Pearson asked to see his airline ticket. A ticket bearing the name of Sidsel was produced. 
Pearson returned the ticket and asked "Mr. Sidsel" for identification. Sery responded that 
he had none, that his name was not Sidsel, and that the name on the ticket was incorrect 
due to airline error. According to Pearson, he did not ask Sery for. and Sery did not offer, 
his correct name. Pearson asked for his destination, which Sery stated was Evanston, 
Wyoming. Pearson then asked if he could search Sery's carry-on bag. Sery said he would 
rather Pearson did not. Pearson told Serv he was free to leave. 
[19] Sery continued on his way along the concourse, took the escalator down to the baggage 
claim area, waited for a few minutes, and then left the terminal. He re-entered the building 
at least once, looked around the baggage claim area, and exited again. 
[20] After releasing Sery, Pearson obtained from I )elta Airlines—and checked out—the callback 
phone number that had been left when Scr\ \ ticket was reserved. After discovering that the 
number in Ft. Lauderdale. Florida had been changed to a nonpublished number. Pearson 
ordered a drug detection dog from a local nonce department. 
[21] The dog and his handler arrived at the airport about noon. Shortly thereafter Pearson and 
other officers again confronted Sery, this time outside the terminal in the passenger pick-up 
zone. Pearson asked Sery to submit his carry-on bag to a drug detection dog sniff; Sery 
declined. Pearson then advised Sery that both he and his bag were being "detained" and 
that he would have to go back into the terminal with them while the bag was presented to 
the drug detection dog. 
[22] After the officers look Sery back inside live lerminai. Pearson look Scry's bag, carried it 
behind the Delta ticket counter to a baggage area out of view and off-limits to the general 
public, and placed it in a four-bag lineup. The drug detection dog was brought in by his 
handler and reacted positively to Sery's bag. This information was conveyed by Pearson to 
Whittaker, who went to the public concourse area where Sery was being detained and 
informed him that he was under arrest. 
[23] A warrant to search the blue carry-on bag was subsequently issued based on Pearson's 
affidavit. It was found to contain cocaine. Sery moved to suppress this physical evidence 
on fourth amendment grounds because ihe officers, at the time they seized Sery and his bag 
outside the terminal, did not have specific, articulable facts warranting a reasonable 
suspicion that Sery was carrying illegal drugs in his bag. The trial court, after stating that 
the question was a close one, denied Sery's motion. 
[24] Sery then entered a plea of no contest to the offense of possession of a controlled 
substance. The plea was explicitly conditional on his preservation of the ability to appeal 
the court's suppression ruling and to withdraw the plea if it was determined on appeal that 
the motion to suppress should have been granted. A judgment of conviction was 
subsequently entered based on the conditional plea. 
[25] CONDITIONAL NO CONTEST PLEA 
[26] As a preliminary matter, we must address the State's claim on appeal that, although the 
prosecutor assented on the record to this conditional plea arrangement, the agreement was 
improper and mistaken. The State now asserts that, under Utah case law, a defendant who 
pleads no contest waives the right to appeal all pre-trial rulings. 
[27] The State argues that, under State v. Beck. 584 P.2d 870 (Utah i 978) (per curiam), and 
State v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1977). a defendant cannot plead guilty and then base 
an appeal on alleged errors other than the voluntariness of the plea. In Yeck, the Utah 
Supreme Court concluded that, by entering a voluntary plea of guilty, the defendant had 
waived a trial and, with it, the right to claim on appeal that he was denied his right to a jury 
trial. Similarly, in Beck, the defendant's entry of a voluntary guilty plea to second degree 
murder, after a hung jury at his trial for first degree murder, was held to be a waiver of his 
claim on appeal that the facts underlying his arrest warrant did not constitute probable 
cause. *fnl 
Although neither of these Utah cases involved timely pre-trial suppression motions, they 
arc consistent with the common-Jaw rule mai a voluntary nuilty pica is a waiver of the right 
to appeal all non-jurisdictional issues, including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations. 
E. g., Gordon v. State, 577 P.2d 701 (Alaska 1978); State v. Carter. 151 Ariz. 532. 729 
P.2d 336 (App. 1986); State v. Coffin, 104 Idaho 543, 661 P.2d 328 (1983); State v. 
Rivers, 226 Neb. 353, 411 N.W.2d 350 (1987); Webb v. State, 91 Nev. 469, 538 P.2d 164 
(1975); Vogel v. City of Myrtle Beach, 291 S.C. 229, 353 S.E.2d 137 (1987); Beaver v. 
Commonwealth. 232 Va. 521, 352 S.E.2d 342 (1987), cert, denied, 107 S.Ct. 3277 (1987). 
This general rale of appellate procedure has been applied in other jurisdictions to preclude 
appellate review of fourth amendment issues where the defendant entered an unconditional 
guilty plea after losing the suppression motion. E. g.. State v. Defoy. 109 Ariz. 159. 506 
P.2d 1053 (1973); Waits v. People, 724 P 2d 1329*(Colo. 1986): People v. New, 427 Mich. 
482. 398 N.W.2d 358 (1986), State v. Schulz. 409 N W 2d 655 (S.D 1987); State v. 
Armstrong, 148 Vt. 344, 533 A.2d 1 183 (1987). Because the conviction is based on the 
plea, rather than on the evidence defendant claims was obtained unconstitutionally. State v. 
Turcotte, 164 Mont. 426, 524 P.2d 787 (1974), the defendant who unconditionally pleads 
guilty forfeits the right to press his fourth amendment claim on appeal, just as 
constitutional rights can be forfeited by a failure to raise them in a timely fashion. 4 W. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.1(d) (2d ed. 1987) (citing Westen, Away from Waiver: A 
Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure. 75 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1214(1977)). 
Jn Utah, this general rule regarding forfeiture of appellate review ot an adverse ruling on a 
pre-plea motion to suppress applies with equal force to a defendant who enters an 
unconditional no contest plea, which "if accepted by the court shall have the same effect as 
a plea of guilty...." Utah Code Ann § 77-13-2(3) (1982). Accord Cooksey v. State, 524 
P.2d 1251 (Alaska 1974); Jackson v. State, 294 So.2d 114 (Fla. App. 1974); People v. 
New, supra. But see City of Huber Heights v. Duty, 27 Ohio App. 3d 244, 500 N.E.2d 339 
(1985) (unlike plea of no contest, guilty plea waives claimed errors in denial of suppression 
motion). 
However, the aforementioned general rule is inapplicable where, as here, the plea entered 
by the defendant with the consent ot the prosecution and accepted b\ the trial Judge 
specifically preserves the suppression issue lor appeal and allows withdrawal ol the plea if 
defendant's arguments in favor of suppression are accepted by the appellate court. See 
Oveson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 574 P.2d 801, 803 n.4 (Alaska 1978) (approving 
expressly conditional nolo contendere plea if resolution of reserved issue on appeal is 
dispositive, refining rule first announced in Cooksey v. State, supra); State v. Ashby, 245 
So.2d 225 (Fla. 1971) (approving conditional nolo contendere pleas that reserve questions 
of law for appeal); State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La. 1976) (conditional guilty plea); 
people v. Reid, 420 Mich. 326, 362 N.W.2d 655 (1984) (approving conditional guilty pleas 
agreed to by defendant, prosecutor, and trial court if there could be no prosecution if 
defendant's fourth amendment claim is sustained on appeal) !Mh2 
[31] We believe the use of such conditional picas by criminal defendants--if agreed to by the 
prosecution and accepted by the trial court--is a sensible and sound practice. vlh3 If a case 
ultimately hinges on the admissibility of evidence whose acquisition is challenged by the 
defendant on constitutional grounds, forcing the parties to go through an entire trial merely 
to preserve the suppression issue is a pointless and wasteful exercise. See United States ex 
rel. Rogers v. Warden of Attica State Prison, 381 F.2d 209, 214 (2d Cir. 1967) (forced trial 
in these circumstances would be a "waste of time, money and manpower"). 
[32] It is true that a conditional plea reserving a suppression issue for appeal does not have the 
complete finality of an unconditioned plea, but it still results m a judgment of convictions 
not an interlocutory order. Thai judgment is as linal as any convicuon after trial that might 
be reversed on direct appeal. Note, Conditional Guilty Pleas, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 564, 574 
(1980). See people v. Reid, 362 N.W. 2d at 660. The essence of the conditional plea 
[33] is that the legal guilt of the defendant exists only if the prosecution's case rests on 
admissible evidence. The crux of the dispute is resolution of the alleged error on appeal, 
not factual guilt or innocence. The conditional plea is tailored to further the resolution of 
these specific issues at the reasonable expense of any state interest in obtaining finality in 
the proceedings. The plea continues to serve a partial state interest in finality, however, by 
establishing admission of the defendant's .dCuial guilt. The defendant stands guilty and the 
proceedings come to an end if the reserved issue is ultimately decided in the government's 
favor. 
[34] Comment, Conditioned Guilty Pleas: Post-Guilty Plea Appeal of Non-jurisdictional Issues, 
26 UCLA L. Rev. 360, 378 (1978). We see no logical inconsistency between a plea that 
admits factual guilt—or refuses to contest it—and the preserved claim on appeal that the 
government is constitutionally barred from being able to prove its case because of the 
illegal seizure of evidence. 
[35] We hold that conditional pleas of the sort in issue here, when agreed to by the defendant 
and the prosecution and approved by the trial court, are permissible in Utah even though 
they are not specifically authorized by the statutes governing the entry of pleas by criminal 
defendants. *fn4 See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-1 (1988); Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-13-2,-3,-6 
(1982); Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11 (1988). Conditional plea agreements were accepted by 
the state courts in Oveson, Ashby, Crosby, and Reid, cited above, despite the absence in 
those jurisdictions of any authorizing court rule or statute. They were also accepted by two 
federal circuits long before the 1983 adoption of Fed. R. Crim. P. 1 1(a)(2). which for the 
first time affirmatively authorized conditional pleas of guilly or nolo contendere that 
preserved a icderal defendant's mjiu to apneilaie review o! adverse nre-inal itilings, 
including those on fourth amendment issues. See United States v. ivloskow. 588 F.2d 882 
(3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1975) (pre-trial motion to 
suppress). *fn5 More recently, the defendant in United States v. Place. 462 U.S. 696, 700 
(1983), had pleaded guilty but expressly reserved the right to appeal the denial of his 
suppression motion. The United States Supreme Court tacitly approved of that conditional 
plea practice, notwithstanding the lack of any authorizing statute or rule, by addressing the 
merits of the fourth amendment issue and affirming the Second Circuit's reversal of the 
trial court's denial of defendant place's motion to suppress. *fn6 
[36] I Inlikc the defendants in Beck and YccL Serv did not forfeit his claim that he was seized 
in violation of the fourth amendment nv enieimu an unconditional pica, instead, he 
specifically preserved that claim as par! o! ihe plea agreement, fhe prosecution agreed to 
that condition on the record; the court accepted the agreed-upon conditional plea. The 
defendant relied thereon and proceeded accordingly. Inasmuch as the court and counsel 
agreed on the procedure and it is not otherwise prohibited, we find no error. 
[3 7] SEIZURE OF DEFENDANT 
[38] The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable 10 tne states through 
the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. whio. >o7 U.S 643 (1961). provides: 
[39] The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
[40] In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). the United States Supreme Court first recognized a 
limited exception to the fourth amendment's requirement that all "seizures" ol persons must 
be based on probable cause Since the intiusion in ferry involved a brief "stop and frisk" 
for weapons, and not an arrest, the Couit neld that probable cause was not necessary. 
Nonetheless, in order to justify under the fourth amendment even this lesser intrusion, 
Terry held that the police officer must be able to point to "specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion." Id. at 21. The Court pointed out that this requirement of specificity in the 
information upon which police action is predicated is "the central teaching" of its fourth 
amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 21 n.l 8. It enables a reviewing court to assess the 
reasonableness of the police action against an objective standard, not the subjective good 
faith of the individual officer. 
[41] The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaninglul onh when it is assured that at 
some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the 
more detached, neutral scrutiny of a Judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a 
particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances. And in making that 
assessment it is imperative that the facts be Judged against an objective standard: would the 
facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief" that the action taken was appropriate? Anything less 
would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more 
substantial than inarticulate hunches, a lestilt this Court has consistently refused to 
sanction. And simple "'good faith on the pan o( the arresting office! is not enough.'... If 
subjective good faith alone were the test, me protections oi ihe fourth Amendment would 
evaporate, and the people would be 'secure :n their persons, houses, papers and effects.' 
only in the discretion of the police." 
Id. at 21-22 (citations and footnotes omitted). See State v. Trujillo. 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah 
App. 1987). Stressing that each case must be decided on its own facts, the Terry court 
concluded that the limited stop and frisk was justified where "a police officer observes 
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that 
criminal activity is afoot...." Terry. 392 U.S. at 30. This language m Terry is now referred 
to as the "reasonable suspicion" test. see. e g.. United States v. tingnom-Ponce, 422 U.S. 
873 (1975). and has been codified in this siate m Utah Code Ann. * /7-7-I5 (1982). *1h7 
A temporary detention or seizure is "justifiable under the Fourth Amendment if there is 
articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime." Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) (plurality opinion). Based on the totality of the 
circumstances, the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for 
suspecting criminal activity by the particular person detained. United States v. Cortez, 449 
U.S. 411^417-18(1981). See State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987). 
On appeal, Sery argues that his detention b\ Pearson and the other officers, after being 
stopped the second time ouiside the lermmai. constituted an arresi unsupported b\ probable 
cause. Alternatively, defendant asserts that the detention constituted a seizure within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment thai was unlawful because not based nn Pearson's 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In its brief the State denies that the detention was 
an arrest" for which the fourth amendment requires probable cause. However, the State 
agrees that Sery was "seized" for fourth amendment purposes when he and his bag were 
detained by the officers for the canine drug check. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 
696, 708-709 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (opinion of 
Stewart, J.) (person is "seized" if, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person 
would have believed that he was not free n> leave). But the State claims the seizure was not 
unconstitutional because Pearson had the necessary reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity to conduct the type and length o! derention to which Sery was subjected. In view of 
the State's position, if we conclude that theie was not a sufficient basis lor e\en a Terry 
stop, we need not consider whether there was probable cause to support an arrest. 
The trial court determined that the articulable facts known to Pearson supported a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by Sery when he and his bag were seized outside 
the terminal. Assuming that Sery's detention was an investigatory stop and not an arrest 
requiring probable cause. :|Th8 the threshold issue is whether this determination is clearly 
erroneous. Mendoza. 748 P.2d at 183 uitam Cortez. 449 US ai 4lo) The uial court's 
finding is clearly erroneous only ii it i , against the clear we mm oi me e\ mence or if we 
reach a definite and firm conviction ilia; ^ .v. aake has been made State \ \she. 745 P.2d 
1255, 1258 (Utah 1987); Slate v Walker. / H P 2d 191. l9 . (Uiah 1987) We need not 
examine the reasonableness of the nature, duration and scope of the detention and 
investigation unless we first conclude that the seizure was constitutionally valid at the 
outset. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985). 
[46] We conclude that the articulable objective facts known to Sergeant Pearson when he seized 
Sery and his bag did not support a reasonable suspicion that Sery was engaged in criminal 
activity. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress the evidence 
found in his bim was clearly erroneous 
[47] Seven facts were enumerated by res respondent in support ol the reasonableness ot 
Pearson's suspicion: +fn9 (1) Sery arrived 1rom Florida; (2) waited a lew/ minutes at the 
gate and looked nervously around there and before entering the snack bar; (3) went to a 
telephone booth and twice stood up and looked in the direction of the officers; (4) took a 
strange route from the phone booth area back to the concourse; (5) possessed a plane ticket 
on which he claimed his name had been inaccurately recorded; (6) told Pearson he had no 
identification on him; and (7) left a telephone number with the airline reservatiomst that 
had been changed to an unpublished number. : fnlO 
[48] Although the government may prcscni a lengthy list of detailed observations, the courts are 
not relieved of their duty to review the list critically and decide whether each particular 
observation cited actually contributes something to the "whole picture"—that is, whether the 
particular observation bears any reasonable correlation to a suspicion that the person 
presently is engaged in criminal activity. 
[49] United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413.1418 (9th Cir. 1987). 
[50] In State v. Mendoza. 748 P 2d 181 (Utah 1987). the Utah Supreme Comt leviewed the 
constitutional validity of an investigatory \ehicle stop preceding a search that yielded 
marijuana. There, seven facts were articulated by the officers in support ol the 
reasonableness of their suspicion: (1) the occupants appeared to be of Latin descent; (2) 
route of travel; (3) time of day; (4) time of year; (5) California license plates; (6) an erratic 
driving pattern; and (7) nervous behavior. A comparative analysis with Mendoza is 
illuminating. We begin with "nervousness." the second Sery fact and the last Mendoza fact. 
[51] A. "Nervousness" 
[52] In Mendoza. the officers' Conclusion ot nci vousness on the part ot the car occupants was 
based on a "white-knuckled," rigid look and failure to make eye contact. Those 
descriptions were not given any weight by the court in determining if the officers had a 
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. Id. at 184. Here, there was no 
attempt by Pearson to articulate any specific objective fact underlying his subjective 
Conclusion, other than to say that Sery was "looking around," *fnl 1 something many 
passengers do when they first reach the arrival gate, especially if they expect to be met by 
someone and that person is not readily seen. Pearson did not claim that Sery's "looking 
around" was in any way unusual lor an arriving passenger. No observations ol 
"nervousness" were made either when
 k
v>en was first approached and questioned by the 
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identified officers or later when he was Jcuineci i lis responses indicate calm and 
deliberate Dehavior rather man agiiauuii a.u apprchensivcness. I he laci that Sery was still 
waiting at the airport an hour after bciiiLi lollowed from the arrival gate and then questioned 
by police belies the nervous label. Seiv did not take flight or behave as if he was avoiding 
apprehension, as would be expected of the truly nervous suspect. 
Nervousness is the most subjective of the characteristics relied on here. Cloud. Search and 
Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug Courier Profile and Judicial Review of Investigative 
Formulas," 65 B.U.L. Rev. 843, 903 (lc)85). If the officer cannot articulate the unusual 
mannerisms or actions by the defendant that led to a Conclusion ol nervousness, it is 
impossible for any reviewing coun 10 uetcimme. alter the fact, wheiher the person's 
apparent nervousness was any difierciu ne,m that observed in countless travelers—or if the 
nervousness existed at all. • ihl2 See ict. In lact. Pearson testified thai Sery's behavior was 
not unusual, i.e., no different than that of other deplaning passengers, fhe officer's mere 
Conclusion regarding defendant's nervousness, unsupported by relevant objective facts, can 
have no weight in determining if he had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Cf. 
State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986) (officer's determination of probable 
cause justifying a warrantless vehicle search must be evaluated in light of his or her 
experience and training "where there are objective facts to justify the Conclusion"). 
B. Itinerary 
In Mendoza, the car occupants' route oi tiavel and California license platen were found to 
have little probative value in determining whether the officers had a reasonable suspicion 
justifying the stop of the car. Mendoza, 748 P.2d at 183. Those facts are similar to the fact 
that Sery came to Utah on a Delta flight originating in Florida, which likewise has little 
probative value. The record does not clearly show the city in Florida from which Sery 
came. Pearson testified, very generally, that Miami is a known source of the supply of 
drugs for the west coast. He also testified he was watching Sery's flight with the trainees 
because "Florida is a known source ol. ipccnically. cocaine and marijuana to the western 
and northwestern United Stales, fhere was no testimony that Serv's particular route of 
travel (somewhere in Florida to Atlanta to Salt Lake City) oi flight was frequently used to 
transport illegal drugs to Utah, while in Mendoza the officers testified Interstate 15 was 
frequently used by illegal aliens from Mexico. See id. Salt Lake City is a major hub for 
airline flights to and from many places. In Mendoza, the court considered it unlikely that 
illegal alien transporters comprised a significant portion of 1-15 traffic. It seems equally 
unlikely that drug couriers comprise a significant portion of the travelers through Salt Lake 
International Airport, even of those whose flights originated in Florida. 
The officers testified in Mendoza mat mc\ relied on "erratic" driving Dehavior in the form 
of failure to vield lane, change of lane, ana sapid deceleration: tne cotm. howevei. could 
not see how this behavior could reasonaDi\ LM\C rise to a suspicion ihat the car occupants 
were engaged in illegal activity. Id. at I 84 Here. Pearson attached significance to the fact 
that Sery sat down in a phone booth and tw ice stood up and looked over the dividing 
partition. We fail to see, and Pearson did not say, how this behavior varies from that of any 
other arriving passenger who keeps looking around the terminal area for whoever was 
supposed to meet him or her at the arrival gate, or who looks around in search of someone 
who might be willing to provide the change necessary to complete the telephone call. See 
Reid, 448 U.S. at 441 (all but one of the characteristics relied upon by the detaining 
officers "describe a very large category ot presumably mnocent travelers"). 
[57] Pearson also found it "strange" that Seiv L-ii the bank oi phone booths bv a different path 
lhan the way he had cnteied it. reioinimi me mam concouise nail\Aa\ at a point that was 
"beyond" Pcaison and the uainees out. pie .umably. iuithei alonu ^ei\'s route down the 
concourse This path was strange, Pcaison asserted, because beiy 'kind ol edged his way 
between the glassed-in wall area and pay phones. Neither the trial court nor counsel asked 
Pearson to diagram the scene or add flesh to his cursory account by giving the actual layout 
and dimensions of the space or the location of the officers. The recoid shows that, while 
Sery was in the phone booth, some oi the surveilling trainees were within five feet of him. 
The path chosen by Sery could have been the one most available to him if the officers were 
blocking the route by which he had come. 
[58J C Name LM.ciepancy 
[59] Furthermore, Pearson did not articulate, and we cannot discern, any special meaning that 
should be given to the error Sery claimed the airline made in the name in which they issued 
his ticket. This fact is transformed by the State in its brief (and, notably, not by Pearson at 
the suppression hearing) into the "fact" that Sery was traveling under an "assumed name, 
one of the facts the United States Supreme Court has suggested could, in tandem with other 
relevant facts, justify an investigative detention of a passenger and his luggage. Royer, 460 
U.S at 502 
[60] Pearson testified that, after Sery told him nis name was not whai appeared on the ticket, 
+fnl 3 he did not ask Sery for his correct name and Sery did not otter it. Although Pearson 
asked Sery to produce some identification other than his ticket, Sery replied that he had 
none. 'Thl4 The officer thus had nothing with which he could compare the name on the 
ticket. Pearson stated he did not know defendant's real name until after Sery was arrested 
by Whittaker. He, therefore, did not know and could not have known until after the seizure 
whether defendant was using an assumed name, as opposed to a misspelled name on the 
ticket due to tiavel agent or airline erroi ( f Mendenhall. 446 IIS at 548 (defendant 
voluntanh showed diuii agents a tinv i s , . ense m the name ot S\ i\ la ivlcnocnhall and a 
ticket issued m the name oi Aimeiie t ^.ay 
[61] D. Unpublished Phone Number 
[62] In this appeal, even the State concedes that Pearson lacked sufficient articulable objective 
facts to support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by Sery up through the point 
when Pearson told Sery he was free to leave, I e., after asking him some questions and 
being refused consent to search Scrv's ban Pearson also must have concluded, drawing on 
his nine veais ol experience in drug conic: mteiception. that the actions he had perceived 
up to that point did not, even taken uvictlu,. provide him dn\ leuai oasis to detain Sery 
involuntanlv. But. the State argues. "Iiei m: initial cncountei with dclendant the officers 
obtained additional facts which caused ine.n u> heheve derendant was committmti a crime." 
Brief tor Respondent at 14 (emphasis added). 
[63] The only further investigation Pearson did after the first encounter was to obtain and call 
the callback number Sery had left with the airline reservatiomst. The only "additional fact" 
Pearson learned was that "t had been changed to a nonpubhshed number." This added 
nothing meaningful or probative to lhat which he had already obseived and evaluated. 
Pearson stated at the hearing he did not know when Serv had made his lcservation or when 
(he number called had been changed tu a lunpuohshed numoei. Despite this, both Pearson 
and the lespondent twist this into the "L,.i" that Seiy lelt a "nonwniking" number with the 
airline when he bought his ticket, i he laci thai a phone numbei leit w uh an airline (on 
some unknown date) was changed to an unlisted number (on some unknown date) could' 
not—in light of all the circumstances and the objective facts known to him—lead Pearson to 
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
[64] Conclusion 
[65] We recognize that a trained law enforcement officer may be able to perceive and articulate 
meaning in gi\en conduct which woiiui \K \aioily innoceiil u> the unnamed observer. 
MendenhalC466 U.S. at 563 (quoting IJiown v Texas, 443 U S 47, 52 n.2 (1979)); 
Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 88. See also Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885 if Pearson perceived 
any such meaning in Sery's actions, he did not articulate that meaning to the trial court. 
[66] The objective facts relied upon by Pearson do not support a reasonable suspicion that Sery 
was engaged in criminal activity. We nojcl that the trial court's deteimmation to the 
contrary was clearly erroneous. Because the seizure of Sery and his bag for the canine drug 
sniff violated defendant's fourth amendment lights, the evidence found in the search of his 
bag should have been suppressed. The orctei ol the trial court dcn\ mg defendant's 
suppression motion is leveised. and the ^,sc is lemanded to the disluct court 1or lurther 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
[67] RICHARD C. DAVIDSON, Judge: (Dissenting) 
[68] 1 respectfully Dissent because 1 believe the majority erred in affirming the trial court's 
acceptance of a no contest plea conditioned on defendant's right to appeal the motion to 
suppress I aiso believe the majonu incon :-:tiv decided that the mution to suppress should 
have been granted 
[69] Rather than point out weaknesses in the majority's recitation ot the facts. I o1 ler what I 
consider to be a complete factual statement of the case but one which highlights certain 
important aspects. At approximately 1 1:05 a.m. on May 22, 1986. Delta Airlines Flight No. 
565, originating in Florida, began deplaning passengers at the Salt Lake International 
Airport. Observing were several law enforcement officers involved in a training seminar. 
Approximately 20 members of different police agencies were training at the airport in 
several groups. Conducting the training was Sergeant William Pearson of the Metro Dade 
Police Department, Miami, Florida. Sergeant Pearson, a veteran ot over 25 years in police 
work had spent 19 years enforcing narcotic > laws. Subsequent to extensive training in 
narcotics surveillance, investigation, anci cnlorcement. Sergeant Pearson has supervised the 
drug interdiction unit, primarily concerned wnh the Miami International Airport, lor nine 
years. During this time. Sergeant Pearson has taught his specialty at colleges and to other 
police departments throughout the United States including Los Angeles, Denver, and 
Gainesville, Florida. Among those at the airport with Sergeant Pearson was Agent Mark 
Whittaker from the Utah State Narcotics and Liquor Law Enforcement Bureau. 
The officers saw defendant leave the aircraft carrying a vinyl suitcase. Sergeant Pearson 
testified that defendant stopped momentarily, looked nervously around, waited there for 
several minutes while other passengers passed him. and then continued on up the 
concourse." Agent Whittaker testified Mini delendant appeared to he \erv nervous" when he 
deplaned and that, while the other pass^n^e, , walked past him. delendant "kept looking 
around nervously." Referring to defendant. Sergeant Pearson indicated to Agent Whittaker, 
"Let's take a look at him" or. "Let's follow mm." 
Defendant proceeded up the concourse until he entered a coffee shop after he "looked 
nervously around again." Upon exiting the coffee shop, defendant proceeded directly to a 
bank of telephones separated by partitions. Defendant sat down and picked up a telephone 
receiver but did not place any money in the machine. Defendant then "put the receiver to 
his ear. he stood up. looked around, sat hack clown." Agent Whittaker testified defendant 
repeated his behavior two or three times without ever inserting anv coins into the 
telephone. Sergeant Pearson testified defendant stood up above rhe partition on two 
occasions and looked in his direction, fuiiner testimony by Agent Whittaker indicated 
Sergeant Pearson and he were about five feet away. Defendant then picked up his suitcase 
but, rather than taking the normal route from the telephone area, he edged his way between 
a glass wall and the telephones allowing him to leave the telephone area beyond where the 
officers were standing. 
At this point. Sergeant Pearson. Agent Whittaker. anci one other officer approached 
defendant and identified themselves as K.UC oiiicers. Seigeant Peaison askeci to speak to 
defendant "loi a moment" to which ucicnaani agreed. When a^ked. delendant showed 
Sergeant Pearson nis amine ticket AIIKI. ^ .\ in the name oi ^ICNCI ^eiiieant Pearson then 
asked "Mi. Siclsel" for some identification io which delendant replied that hib name was 
not Sidsel, that the airline had made a mistake, and that he did not have any identification. 
Defendant did not offer his correct name. When asked if he had "any objections to giving 
[Sergeant Pearson] a consent to search the suitcase," defendant replied he would rather not. 
Sergeant Pearson then thanked defendant and informed him he was "free to leave." Agent 
Whittaker testified that after leaving the oiiicers, defendant proceeded further down the 
concourse to another telephone area and made calls.. Defendant then went to the baggage 
claim area via the escalator. Pie waited in mat area for several minutes, walked around the 
downstairs area ol the terminal, and went mnside on at least one occasion. Meanwhile. 
Sergeant Pearson deteimined from Delia Amines that defendant had amved horn Ft. 
I audeidale. Florida and also obtained me .all-back numoei" <j'\ui when SKKCI'S ticket 
was reserved. Upon checking the telephone nuniDer. Seigeant Peaison discoxered. "t was 
no longer a working number. It had been cnanged to a nonpubhshed number " Sergeant 
Pearson then requested Agent Whittaker to obtain a drug detection dog. 
At approximately noon, Officer Brook Plotnik, a dog handler with the West Valley City 
Police Department, arrived with a drug trained dog. After briefing Officer Plotnik, Sergeant 
Pearson and Agent Whittaker approacned defendant who was seated outside the terminal 
with his suitcase. From the first conversation with Sergeant Pearson until this second 
approach l>v me oiliceis. no law uiiui. n IK oificei had approauiicl oi LUKCU lo 
delendant. Seigeant Pcaison askcu ue.e.iucaii A lie would ^umnn A\t> nag "to a MiiJt by a 
drug detection dog." Again, cictenciam answcicci that "he would lather not ' defendant was 
then told by Sergeant Pearson that he and his suitcase were being detained and the suitcase 
would be presented in a lineup to the drug detection dog. Depending on what happened at 
the lineup, defendant would be informed of "the next step in the procedure" Sergeant 
Pearson placed defendant's suitcase in a lineup with four other bags in the Delta Airlines 
baggage makeup area, approximately 10 to 15 minutes after Officer Plotnik's arrival. The 
drug detection dog gave a positive alert to defendant's suitcase. Sergeant Pearson relayed 
this information to Agent Whittaker who informed defendant of the results of the lineup, 
placed him under arrest, and informed him ol his rights. A search warrant, based on 
Sergeant Pearson's affidavit, was ontaaieo A subsequent seaich oi defendant's suitcase 
revealed three bags oi cocaine. Agent Whutaker's report indicates delendant was arrested at 
12*25 p m Defendant also testified 20 minutes elapsed between the lime he was detained 
and when he was placed under arrest. 
Defendant's pre-trial motion to suppress was heard on July 9, 1986. When asked what 
actions of the defendant aroused his suspicions. Sergeant Pearson replied: 
The ones 1 have testified to earlier Numbei one. his appaient nervous looking about when 
he got off the plane. The fact that he waited thcie at the deplaning area belore he proceeded 
on to the concourse to wherever he was going to go I lis nenous looking about belore he 
went into what 1 call the coffee shop. 
When I went to the pay phone bank, number three, the fact he was, 1 would guess, making 
a phone call. But he kept popping up concerned about my whereabouts and Agent 
Whittaker's whereabouts, as opposed to concentrating his conversation with whomever he 
was trying to call. This what 1 find a strange way of exiting the phone enclosure instead of 
going out with ease into an open area to walk between enclosures and a side hole next to a 
phone enclosure and a windowed area lo ihc concourse. The I act thai attei he left, lefused 
lo give us a consent to search and was allowed lo go on his way his constant popping in 
and out ol the terminal and walking aiounci '.ad the fact that he. thai the phone number 
that he gave to the airlines was not a working number, which would mean the airline could 
never call him and tell him his flight had been cancelled, delayed or whatever. 
[77] All these things, accumulatively speaking, 1 Jelt veiy suspicious 
[78] Upon denial of his motion, defendant pled no contest to unlawful possession of a contiolled 
substance Defendant's plea was couched as 
[79] [Delense Counsel] \ oui 1 lonoi in \ u w ui mai lining WL IL piepaiui ar ihis time 10 entei 
a conditional plea of no contest to ihe cnaisjcs 
[80] 1 would like to have the opportunity to appeal on the motion, and and 1 decided, in view of 
the Utah Supieme Court's decision in the Kay [State v Kay, 717 P 2d 1294 (Utah 1986)] 
case wheie they did allow foi conditional pleas, that Mi Seiv can entei a plea on the 
condition that should the Supieme Court find this motion should have been gianted, he can 
withdiaw the plea 
[81] 1 think this may be a new thing to do out I think it would piobaoh help judicial 
admimstiation Theie's no sense in gonm miough a tual on (acts such as this and would ask 
the Court to go along with it 1 ha^ e explained it to Mi Seiy. he uncteistands it, and he 
would like to get on with the process lathei than wait aiound foi a tual 
[82] That's conect, yom Honoi 
[83] Defendant's plea was accepted and he was ,ubscquentlv :>cnienccci lo the Utah State Pnson 
loi a penod not to exceed live \eais I he pnson sentence was sta\ed and detendant was 
placed on piobation foi a penod ol IX months Piobation was staved pending the issuance 
of a certificate of piobable cause wInch was signed on Septembei 25 1986 
[84] CONDITIONAL NO CONTEST PLEA 
[8*5] Utah Code Ann ^ 77-11-2 (1982) explains ihe effect ot a no contest plea In 1 to an 
indictment oi infoimation Subsection 77-11-2(3) states 
[86] A plea of no contest indicates the a^ui ^u um > not cnallengL ihe UUUULS in me mioimation 
oi indictment and if accepted by the court >iiail ha\c the saniu el lea as d plea ol guilty and 
imposition oi sentence maj be lendeied m the same mannei as il a plea ol guilt) had been 
entei ed 
[87] Utah Code Ann ^ 77-13-3 (1982) also states, "A plea of no contest ma\ be entei ed by the 
accused only upon appioval ot the court and only attei due consideiation of the views of 
(he parties and the inteiest ol the public in (he effective admimstiation ot lustice 
[88] The plea of no contest is treated the same as a plea of guilty: once knowingly and 
voluntarily entered, there are no issues lemaming lor trial. State v YccL 566 P.2d 1248. 
1249 (Utah 1977) In State v. Beck. 5S4 P 2d 870. 872 (Utah 1978). the Court wrote. "By a 
plea of guilty the defendant waived any claim ol error on behalt ol the oltlccr in saying that 
he had been identified as the murderer." A defendant cannot enter a guilty or no contest 
plea and then base an appeal on objections to the evidence. By entering such a plea, all 
such objections are waived. 
[89] The majority states in footnote 4 that the absence in Utah R. Grim. P. IK Utah Code Ann. § 
77-35-11 (1988), of conditional picas is not an affirmative bar to such picas, flic majority 
also cites State v. Kay. 717 P 2d 1294 (Uicm i986). c»s authonn loi conditional picas. Phis 
is irrelevant In Kay. the trial court ac^  cored
 l( tjuilty pica io mrcc counts ol capital 
homicide in exchange lor die promise mai Jjiendant would noi nc sentenced io death. The 
trial court agreed to impose one of the statutory punishments for the crimes charged and 
defendant pled guilty "with no strings attached." There was no plea conditioned on an 
appeal concerning the state's ability to prove Kay's underlying guilt. What the majority fails 
to understand is that is established by statute. As such, it must be strictly construed within 
the statutory bounds. Counsel and the trial court may not invent a new plea by agreement 
any more than they can agree to add or delete an element of a crime. 
[90] A further examination of Rule 1 1 in suDsecuon (c) reveals: 
[91] The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest and shall not accept such a 
plea until the court has made the findings: 
[92] (4) That the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which he is 
entering the plea; that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of 
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt: and that the plea is an admission of all those 
elements (emphasis added)|.| 
[93] In light of this rule it is impossible for delendant to enter a no contest plea after his motion 
to suppress has been denied, yet still base an appeal on that motion. In effect, defendant 
told the trial court that he was guilty of possession of a controlled substance but that he 
intended to contest his own admission on appeal. When the trial Judge explained the 
meaning of the no contest plea to defendant, he stated that defendant would still have the 
right to appeal "because of the stipulated facts in this particular instance here...." This does 
not comport with the requirements of Rule 11 (e). See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1 309, 
1313 (Utah 1987), for a strict interpretation of the necessity to comply with Rule 11(e). 
[94] INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 
[95] When this case is stripped of its pretensions we find an attempt to circumvent the rules of 
appellate procedure to force this Court to hear an interlocutory appeal. This is justified and 
approved by the majority in order to avoid a "pointless-and wasteful exercise." As I read R. 
Utah Ct. App. 5(d), that is precisely the reason for an interlocutory appeal. However, R. 
Utah Ct. App. 5(a) provides that a petition seeking permission to appeal must be filed with 
the Court. The Court may then decide to re\ iew or not review. The appellate court, not 
counsel, and not the lower court, is given the opportunity to determine whether the appeal 
should be taken and whether iurther proceedings at the trial level would be desirable or a 
"pointless and wasteful exercise " m this uisc counsel ana ihe inai conn decided to allow a 
direct appeal to this Court wuhout a pnor 111:11 1 he lequest nv oeiense counsel and by the 
court shows that this is an appeal liom the denial ol the motion 10 suppress and nothing 
more. There is no way under the rules to make such a denial a final oider without pleading 
not guilty and going through a trial. Unless the majority has decided to leave applications 
of the rules of this Court to counsel and the lower court such appeal is improper. 
[96] This case should be remanded and the defendant given the opportunity to enter a proper 
plea. Until that is done and the correct procedures are followed to bring the case on appeal, 
this Court has no business reviewing the laetual findings, llowcvci. the majonn has 
chosen to lender an advisoiy opinion SIIKC 1 -tionuly disamee with the Conclusion, 1 am 
lorced also to write an advisory opinion 
[97] SEIZURE OF DEFENDANT 
[98] I disagree with the majority that defendant's fourth amendment rights were violated and 
that the evidence found in the search of his suitcase should be suppressed. 
[99] Defendant first argues that nis detention. Ana that ol his suitcase 101 investigate e purposes, 
constituted an unlawful seizure because ILL uilleeis lacked leasonaole suspicion that he 
was involved in criminal activity. Second, delendant asserts that no probable cause existed 
upon which to base his arrest. 
[100] In State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616. 617 (Utah 1987), the Court cited United States v. 
Merritt, 736 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 476 U S. 1142 (1986). for the "three 
levels of police encounters with the public which the United States Supreme Court has held 
are constitutionally permissiblef.]" The Fifth Circuit Court wrote: 
[101] (1) an officer may approach a citizen at am time and pose questions so long as the citizen is 
not detained against his will; 
[102] (2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the person 
has committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be temporary 
and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop". 
[103] (3) an officer may arrest a suspect it the ollieei has probable cause 10 believe an offense 
has been committed or is being commuted Sue Florida v. Koyei. *(>() US. W\. 498-99, 
103 S. Cl. 1319, 1324-25.75 f.F.2d 229. "3o-37 (19X3) 
[104] Merritt, 736 F.2d at 230. 
[105] Concerning the first of the three levels of police encounters, in State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 
85, 87-88 (Utah App. 1987). this Court wrote: 
[106] seizure within the meaning ol the iouiili amendment does not occm when a oolice officer 
merely approaches an mcti\ iciual uii tin ,i ,\ unci uiiesiious mm. i, me ncison is w illing to 
listen. However, the person approached is .IOI iec|uned to unswu me olncci's uuesiions, 
and his refusal to listen to the officer's questions or answer them, w ithout more, does not 
furnish reasonable grounds for further detention (footnote and citations omitted). 
[107] In their brief, the state conceded the police lacked reasonable suspicion when they initially 
approached defendant. However, what little information provided by defendant was given 
freely and he was not detained against his will. This clearly was a level one encounter. 
[108] From the time of the initial encounter, ohoiih alter I 1:05 a.m.. delendant wandered the 
terminal area without restraint until the druii detection dog was in place at several minutes 
past noon. At that point delendant was detained and his suitcase taken to be included in the 
lineup presented to the dog. This was a level two encounter requiring the officer to have 
reasonable suspicion. 
[109] The touchstone case applicable to this situation is Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The 
proposition for which Terry is known has been codified as Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 
(1982) which states: 
11 I0| A peace officer may stop any person m a name place when nc ha., a icasonamc suspicion 
to believe he has committed or is in the act ol committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of actions. 
[ I l l ] Again, as noted by the majority. Terry admonishes the judiciary to decide each case on its 
own facts and that a police officer may detain an individual for the purposes of a Terry stop 
where he "observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his 
experience that criminal activity may be alooi " Id. at 30 See also United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponee. 422 U.S. 87"!. 885 (N"7^, 'In all situations the officer is entitled to assess 
(he facts in light of his expenence in dccLium illegal entrv unci muiiighng ): State v. 
Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181. 183 (Ulan ffi87) I he trial court "must consider the lotahtv of the 
circumstances facing the officers" and the "reviewing court should not overturn the trial 
court's determination unless it is clearly erroneous." Id. (citation omitted). The detaining 
officer's experience in similar cases is an important factor a trial court must weigh in 
determining if the officer had valid reasonable suspicion. The factors making up such 
suspicion must be considered in total context rather than in a vacuum. 1 believe Sergeant 
Pearson did have reasonable suspicion which he clearly articulated at the suppression 
hearing. Defendant initially appeared nervous. He appeared nervous to both Sergeant 
Pearson and Agent Whittaker. The nervousness was exhibited when deplaning, on the 
concourse, and upon entering the coifee shop Nervousness alone does not prove 
leasonable suspicion because such bciki\i i ...av be consilient \xiih innocent as well as 
criminal conduct, fiupllo. / » P 2d ai
 t{9 , ,ui it is a iuctor to he Luiisicieied. Defendant 
also waited in the deplaning area while the oilier passengers walked past him. Again, a 
factor to alert a trained officer to the need to investigate furthci, a duty of the police. State 
v. Houser, 669 P.2d 437, 439 (Utah 1983). Defendant's behavior at the telephone and his 
not inserting a coin in the machine is another factor. The initial approach and contact was 
made after defendant made his unusual exit from the telephone area, another factor. 
[112] During the initial stop, the officers discovered defendant's ticket was written in a name 
denied by defendant to be his and he cujneci no identification, two more lactors to be 
considered. Subsequent to this valid sion. i.emcant Pearson learned that the [light had 
originated m Ft. Lauderdale. Florida and Uiai the telephone number given upon reserving 
Ihe ticket was no longer working and had been changed to a nonpubhshed number, 
additional factors. Agent Whittaker also knew defendant had utilized another telephone 
further down the concourse to make calls. The totality of this behavior was sufficient to 
generate a request for the drug detection dog. Between the time of the request and the 
arrival of the dog, defendant's "constant popping in and out of the terminal and walking 
around" added further fuel to Sergeant Pearson's suspicions. Defendant was not detained 
until such time as Sergeant Pearson had abundant, articulable and reasonable suspicion. 
1
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[113] DETENTION OF DEFENDANT 
[114] I now address whether defendant's detention was proper. The primary concern is whether 
the length of the detention transformed it from a Terry stop into a de facto arrest. United 
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1574 (1985). The United States Supreme 
Court has stated: 
[1 15] n investigative detention must be temporal v And last no longer than is necessary TO 
effectuate the purpose ol the stop SimilaiP the investigative methods employed should be 
Ihe least intuitive means leasonablv av.ulanic lo verify or cnspei the ollieei's suspicion in a 
short period of time. It is the State's burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to 
justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited m scope and duration 
to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure. 
[116] Florida v. Ro\ei\ 460 U S. 491. 500 (1981) (citations omitted). Guidance is provided in 
determining what would be "sufficiently limited in scope and duration" by the Court in 
United States v. Place. 462 11 S. 696 (I98T) There, Place's behavior aroused the suspicion 
of law enforcement officers who weie ohsci ving activity at M airport. Ultimate!}. Place's 
luggage was presented to a diug dctecuon Jon which leacted positi\cly to one bag which 
was found to contain cocaine I he ^CLUIRI V inuit Couit rcvciscd placed con\ iciion and the 
United States Supreme Court alfnmcd although the Court wrote approvingly of the use of 
a dog in the examination of luggage suspected of containing drugs. Id. at 707. it held: 
[117] Although the 90-minute detention of [place's] luggage is sufficient to render the seizure 
unreasonable, the violation was exacerbated by the failure of the agents to accurately 
inform of the place to which they were transporting his luggage, ol the length of time he 
might be dispossessed, and of what arrangements would be made lor return ot the luggage 
if the investigation dispelled the suspicion 
[118] Id. at 710. 
[119] The United States Supreme Court held a defendant's detention to be unlawful when the 
defendant was confined in a "large storage closet" with a detective for approximately IS 
minutes while another detective retrieved defendant's luggage, brought it to the place of 
confinement, and opened the two suitcases. Royer, 460 U.S. at 507-08. Conversely, the 
Court upheld a 20-minute detention during which the police proceeded expeditiously in 
confirming their suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal activity Sharpe, 470 
U.S. at 687-88. The Court stated that its ca.es "impose no ngiu time limitation on I erry 
stops," emphasized the need "to consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the 
stop as well as the time reasonably needed lo effectuate those pin poses." and that there was 
no "bright line" rule. Common sense and oidinary human experience must take precedence 
over some rigid criteria. Id. at 685. 
[120] The hearing transcript indicates defendant was told his suitcase was being taken into the 
airport security area (the Delta Airlines baggage makeup area), into which those without 
the appropriate security clearance were not allowed, that the suitcase would be included in 
the lineup, and the next step depended on wnat happened at the lineup In anv event, it 
would be further explained to defendant Scigcant Pearson testnicd that, il the (\oii had not 
alerted on the suitcase, it would have Deer, .emincd to defendant and lie "would have been 
allowed to leave." During the period the suacasc was taken, delcndant was not confined in 
any manner. Agent Whittaker testified that, when he departed the lineup area after being 
told of the positive alert, defendant "was seated at one of chairs out in the concourse area. 
Defendant claims 20 minutes elapsed between the time he was detained and when he was 
placed under arrest. During this period. Sergeant Pearson rendered his explanation 
concerning the suitcase to defendant, the bag was taken into the lineup area, the lineup was 
arranged, the drug detection dog was introduced to the lineup, and Agent Whittaker walked 
back out of the lineup area to where defendant was seated I believe the investigative 
methods employed by the police during the detention v\ere nunimalU intrusive and that the 
duration was limited to that necessan to eliectuatc the purpose ol the detention. 
[121] In his initial brief, defendant claims the officers did not have probable cause to arrest him. 
His argument centers on a lack of reasonable suspicion and that the detention exceeded the 
scope of a Terry stop. I have already discussed these issues but to lay the matter to rest, 1 
need only restate the testimony of Agent Whittaker concerning the dog's reaction when 
confronted by defendant's suitcase. He stated, "I observed the dog jump on Mr. Sery's bag, 
attempt to bite it, was scratching it and was very excited." I submit that was probable cause 
of a very convincing nature. 
[1221 The majority opinion tails 10 pro\iue me .aw eniorccmcnt cummuimv ul I hah with any 
guidance ;h u> what the oi HUMS siioum ,i one n> have been an icei. 1 lie onvious 
message to law enforcement is to leave ,)u*|)ic aionc unless prubanlc cause is present. 1 
strongly disagree. This case should stand as a model of proper ponce procedure and a 
demonstration of the step by step development of reasonable suspicion. 
[123] The lower court was correct in denying the motion to suppress. It was in error in allowing 
the entry of an invalid plea. I believe the majority in this case is wrong on both issues. 
Opinion Footnotes 
[124] *fii_l Furthermore, because Beck pleaded guilty to second degree murder and had no trial 
on that charge, he was precluded from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence at his 
hung jury trial on the first degree murder charge. State v. I Jeck, 566 P.2d at 872. 
[ I25 | :!Tn2 A Jew states have stauuorih j\cm:)tcJ sieged fourth amendment violations Irom the 
common-law/ waiver rule, specificalix pcnnming appellate review oi The denial of a 
suppression motion even though the judgment of conviction appealed from is based on the 
entry of a guilty plea. E. g., Cal. Penal Code § 1538.5(m) (West 1982); N.Y. Cnm. Proc. 
Law § 710.70(2) (Consol. 1984); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 971.31(10) (West 1985) 
[126] *fn3 New York's statute, (supra) note 2, has been described by the United States Supreme 
Court as a commendable effort "to relieve the problem of congested trial calendars in a 
manner that does not diminish the opportunity for the assertion of rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution Lefkowuz v Ncwsomc. \ \) ' S 283. 293 (1 97">) (per Stewart. I.) ()ne writer 
has argued that the United Slates v uusuiunoii compels coin is u> gu e delendants the option 
to plead conditionally guilty because an unconditional plea system needlessly burdens 
fourth amendment rights by forcing the deiendant to choose either the benefits of plea 
bargaining or preservation of the constitutional issues for appeal. Note. Conditional Guilty 
pleas, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 564, 577-85 (1980). The four main arguments against the 
conditional plea practice were analyzed and rejected by the drafters of the current rule 
governing federal criminal procedure. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2) advisory committee notes, 
reprinted In 3A C. Wright, Federal practice and procedure 77-80 (Supp. 1987). See also 
Comment. Conditioned Guilty pleas: Post-c unity Plea Appeal of Nnn-)iirisdictional Issues, 
26 UCLA L. Rev. 360. 375-82 (1978) 
[127] J'fn4 We recognize that some state conns have refused to permit the defendant, the 
prosecution, and the (rial Judge to make such conditional plea agreements without a 
specific authorizing statute or court rule. See. e.g.. State v. Amsberg. 27 Ariz. App. 205, 
553 P.2d 238 (1976); State v. Dorr. 184 N W 2d 673 (Iowa 1971) (conditional plea 
reserving search and seizure issues for appeal is unauthorized interlocutory appeal); State 
v. Turcotte, 164 Mont. 426, 524 P.2d 787 (1974) (conditional guilty plea agreement is not 
statutorily authorized and cannot be used to preserve fourth amendment issue for appeal). 
Unlike our Dissenting colleague, however, we do not construe the absence of any mention 
of conditional pleas in Utah Code Ann § 77-35-11 (1988). Utah R. Crim. P. 11. as an 
affirmative bar to such arrangements. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court recently approved 
of a guilty plea conditioned on the imposition of an agreed-upon sentence although Rule 11 
makes no mention of any type ol conditional nlca. State v Kav. 7i 7 p.2d 1294 (Utah 
1986) 
[128] *fn5 Contra United States v. Matthews, 472 F.2d 1173 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. 
Swann, 574 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1978) (conditional pleas inappropriate in absence of 
authorizing rule or statute); United States v. Clark, 459 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1972); United 
States v. Benson, 579 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1978) (conditional plea has no statutory basis and 
is contrary to prior United States Supreme Court decisions); United States v. Brown, 499 
F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1974) (conditional plea logically inconsistent and thus improper). 
[1291 *fn6 Previously, the Supreme Court hau considered and rejected on the merits a 
defendant's claim that his prosecution was barred by the statute ol limitations, even though 
he had pleaded nolo contendere after his motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court. 
Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214 (1965). As the court in United States v. Doyle, 348 
F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1965), pointed out, the record in Jaben showed that defendant's plea 
was explicitly conditioned on the right to appellate review of the limitations issue. 
[130] *fn7 That statute provides: 
[131] A peace officer may stop any person m a puhiic place when lie lias a reasonable suspicion 
to believe he has committed or is in the act ot committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation ol his actions. 
[132] Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1982). 
[133] *fn8 The United States Supreme Court has recently acknowledged that its prior decisions 
"may in some instances create difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an 
investigative stop from a de facto arrest " I huted States \ . Sharpe. -*70 I l.S (>75. ()85 
(1985). In another airline passenger detention case, the Fifth Ciicuit Court of Appeals has 
stated that, except in the context of border searches, successive investigatory stops of an 
individual based on the same information strongly indicate that an arrest requiring probable 
cause has taken place: 
[134] The coercion inherent in the successive stop situation must be acknowledged. Otherwise, 
an intrusion which can be much more severe than an actual arrest will be allowed to take 
place on the basis of much less justification 
[135] United States v. Morin, 665 F.2d 765. 760 (Sth Cir. 1982) 
[136] *fn9 'I he United Stales Supreme Court has ..crutmized stops ol an tine passengers 
exhibiting "drug courier profile" characteirmcs in three cases. United States v iViendenhall, 
446 U.S. 544 (1*980); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (per curiam); Florida v. Royer, 
460 U.S. 491 (1983). More recently, in Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984) (per 
curiam), the Court ruled on a Terr)' stop in an airport that was apparently not initiated 
based on a match-up with formal profile characteristics. 
[137] In MendenhalL the facts relied on by agents lor their suspicion of criminal acti\ ity were: 
defendant arrived from Los Angeles; was ihc last to leave the plane; appeared nervous; 
scanned the arrival area; did not claim luggage; and changed airlines. The Court did not 
reach a consensus on the appropriate reasoning to the result reached. Two of the majority 
held there was no seizure because the entire encounter with the agents was consensual; the 
reasonable suspicion issue was not reached by them. The three Concurring Justices 
assumed there was a Terry seizure and found reasonable suspicion. The four Dissenters felt 
there was a seizure without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In Reid, the agent 
was held to lack any reasonable suspicion based on the facts that defendants: arrived from 
Ft. Lauderdale; in the early morning; with only carry-on bags; and appeared to the agent to 
try to conceal their travel together. In Rover, plurality held the police conduct exceeded the 
permissible scope of a Terry investigative ion. turning the encounter into an arrest for 
which there was no probable cause, fhe lorn ujssenters concluded there was reasonable 
suspicion for defendant's stop based on me .acts that he: carried two ncav\ American 
Tourister bags; was young; casually diesscd. appeared nervous; looked around: was flying 
out of Miami, a major drug distribution center; paid for his ticket with small bills; did not 
complete the baggage ID tag; and traveled under an assumed name. Finally, in its per 
curiam decision in Rodriguez, the Court assumed there was a seizure of defendant but held 
it was justified by an articulable suspicion of criminal activity because defendant had: 
spoken furtively with his confederates after spotting the plainclothes officers; was told by 
one confederate to "Get out of here, attempted to evade the officers: and gave contradictory 
statements concerning his identity during the consensual encounter before the seizure. 
11381 These results have led one noted cum.neniatoi to conclude: 
[139] From Reid, Mendenhall, Royer and Rodriguez, it cannot be said with assurance what 
combination of factors from the "drug courier profile," if any, will suffice to justify a Terry 
stop. But some Conclusions may be reached from these decisions. For one thing, the fact 
the traveler has come from a "major source city" is of some significance, but—for the 
reasons stated in Reid —is hardly a weighty factor. Clearly that factor alone will not justify 
a stop. Nor will that factor suffice in conjunction v\ nh some other circumstance which is 
hitihlv ambiuuous. such as that the ira\rlc: aoncars nervous 
[140] 3 W LaFave, Seaich and Seizure ^ 9 ](L) (id ed 1987) (lootnotes omitted) 
[141] *fnlO Sergeant Pearson disclaimed any use of a drug courier profile as the basis for his 
stops of Sery. Nonetheless, the facts he relied on closely parallel the characteristics listed in 
a typical drug courier profile. A useful and enlightening empirical analysis of drug courier 
profile characteristics appears in Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug 
Courier profile and Judicial Review of Investigative Formulas, 65 B ILL. Rev 843 (1985). 
The author selected ninety different lepoitcd opinions irom state and fedeial appellate 
coiuts involving 103 defendants i ne JDIIIIOIIS studied weie issued nv i\vcnt\-seven 
different courts during the period hom MILIUM. 1975 thiough December 19X3 Id at 888. 
The methods employed weie designed io \ iciti luct-based mioimation Pun icting insight 
into the use ol the drug courier profile dntl its impact on judicial decision-making The 
study presents a comprehensive overview unavailable to courts reviewing the facts of 
individual cases and calls for additional scrutiny of the profile using other systematic 
methods: 
[142] The diug courier profile has never been subjected to process oi^  validation. The government 
has not conducted any systematic stuu>7 to determine whethei the cium profile has any 
predictive validity Indeed, the onlv evidence oi its effectiveness has geneialh been the 
testimony of agents who utilize the profile .n tne field This testimony is hpically deficient 
because even when agents "weie recognized as having made stops in a substantial number 
of past instances where their suspicions proved to be correct |theie was no| evidence as to 
the number of instances in which innocent passengers had been subjected by them to 
investigatory stops." 
[143] ... In the rare instances where the government has provided non-anecdotal evidence 
purporting to establish the profile's validity, (he information has been facially deficient. In 
particular, the data fails to account (oi all piotile-related police encounters with an 
travelers and provides no evidence mciicaimi* that the profile aeeuiateiv distinguishes drug 
couiieis from innocent passengeis 
[144] Id. at 875-76 (quoting United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1981), aff d, 462 
U.S. 696 (1983)). We share the author's concerns about the reliance on drug courier 
profiles by police and reviewing courts. No litmus-paper test can determine whether the 
police possessed sufficient facts to justify a person's seizure Id. at 857 The profile formula 
is such a test. If (a) courts accept the piemise that the profile works accurately, l e . 
identifies couriers and (b) the government shows a trained agent has conformed the traveler 
to the profile, the courts' reviewing function is vutually eliminated Id. I he agent's 
behavioial inteipietation supplants com i lcview because his claims become seil-venfying. 
[145] Cloud's analysis yielded these Conclusions about the following frequently occurring shared 
profile characteristics, similar to the seven facts enumerated by the State in the case before 
us: 
[146] (1) Arrival from or Travel to Drug "Source City" or Drug "Use City": The results indicate 
that the cities of arrival or destination of drug couriers (for those defendants arrested before 
their flights were completed) are dispersed throughout the country. Id. at 901. "f every area 
of the nation is suspect (as a drug use location), then every air naveiler is potentially a 
suspect merely by virtue oi traveling between two locations." k;. at 91KJ furthermore, 
"drug traffickers may travel to anv cit\ in the nation Suspicion surely cannot attach to a 
traveler simply because he is going somewiicic." Id. at 902. 
[147] (2) Nervousness: 
[148] According to the police... 50.5% of the defendants exhibited pre-contact nervousness. 
Although nearly one-half of the defendanis did not conform to [this characteristic), the data 
suggest that it is one of the most significant characteristics to me police. I Miommately, it is 
also the most subjective of the characieiisucs comprising the lormai profiles 
[149] Id. at 903. 
[150] (3) Using Telephone Upon Arrival: More drug couriers did not make telephone calls than 
did. Phone calls were made by only 19.4% of defendants in the studied cases. Id. at 906. 
[151] (4) Unusual Itinerary: Placc-to-place iravel by an unusual itinerary (not within the terminal, 
as with Sery). such as rapid turnaround time. ^ u cnaractensuc in o\w standard drug courier 
profile. Yet only I 7.5% ol the studied uelencianis were described as tiavelmg with a fast 
turnaround time. Id. at 909. 
[152] (5) Use of an Alias: Police learned of an alias before making investigative contact with 
only 3.9% of defendants. Officers learned during the initial contact that 21.4% of the 
suspects were not using aliases, yet continued their investigations. Id. at 905-06. 
[153] (6) Left False Telephone Callback Numbci with Airline: Leaving a false number may be 
suspicious because it leaves no record u>r use in tracing suspects. \et it was attributed to 
only 11% of the defendants, fhe reliability ol this characteristic is doubtful, since 
substantial record-keeping problems exist that increase the possibility of a false number 
report. Any error in reciting the number to the airline, or by the airline in receiving, 
recording or retrieving, or by the police in doing the same (or in dialing) could lead 
investigators to conclude incorrectly that the traveler had left a fake number. Id. at 907. 
[154] *fnl 1 Pearson's description of Sery's nervousness is remarkably similar to that used by 
drug agents to describe the behavior ol the defendants stopped in Mcndenhall. 446 U.S. at 
547 n.l (deplaning defendant "appeared to nc \eiv nervous" and "completely scanned the 
whole area where |the agents| were siandaiLi"; and Ko\ci. 4o() 11 ", ii i9 > n ^ (defendant 
"appeared pale and nervous, looking arounu ai omcr people"). These cases liiusiraic the 
ease with which agents may make an JKC, ii.c laci subjective assc.i.on Illuni! the suspect 
into a mode of criminality. 
[155] *fnl2 In United States v. Sanford, 658 F.2d 342, 345 (5th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 
991 (1982), the famous drug agent Markonni had asserted he could distinguish innocent 
nervousness from criminal nervousness. Pearson did not describe Sery's looking around as 
unusually nervous; his use of this human characteristic must rest on the presumption that 
drug couriers, afraid of discovery, act differently from innocent travelers and exhibit 
increasingly nervous behavior when uaiciicu. approached. o\' questioned. The necessity for 
(he officer TO make an on-ihc-spot c\au,aiiun ol a person's psychological slate portends 
enormous potential lor subjective abuse, A a uavei frequently involves events and human 
feelings which spawn nervous and perhaps "suspicious" behavior. Some examples are: 
frightening, cancelled, or delayed flights; missed connections; late arrivals causing missed 
appointments; lost tickets or baggage; and dashed expectations of being met by someone. 
To this list of quotidian travel traumas, we would add: being watched, followed, or 
accosted by unknown persons for unknown reasons. 
[156] *fnl3 The court reporter at the suppression hearing first transcribed the stated name on the 
airline ticket as "Sid Sellow " riieieaner. ,, »\as variously transcribed as Sedsel. Sidse] and 
Sutcel. 
[157] *fhl4 Respondent cites United States v. Espinosa-Guerra, 805 F.2d 1502 (1 ] th Cir. 1986), 
as support for the notion that an airline passenger's claim to not be carrying identification 
other than a ticket is a fact reasonably arousing suspicion in a trained drug agent. In 
Espinosa-Guerra, however, defendant's claim that he wras carrying no identification 
assumed unusual significance—along with other objective facts articulated by the 
investigating drug agent—because he was traveling a long distance and did not speak 
English. Id Ait 1508. 
[158] 1 Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-1 (1988) lists live kinds of pleas: not guilty; guilty: no contest; 
not guilty by reason of insanity; and guilty and mentally ill. 
[159] 2 In footnote 10, the majority acknowledged that Sergeant Pearson "disclaimed any use of 
a drug courier profile" in his stops of defendant. However, the majority then discusses at 
great length a law review article primarily concerned with the profile. Several discrete 
behavioral factors relative to drun couriers are analyzed and. where possible, a percentage 
is stated. The percentage relates to thuse ... JL» .ouner defendants \,no exhibited the 
particular factor. The results arc noi uainninn wnen an individual lacior is examined. 
However, when a defendant exhibits a multiplicity of these factors, the significance of the 
percentages fades. The bias in the lootnote snould also be noted. In most, a small 
percentage is stated to show just how small the percentage of suspects exhibited the 
characteristic. In the use of an alias the use of the percentage is reversed. In truth. 78.6% of 
suspects were using aliases as was Sery. While the majority claims the officers did not 
know Sery was using an alias, Sery himself told them the ticket was not in his name and 
that he carried no identification. 
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APPENDIX F 
Information 
George W. Preston, 2643 
Rich County Attorney 
20 South Main Street 
Randolph, UT 84064 
Telephone: (435)793-2100 
Fax: (435)793-2101 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR RICH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
INFORMATION 
vs. 
JACOB A WEBB j 
DOB: 10/16/1987, 
Defendant. J 
Case No. 
Judge 
OTN#: 
Clint S. Judkins 
t>1 
The undersigned George W. Preston, under oath states on information and belief that the 
defendant, in Rich County, State of Utah, committed the following crime(s): 
COUNT 1: BURGLARY in violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-6-202, a third degree 
felony, as follows: That on or about^tofeer 21^2005, in Rich County, the defendant 
entered or remained unlawfully i n ^ ^ p K ^ ^ ° r anY portion of a building with intent to 
commit: (a) a felony; 
(b) theft; 
COUNT 2: THEFT in violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-6-404, a class A 
misdemeanor, as follows: That on or about October 21, 2005, in Rich County, the 
defendant obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of another with 
the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and that the value of said property was or 
exceeded $300, but was less than $1,000. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witness: Mark 
Lee. 
Dated this 6 December 2005 
Geofgf W. Diiston 
Ricn Count\lAttorney 
APPENDIX G 
Utah DMV Vehicle Requirement 
Utah DMV - Registering Vehicles Page 1 of2 
Revised April 14, 2006 
Registering Vehicles - General Information 
• Pub 9. How To Register Your Vehicle in Utah 
• What Vehicles Must be Registered? 
• Who Must Register Their Vehicles? 
• Where to go and What to Bring 
• First Time Registration 
• Safety Inspection 
• Emission Inspection 
• Insurance Requirements 
What^ehicleg Must Be Registered? 
^ A l H c a r s ^ motorcycles, boats, trucks;.campers and pff-|* 
highwayVefficaesW^cl in t h g s B ^ ^ b^eglsteredl:Tr^ler$^eigHihg /6U iBiTfog 
— Tepre^pl\piomot have 10 be registered. However, any trailer may be registered-for 
i^ioufcony€inience| 
Who Must Register Their Vehicles? 
Utah residents must register any of the above vehicles for use in the state. 
Nonresidents using their boats, off-highway vehicles and snowmobiles in Utah for more than 
14 days per year must register in Utah. For more information, follow these links: 
OHVs (includes snowmobiles): http://www.st^ 
Boat Registration: http://www.stateparks.utah.gov/boating/registering.htm 
For vehicle registration purposes, a resident is anyone who engages in a trade, profession, 
occupation or gainful employment in Utah for more than sixty days. 
Exceptions: Nonresident students who pay nonresident tuition, certain military personnel and 
temporary workers may be exempt from registering vehicles. 
Where To Go And What To Bring 
Bring to the Divisjortof Mojor Vehicles (DMV) the following for each vehicle 
• Most recent registration 
• Title 
• Utah safety inspection certificate, if required 
• Utah emission certificate, if required 
• Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) inspections, if being titled in Utah for the first time. 
See Form TC-661, "Certificate of Inspection". 
• At least one person whose name will appear on new title 
First-time Registration 
APPENDIX H 
Official Report 
..2/06/05 Rich Co. Sheriff's Office 2< 
il:17 LAW Incident Table: Page: 
Case Number: 
Incident Number: 05-1143 
Nature: Burglary 
Addr: Pole Canyon 
City: Randolph 
+- Complainant: 153 96 
Lst: Hines 
DOB: / / SSN: - -
Rac: Sx: Tel: (801)622-5454 
Image: 
St: UT Zip: 84064 
Area: RAND Randolph 
Contact 
Fst: Linda Mid: 
Adr: 680 E North Street 
Cty: Ogden St: UT Zip: 84404 
Offense Codes: 
Circumstances: 
Xspndg Officers: 
^spnsbl Officer: 
Received By: 
How Received: 
When Reported: 
Dccurrd between: 
and: 
40: 
BNFE __ Reported: Observed: 
Mark Lee 
Mark Lee 
Brandi Jones 
P IN PERSON 
21:26:00 10/21/05 
21:26:00 10/21/05 
21:26:00 10/21/05 
Agency: RCSO 
Last RadLog: 
Clearance: 
Disposition: 
Judicial Sts: 
Misc Entry: 
CAD Call ID: 
: / / 
CAA Disp Date: 11/16/05 
Narrative: Someone broke into thei two campers and took numerous items 
Supplement: (See below) + (See below) 
INVOLVEMENTS 
Ype Record # Date Description Relationship 
NM 
NM 
NM 
NM 
11006 
11784 
14460 
15396 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
Dalke, Christopher David 
Webb, Jacob Allen 
Gray, Skyler 
Hines, Linda 
Suspect 
Suspect 
Suspect 
^Complainant 
AW Incident Offenses Detail: 
Offense Codes 
eg Code 
1 BNFE Burglary, Non-res, Forcibl Ent 
Amount 
0.00 
AW Incident Responders Detail 
Responding Officers 
eg Name Unit 
1 Mark Lee 4 
** Officer's Report * * * 
n 10/22/1005 Ueput^^S.chirado and I responded to the |Pole Canyon, area on 
report of a ^ x^^^^i)^rlary. We met with Buddy Hines and his family 
wife is listea complainant)". Their € § 8 ^ was located at N 41 39.311 N 
11 19.570. They left the camp last %U^day night at the close of the 
Ik hunt and returned last night at around 1830 hrs. They discovered 
Dth trailer doors were open, the locks either broken or missing and the 
indow of the gold trailer broken out. Ijphotographed both trailers, 
sputy Schirado collected some possible c/ontact- evidence for processing. 
""he following items are missing: 
ralue Description 
1100 3 camp chairs 
100 Misc. clothing, incl. hoody w/ "ABC Roofing Supplies" 
40 Faded orange/camo hunting vest, "poofy" 
50 Misc. food 
50 DVD player, Colby 
100 Two BB guns, one Red Ryder, another w/ stickers 
200 Ammo (7mm, .30-06, .30-30, .243, 12 ga. 
50 Small green Coleman propane tanks 
6 New blanket w/ Deer on it 
90 Knife sharpening kit in blue case 
50 Other knife sharpening equipment 
100 Hunting and skinning knifes 
50 Gun cleaning kit 
fm relaying specifics of some of these items to local law enforcement 
fficers for ATL. No suspects at this time. 
ee 
** Supplemental Report *** 
was called to assist Deputy Russell on a possible possession of stolen 
roperty case on 10/25/2005. After meeting with him, we decided the 
Bst approach would be to craft an affidavit requesting a search warrant 
lich we did on 10/25 and 10/26. 
i 10/26/2005 I served a search warrant with Agent Bartschi of the 
ache-Rich Drug Task Force on the Red 1992 Pontiac Sunbird bearing Utah 
)4MYB located at 160 N. Main, Randolph. In the process of the service, 
> spoke with Jacob Webb (DOB 10/16/1987), an adult, and his mother. We 
Ivised them of the service and Jacob came out with us to the car. I 
^covered a deer print blanket from the back seat of the car, and a blue 
>ody sweat shirt bearing "ABC Supply" on the front and a camo/faded 
inter orange reversible pillowed vest from the trunk. I read Jacob 
.randa from my pocket code booklet and he waived silence and counsel. 
i admitted that he'd gotten the deer blanket and the hoody from a 
*ail^^."up Pole Canyon" but wasn't sure about the vest at that time, 
ianwliiie, Agent Bartschi recovered two gun cleaning kits from under the 
iats of the car and a dart set from the glove box. Jacob admitted that 
Lose items weren't his either. 
• spoke with Jacob's mom who gave us permission to go into the room 
.at Jacob shares with his older brother. Jacob doesn't pay rent, 
cob accompanied us into the room and voluntarily ejected a 
me-recorded videotape from his player (titled "10" in handwriting) and 
rrendered it along with a box of fuses. He said he got them from a 
ailer "near Stauffer's Mine" in Lincoln County, Wyoming. He also 
rrendered a plastic bag full of ammo (seven full or paritial boxes 
m, one .30-06, and one 12 ga.) which he said he got from the-Pole* 
nyon trailejr. Jacob's mother gave us a videotape that she'd taken 
^rom Jacob's room because she thought it was inappropriate. The video 
was a prerecorded VHS tape bearing the title "Raquel Darrian." 
Agent Bartschi and I interviewed Jacob in his parents' bedroom on fvideo 
wmsw hrs-r 
Jacob admitted that he'd been up in the Pole Canyon "last Friday" "two 
days before the hunt started." He described two campers similar to 
those burgled. He said that the blanket with the deer and the hoody 
were some of the property taken during the ten minute burglary. He also 
admitted to being involved in a trailer burglary in Lincoln Co. after 
the Pole Canyon burglary. He said it was a Sunday. He and an unnamed 
partner were running out of gas, and they saw a generator near the camp 
they later burgled so they thought there might be some gas there. There 
was. The trailer door was open and they took property including poker 
chips, and alarm clock, "squeeze" Kool aide and "they" brought back 
other property. With prompting, Jake admitted also taking some videos 
during this five minute burglary. They came back later and spoke with 
some guys at the camp who asked them about any information they might 
have about a burglary. We concluded this short interview at 1845 hrs*. 
^gent Bartschi agreed to meet with Jake at the Sheriff's Office for a 
nore detailed interview while I collected the property and processed it. 
We went to the Sheriff's Office. While we were there, Jake's mom 
called and indicated that she'd discovered other property she believed 
night be related to our inquiry. Sheriff Stacey went by and picked that 
property up. 
3ee other supps. for additional information. 
jee 
C-ref case 05-1161 
APPENDIX I 
State vs. Musser 118 UT 537, 232 P.2d 193 (1950) 
10/20/50 STATE v. MUSSER ET AL. 
[ 1 ] SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
[2] No. 6818 
[3] 1950.UT.78 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 223 P.2d 193, 118 Utah 537 
[4] October 20, 1950 
[5] STATE 
v. 
MUSSER ET AL. 
[6] Appealed from Third District court, Salt Lake County, Ray Van cott. Jr.. Judge. 
[7] Claude T. Barnes, T. H. McKnight. Knox Patterson, Ray S. McCarty. fid win D. Hatch, Salt 
Lake City, for appellants. 
[8] Grover A. Giles. Attorney General, with Calvin L. Rampton and W. S VVagstaff. Assistant 
Attorneys General. Brigham E. Roberts. District Attorney, and II. D I owry. Deputy 
District Attorney, Salt Lake City, for respondent. 
[9] Wade. Justice. Wade, Latimer, Pratt, C. J., and Wolfe and Mcdonough. JJL concur. 
[10] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Wade 
[111 WADE. Justice. 
[12] Section 103-11-1, U.C.A. 1943, denounces as a criminal offense for two or more persons to 
conspire 
[13] "(5) To commit any act injurious * * * to public morals * * *" 
[14] Our problem here is to determine whether the broad sweep of that general language, in view 
of the whole context of that statute and our other statutory and common laws and the history 
and background of the enactment of that statute may be by construction limited so as to 
define the offense therein denounced so as 
[15] "to give adequate guidance to those who would be law-abiding, to advise defendants of the 
nature of the offense with which they are charged, or to guide courts m trying those who are 
accused" 
[16] under that subdivision. Musser v. State, 333 U.S. 95, 68 S. Ct. 397, 398, 92 L. Ed. 562. 
[17] Appellants were convicted of an offense under the above subdivision. We sustained that 
conviction on the grounds that the evidence showed that they were parties to "an agreement 
to advocate, counsel, advise and urge the practice of polygamy and unlawful cohabitation 
by other persons". State v. Musser. I H) Hum 534, I 75 P.2d 724. 734 Vlthough the 
appellants urged that their conviction violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution, the question here presented was never specifically assigned or argued in any 
court until inquiries from the bench suggested it during the argument before the United 
States Supreme Court. That court set aside the convictions and remanded the case to us for 
further consideration. Musser v. State, supra. 
[18] The problem which we must decide as stated above, must be answered in the negative. The 
argument before this court has developed no reason why we should believe that the 
legislature intended, in using this language, that it should be limited 10 a meaning less broad 
than the words therein usca would indicate in uieir ordinary sense i\o language in this or 
any other statute of this state or other law {hereof or any historical laci or surrounding 
circumstance connected with the enactment of this statute has been pointed to as indicating 
that the legislature intended any limitation theron other than that expressed on the face of 
the words used. We are therefore unable to place a construction on these words which limits 
their meaning beyond their general meaning. The conviction of the defendants thereunder 
cannot be upheld. This part of the statute is therefore void for vagueness and uncertainty 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. 
[19] In the case of Ot \ of Price \. Ja\ncs el a!.. : i3 Utah 89. NI i} 2d o0(>. u()7. we struck down 
a city ordinance on this ground. That ordinance provided that the right of the people of that 
city "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures shall not be violated", and denounced the violation of that provision as a crime. 
[20] While the wording of this ordinance was taken directly from the Fourth Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution, and the terms thereof have been many times construed by the courts 
of this nation, still we were of the opinion that under the decision in Musser v. State, supra, 
that ordinance was void on account of vagueness and uncertainty. If that ordinance was 
void on that account and in view o1 the many judicial constructions which have been placed 
upon those words, certainly in the absence ol any judicial construction of the words of this 
statute, which is equally vague and uncertain, we are not justified in the absence of some 
historical basis therefor in limiting this statute by construction. 
k&' 
[21] The judgment of the lower court is therefore reversed. The convictions of the defendants are 
vacated and set aside. 
[22] PRATT, C. J., and WOLFE and MCDONOUGH, JJ., concur. 
[23] LATIMER, Justice (concurring in the result). 
[24] I concur in the result. 
[25] The United States Supreme Court in Ivlusser ci ai v. State of Utah, 33 U.S. 95. 68 S.Ct. 397, 
92 L. Ed. 562, passed back to us a determination of two questions: (I) Whether Section 
103-11-1, U.C.A., 1943, is so vague and indefinite that it fails adequately to define the 
offense or give reasonable standards for determining guilt; and (2) whether the right to raise 
the first question has been waived or lost because there was a failure to comply with our 
appellate practice and assign ii as error in ihc first hearing. Admitted!) . die first question 
was not raised before this court in the previous hearing, but in view of the importance of the 
principle involved. 1 believe it requires an answer. 
[26] Insofar as is material to my decision. Seeiiou U)3-l 1-1. I '.C.A.. I l '43. is as follows: 
[27] "If two or more persons conspire: 
[28] "(1) To commit a crime; or 
[29] "(5) To commit any act injurious ::: :' ::: u> public morals . :;: * :;: thev aie punishable by 
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one \car. or by fine not exceeding Si.000." 
[30] 1 am of the opinion that the conviction could have been sustained under subsection (1) of 
Section 103-1 I - 1 , U.C.A., 1943, had it not been lor the theory of the state and the 
instructions given by the trial court. Both polygamy and cohabitation have been made 
offenses by our legislature and under subsection (1) when two or more persons conspire to 
commit either of those crimes they have committed a separate offense. 
[31] To illustrate the theory of the trial, the Judge instructed the jur\ as follows: 
[32] "Your attention is directed, however, to the fact that the defendants are not charged 
specifically with the crime of polygamy, nor specifically with the crime of polygamy, nor 
specifically with the crime ol unlawful cohabitation. They are charged with the crime of 
conspiracy, conspiracy to do an act injurious to public morals * * * " 
[33] "You are instructed that an agreement between two or more persons to advocate, promote, 
encourage, teach, counsel, advise, and practice polygamous or plural marriages and to 
advocate, promote, encourage, urge, counsel, advise and practice the cohabitation of one 
male person with more than one woman, is, as a matter of law, an agreement to do an act 
injurious to public morals." (Emphasis added.) 
[34] These instructions direct the attention of the jurors to the theory that the prosecution is 
predicated upon a conspiracy to commit acts injurious to public morais and not upon a 
conspiracy to commit a crime. An agreement between two or more parties to teach 
polygamy might be considered by a jury as a conspiracy to commit an act injurious to 
public morals and yet not be considered as a conspiracy to commit a crime. Marrying 
another while married has been made a statutory offense, but teaching that polygamy should 
be legalized has not. 
[35] The state, having electee! to prosecute undei Midsection (5). cannot m > :ei\ nn Mtbsection 
(1) as the jury might have taken a different view under a different theory Such being the 
case, we are required to determine wheiner tne conviction can ne sustained under the first 
mentioned subsection 
[36] This court in the case of Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke et aL 50 I tah 114, 167 P. 241. 
242, stated: 
[37] "To challenge the constitutionality of a solemn and deliberate act of legislation by the 
lawmaking power of a sovereign state always presents a serious question. howe\er trifling 
or insignificant may be the amount unoived in the particular case.' 
[38] In connection with the present action, its history, background and procedural deficiences. 
declaring the statute unconstitutional is a serious and delicate task and owe which 1 would 
not do unless 1 believed the statute clearly violated the constitutional rights of the 
appellants. However, this court's duty is to protect these rights of citizens and if a penal 
statute fails adequately to define an offense so that an ordinary individual cannot tell 
whether the acts he is committing are legal or illegal it must be held invalid for failing to 
meet the tests prescribed by the due process clause. The legislature cannot leave to Judges 
or juries the right to prescribe the elements of an offense. Different coarts and different 
jurors would prescribe different standards and no one would know wivther he was a sinner 
or a saint. As stated by Mr. Justice JACKSON in Musser et al. v. Suite of I liah. supra: 
[39] "Legislation may run afoul of the Due Process Clause because it fails to give adequate 
guidance to those who would be law-abiding, to advise defendants of the nature of the 
offense with which they are charged, or to guide courts in trying those who are accused.' 
The subsection need not stand by itself as the law of this state. It could be considered in 
connection with other statutory enactments or decisions of this court, if there were any, 
which had a bearing on its interpretation. 11 other statutes had been enacted which set up the 
necessary standards, or had this court circumscribed the import of the language, or could it 
now fix reasonable limits from the language of the act, then the vagueness or uncertainty 
might be cured. However, a search has convinced me that this court has not by any decision 
limited the subsection, other provisions of the statutes do not afford definite standards for 
determining guilt and the language, when given its ordinary meaning, covers so much that it 
has no bounds. 
I might pose the question: How all inclusive is the phrase "contrary to public morals"? It 
mut be conceded it has wide coverage unless limited by other judicial or legislative 
pronouncements. It has been suggested that the phrase can be interpreted so as to indicate a 
legislative intent to limit its effect to those acts which are specified by the legislature in 
other sections of the statutes as being injurious to public morals. This argument overlooks 
the fact that if the acts were denounced by the Legislature they would constitute crimes, and 
that subsection (1) covers those instances where parties conspire to commit a crime. I do not 
conceive of an\ act which the legisiaiiuc has .said LS prohibited because of being injurious to 
public morals which has not been made a crime, the Legislature must have contemplated 
some acts additional to those defined as ciirncs when it selected the wording it used. The 
acts encompassed by the phrascoloLW >! .uh.cchon ( s! appear to he '.M isc u\ -r and abo\e 
the ones mentioned in subsection (I). i Mhcrwisc. the Legislature enacied a useless 
provision. 
In interpreting a statute, the legislature will be presumed to have inserted every part for a 
purpose and to have intended that every part be given effect. Significance and meaning 
should, if possible, be accorded every phrase, and a construction is taxored which will 
render every word operative rather than one which makes some phrases or subsections 
nugatory. If we adopt the foregoing rule of construction we must hold that subsection (5) is 
a catch-all provision without guides, standards or limits. 
There are situations when conspiracies to teach certain dogmas, tenets, or beliefs might be 
deemed inimical to public morals by some jurist and by some jurors, and yet not be defined 
by the Legislature as crimes. The teaching of card-playing might be considered by some as 
being in that category, although the Legislature may not have made such teaching a crime. 
It is in this aspect that category, although the Legislature may not have made such teaching 
a crime. It is in this aspect that subsection (5) becomes vagrant and wandering and has no 
limits. Courts and juries might determine thai certain teachings offend against public morals 
and yet the parties dong the teaching mnihi noi be ad\ ised by slatute ov otherwise that they 
were committing a crime. The standards mi an ollcnse would thus he fixed b\ those who 
heard the evidence and not by the I.egiMaiuic. whose duty it is to define crime with some 
degree of particularity. 
In the final analysis, each individual has his own moral codes, private and public, and what 
acts might be considered as injurious to public morals are as numerous as the opinions of 
man. The law requires that crimes be defined with more certainty than that. 
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APPENDIX J 
Information #66 
George W. Preston, 2643 
Rich County Attorney 
20 South Main Street 
Randolph, UT 84064 
Telephone: (435)793-2100 
Fax: (435)793-2101 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
EST AND FOR RICH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACOB A WEBB i 
DOB: 10/16/1987, 
Defendant. | 
| INFORMATION 
Case No. 
Judge Clint S. Judkins 
OTN#: / , 
The undersigned George W. Preston, under oath states on information and belief that the 
defendant, in Rich County, State of Utah, committed the following crime(s): 
COUNT 1: VEHICLE BURGLARY in violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-6-204, a 
class A misdemeanor, as follows: That on or about October 21, 2005, in Rich County, the 
defendant unlawfully entered any vehicle with intent to commit a felony or theft. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witness: Mike 
Russell. 
Dated this 6 December 2005 
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State vs. Cates, 2000 UT APP 256 #990402 CA 
Utah Court of Appeals Decisions 
State v. Cates 
2000 UT APP 256 
Case Number: 990402CA 
Decided: 09/08/2000 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Cite as: 2000 UT APP 256, 
State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee 
v. 
Rick Keith Cates, Defendant and Appellant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Eighth District, Vernal Department 
The Honorable John R. Anderson 
Attorneys: 
Wesley M. Baden, Vernal, for Appellant 
Jan Graham and Karen A. Klucznik, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Billings. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Defendant appeals his conviction of burglary of a dwelling, a second degree felony. Defendant claims he should 
only have been convicted of third degree burglary because the camping trailer where he committed the burglary 
was not a "dwelling." 
At issue is whether a rented camping trailer with sleeping quarters, parked in the mountains and being used 
during the fall deer hunt, is a "dwelling" within the meaning of the Utah burglary statute, Utah Code section 76-6-
202. That section provides: 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a 
building with intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is 
a felony of the second degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1999). The burglary statute defines "building" and "dwelling" as follows-
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, 
or other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on 
business therein . . . . 
(2)MDwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night, 
whether or not a person is actually present. 
Id. §76-6-201. 
Defendant argues the rented camping trailer was a "building" rather than a "dwelling," and he should therefore 
have been charged with a third degree felony, rather than a second degree felony. We disagree. Defendant 
ignores the plain language of the statute, case law, and the policy behind distinguishing burglaries of dwellings 
from those of other types of structures. 
Defendant argues that a structure cannot be both a "building" and a "dwelling" under sections 76-6-201 and -202. 
However, under the plain language of the statute, it is clear that a "dwelling" is a specialized type of "building," 
one "which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(2) (1999). Thus, 
although not every "building" is a "dwelling," every "dwelling" is necessarily a "building" under the statute. 
Defendant's assertion that a rented camping trailer cannot be a "dwelling" because it is a "building" is therefore 
incorrect.(1) 
This Court dealt with the interpretation of "dwelling" under section 76-6-201 and -202 in State v. Cox, 826_P,2d 
656 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). We held that the statutory term "usually occupied" in section 76-6-201(2) "refers to the 
purpose for which the structure is used. If the structure is one in which people typically stay overnight, it fits within 
the definition of dwelling under the burglary statute." Id. at 662. In Cox, the defendant argued that a mountain 
cabin, occupied less than fifty percent of the time and unoccupied at the time of the burglary, was not a "dwelling" 
under the statute. See id_. We concluded the cabin was a "dwelling," noting that "our second degree burglary 
statute is intended to protect people while in places where they are likely to be living and sleeping overnight, as 
opposed to protecting property in buildings such as stores, business offices, or garages." Id. 
Like the cabin in Cox, the nature of camping trailers equipped with sleeping quarters is such that persons may 
typically be expected to use them for overnight lodging, especially in the mountains or camping areas. Indeed, the 
victims had rented this trailer for the express purpose of staying in it during the fall deer hunt, and had slept in it 
the previous night. The record reveals the trailer had its own table, bathroom, and beds, and was "self-contained," 
complete with dishes, pots and pans, and bedding. In short, it was equipped for overnight lodging, and was, when 
rented and parked, "usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(2) (1999). 
Because the trial court correctly interpreted the Utah burglary statute to include a rented overnight camping trailer 
within the statutory definition of "dwelling," defendant's conviction of second degree burglary is affirmed. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Associate Presiding Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
FOOTNOTES 
1. We recognize that the statutory definition of "building" under § 76-6-201(1) includes "any . . trailer. . . adapted 
for overnight accommodation of persons." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201 (1) (1999). However, it is a rule of statutory 
construction that specific terms control over more general terms. See, e.g., Biddle v._ Washington Terrace, 1999 
UTJ_10,1(14, 993 P.2d 875. Thus, the more specific definition of "dwelling" may include a "trailer. . . adapted for 
overnight accommodations," if the trailer is "usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night." Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-201(1) & (2). 
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Appendix L 
State vs. Shondel at 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969) 
H/10/69 STATE UTAH v. HERBERT LEE SHONDEL 
[I] SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
[2] No. 11287 
[3] 1969.UT.69 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 453 P.2d 146, 22 Utah 2d 343 
[4] April 10, 1969 
[5] THE STATE OF UTAH, PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT, 
v. 
HERBERT LEE SHONDEL, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
[6] Jay V. Barney, Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
[7] Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Lauren N. Beasley, Joseph P. McCarthy, Asst. Attys. Gen., 
Salt Lake City, for respondent. 
[8] Crockett, Chief Justice, wrote the opinion. 
[9] Callister and Tuckett, JJ., concur. 
[10] Henriod, Justice (dissenting). 
[II] Ellett, Justice (dissenting). 
[12] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Crockett 
[13] CROCKETT, Chief Justice. 
[14] The defendant was charged by information with unlawful possession of LSD (Lysergic acid 
diethylamide). After an unsuccessful motion to quash, the defendant admitted his 
possession and was found guilty of a feiony as charged and sentenced to the Utah State 
Prison. He appeals, attacking the validity of his sentence and the statute under which it was 
imposed. 
[15] The question here presented arises because of an uncertainty created by an overlapping of 
our statutes dealing with such drugs. Under what is called the Drug Abuse Control Law, 
enacted as Chapter 140, Session Laws of 1967 (§ 58-33-1(d) [U.C.A. 1953]), it is provided: 
[16] The term "depressant or stimulant drug" means: (3) Any drug or derivative containing any 
quantity of d-Lyser-gic acid diethylamide commonly known as LSD. 
[17] Section 58-33-2 prohibits possession and Section 58-33-4(a) provides that: 
[18] Any person who violates any of the provisions of section 58-33-2 shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor and shall on conviction thereof be subject to imprisonment for not more than 
one year or a fine of not more than one thousand dollars or both such imprisonment and 
fine; * * *. 
[19] The overlapping in our statute occurs because the same session ot the legislature m Chapter 
139 passed an amendment to the Narcotic Uiug Act as follows: 
[20] § 58-13a-l(16) "Narcotic drugs" means * * * LSD-25, and every substance neither 
chemically nor physically distinguishable from them. 
[21] § 58-13a-2. It shall be unlawful for any person to * * * possess + * * any narcotic drug, 
except as authorized in this act. 
[22] § 58-13a-44. * * :! Any person violating any otner provision of this chapter shall, upon 
conviction, be punished for the first offense by a fine of not less than $1,000 or by 
imprisonment in the Utah state prison for not exceeding five years, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment, * * *. 
[23] We agree with the proposition advocated by the defendant that the equal protection of the 
laws requires that they affect alike all persons similarly situated. A fnl It is therefore 
necessary for us to determine which of the two penalties should apply to persons found 
guilty of possession of LSD to obviate unequal treatment of such persons under the law. 
i!
 fn2 We first direct attention to the generally-recognized rule that where there is conflict 
between two legislative acts the latest will oiduianly prevail but in this instance that rule is 
not helpful. Although it is true that the Drug Abuse Control Act was the later enactment by 
a few days, both statutes were passed at the same session of the legislature, and they have 
the same effective date. In such a situation the rule that the later act takes precedence over 
the former has no application unless there is a clearly-expressed intention to that effect. 
*fn3 We must therefore look to the two statutes vis-a-vis each other. 
[24] Looking at the Drug Abuse Control Act by itself, there is a clear and understandable 
specification of the drug and that its unlawful possession in punishable as a misdemeanor. 
However, if that Act is read carefully the situation is beclouded because there is another 
provision. § 58-33-6(g) which states: 
[25] Notwithstanding the other provisions of this act, whenever the possession, sale, transfer, or 
dispensing of any drug or substance would constitute an offense under this act and also 
constitutes an offense under the laws of this state relating to the possession, sale, transfer, or 
dispensing of narcotic drugs or marijuana, such offense shall not be punishable under this 
act but shall be punishable under such other provision of law. 
[26] This reference to "such other provision ol the law" leaves one concerned with compliance 
with the law to search elsewhere to discover whether some "other provision of the law" 
dealing with narcotic drugs or marijuana prescribes some other penalty for the possession of 
LSD. The well-established rule is that a statute creating a crime should be sufficiently 
certain that persons of ordinary intelligence who desire to obey the law may know how to 
conduct themselves in conformity with it. *fn4 A fair and logical concomitant of that rule is 
that such a penal statute should be similarly clear, specific and understandable as to the 
penalty imposed for its violation. 
[27] Related to the doctrine just stated is the rule that where there is doubt or uncertainty as to 
which of two punishments is applicable to an offense an accused is entitled to the benefit of 
the lesser. :Tn5 This impels the Conclusion heie that the clear, specific and lesser penalty 
prescribed for the offense as a misdcmeanoi under Sec. 58-33-2 is me one which should be 
imposed. We say this mindful of our statute v\hich provides that the common-law rule of 
strict construction of statutes is not applicable in this state. But it is our opinion the 
Conclusion we have reached is in harmony with that section's further mandate that our 
statutes should be "construed according to the fair import of their terms with a view to 
effect the objects of the statutes and to promote Justice." *fii6 
[28] It has previously been adjudicated that when the wrong sentence has been imposed, the 
correct procedure is to impose the proper sentence '' ln7 Remanded tor proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
[29] CALLISTER and TUCKETT, JJ., concur. 
[30] HENRIOD, Justice (dissenting). 
[31] I Dissent. I would be constrained to concur except for the statement in the main opinion that 
"where there is doubt or uncertain^ as to \\mch of two punishments i^  applicable to an 
offense an accused is entitled to the benefit ol the lesser." I believe that the quoted 
statement should be the law. and is the law .n at least a gieat ma|ont\ ol the states other 
than Utah. In saying this 1 refer to State v. i witchell, 8 Utah 2d 314, 333 P 2d 1075 (1959) 
in which the author of the instant opinion concurred. It seems to e that Twitchell flies in the 
teeth of the instant case, and unless o\ei ruled, should be controlling here. It seems to me 
that the Twitchell case supports the Conclusion armed at in Mr. Justice Ellett's Dissent. 
[32] ELLETT, Justice (dissenting). 
[33] I Dissent 1 he statutes are too cleai ioi me IO see am conflict \\hate\er between them. Title 
5*S. Chaptei ^ . I T A 19 M hkiiDwn i .nuUum Vbu^ e v uniioi , u\\ It in substance 
provides amount to an indictable ol its pu»\ IMOUS amount to an inuiuablc misdemeanor, 
and it sets forth the punishment theietoi in ^CL 58-33-4 Howc\ei. it iuither pro\ ides b\ 
Sec. 58-33-6(g). that if a \tolation of one ot us pio\isions is also a \ lolation ot the Uniform 
Narcotic Drug Act (Title 58, Chapter 13a), then the punishment will be under the latter (a 
felony) and not under the former (an indictable misdemeanor). 
[34] The same legislature which passed the Diug Abuse Contiol Act also amended the Uniform 
Narcotic Drug Act so as to include a piohinmon against the possession and so foith of LSD-
25 'in I 
[35] It. therefoie, seems ob\ious to me that all the world must know and understand what the 
punishment for unlawful possession ol LSD is 1 would affirm the judgment and sentence of 
the trial court. 
Opinion Footnotes 
[36] 4hl McDonald v. Commonwealth oi Mass . 180 U.S. 311,21 S Ct 3X0. 45 L Ed 542 
[37] *fn2 Cf. State v. Fowler, 193 N.C. 290, 136 S.E. 709. 
[38] • fn3 Cf In re Lewis, OLL 380 P 2d 097 
[39] ! fn4 See State \ Musser. 1 i 8 I Hah 53"? 22n !) 2d 193. 19 1 t nued States \ L Cohen 
Grocery Co.. 255 U S. 81, 41 S Ct 298. 65 L Ed. 516. and Lanzetta \ \few Jerse\. 306 
U S. 451. 59 S Ct. 618. 83 L. Ed. 888 
[40] *fn5 State v Brunson, 162 La. 902. 111 So 321, 50 A.L R. 1531; State v. Mitchell, 217 
N C. 244, 7 S E.2d 567 and United States \ Unhersal C I T Ciedit Coip.. 344 lT S 218, 73 
S.Ct. 227. 97 L.E.2d 260 
[41] *fh6 § 76-1-2, U.C.A. 1953. 
[42] * fn7 State v Justice, 44 Utah 484, 141 P 109 
[43] 1 The figure 25 indicates simply the date oi discoveiy ot the diug and does not purport to 
indicate any different form of drug othei than LSD 
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Appendix M 
State vs. Green 995 P.2d 1250, 2000. UT. Case #990281-CA 
State v. Green, 995 P.2d 1250 (Utah App. 02/10/2000) 
[ 1 ] Utah Court of Appeals 
[2] Case No. 990281-CA 
[3] 995 P.2d 1250, 2000.UT.0042042 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 
[4] February 10,2000 
[5] STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, 
V. 
EDWARD DON GREEN, 
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. 
[6] Attorneys: Catherine E. Lilly and Ronald S. Fujino, Salt Lake City, for Appellant Jan 
Graham and Karen Klucznik, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
[7] Judges Greenwood, Orme, and Wilkins. *fnl 
[8] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Wilkins, Judge 
[9] OPINION (For Official Publication) 
[10] 2000 UT App 033 
[11] Third District, Salt Lake Department The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
[12] Tjl Defendant Edward Don Green appeals from a conviction pursuant to a conditional guilty 
plea for attempted theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 
(1999), 76-6-412(1 )(a)(iv) (1999), 76-4-101 (1999) and 76-4-102 (1999). We affirm. 
[13] BACKGROUND 
[14] \2 In October 1998, a car carrying the defendant pulled into Murray High School's front lot 
where defendant's friend Zarah Welch waited to lend him money. When defendant stepped 
out of the car, Welch told him that he must accompany her to the store to break a fifty-
dollar bill before he could borrow any money. Defendant kissed Welch, then, as if to hug 
her, slid his hands in the side pockets of her jacket and pulled out the fifty-dollar bill. Welch 
told defendant to return the money and tried to grab it back but defendant pulled the bill 
away and jumped into his friend's car and sped off. 
[15] 1(3 The State charged defendant with one count of theft from the person of another, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and 76-6-412(l)(a)(iv) (1999). 
After the trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss or reduce the theft charge to theft 
of an amount of property valued at less than $300 under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6- 412(d), 
defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of attempted theft from a person, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 (1999), 76-6-412(l)(a)(iv) 
(1999V 76-4-101 (1999) and 76-4-102 (1999). Defendant appeals. 
[ 16] THE SHONDEL RULE 
[17] [^4 The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to 
dismiss or reduce the charge of theft from a person (felony theft) *fn2 to theft of property of 
an amount less than $300 (misdemeanor theft). *fn3 Specifically, we consider whether the# 
4$i#ny theft statute proscribes the same offense as the misdemeanor theft statute, requiring' 
that defendant be charged and sentenced under the lesser crime, under State v. Shondeh 22 
Utah 2d 343,453 P.2d 146 (1969): 
[18] Tf5 "Our review under the Shondel rule focuses on the trial court's legal conclusions, which 
we review under a correction-of-error standard, according no particular deference to the 
trial court's ruling." State v. Kent, 945 P.2d 145, 146 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations and 
internal quotations omitted). 
[19] f6 The Shondel doctrine requires that when two different statutory provisions define the 
same offense, a defendant must be sentenced under the provision carrying the lesser 
penalty. See Shondel. 453 P.2d at 148; see also W.C.P. v. State, 1999~l 'T App 035.1J1f12-
15, 974 P.2d 302; State v. Vogt 824 P.2d 455, 457 (Utah Ct. App. 1901). 
[20] However, if the elements of the crime are not identical and the relevant statutes require 
proof of some fact or element not required to establish the other, the slatutes do not 
proscribe the same conduct and . . . [a defendant] may be charged with the crime carrying 
the more severe sentence [without violating his due process or equal protections rights],. . . 
so long as there is a rational basis for the legislative classification. Kent. 945 P.2d at 147 
(citations and internal quotations omitted). 
[21] T[7 The State maintains that the Shondel rule is inapplicable here because the substantive 
elements of the two crimes differ and the Legislature's distinction between these offenses is 
not arbitrary or irrational. Specifically, it argues that the felony theft statute requires the 
property to be stolen "from the person of another" whereas the misdemeanor theft statute 
does not. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-6- 412(l)(a)(iv) (requiring property to be stolen 
"from the person of another") with Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(l)(d) (making it crime to 
exercise unauthorized control over the property of another with a value of less than $300 
with the intent to deprive the person of the property). Relying on State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 
257, 263 (Utah 1985), defendant argues that the words "from a person" in the felony theft 
statute do not constitute a meaningful or significant distinction from the misdemeanor 
statute. We reject defendant's argument, and agree with the State that the statutes describe 
different offenses. 
[22] Tf8 While both statutory prohibitions criminalize theft of property, the elements of these 
offenses significantly differ. The misdemeanor theft statute does not require that the 
property be stolen from the person of another, and is limited to less than $300 in value. The 
felony theft statute has no value limitation. More significantly, the felony theft statute 
involves a direct violation of a victim's personal freedom with the associated increase in the 
possibility of physical harm. This difference provides an adequate rational basis for a 
heightened penalty. As such, because significant elements of these offenses are different, 
and because the Legislature's distinction between the offenses is rationally based, we hold 
that the Shondel rule does not apply here and affirm the trial court's ruling on defendant's 
motion to dismiss, and therefore affirm defendant's conviction. 
[23] CONCLUSION 
[24] f) The elements of the felony theft statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6- 412(1 )(a)(iv) are 
distinct from those of the misdemeanor theft statute, Utah Code Ann. £ 76-6-412(l)(d). 
Accordingly, the misdemeanor theft statute does not proscribe the same conduct as the 
felony statute, and defendant was properly charged with, and sentenced under, the felony 
theft statute. Affirmed. 
[25] Michael J. Wilkins, Judge 
[26] 1fl0 W E CONCUR: 
[27] Pamela T. Greenwood. Presiding Judge 
[28] Gregory K. Orme. Judge 
Opinion Footnotes 
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[29] *fnl . Justice Wilkins heard the arguments in this case and participated in its resolution 
prior to his swearing-in as a member of the Utah Supreme Court. 
[30] *fn2 . Section 76-6-404, the general theft provision, provides: "A person commits theft if he 
obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999). Section 76-6-412(1 )(a)(iv), 
which classifies the various forms of theft, provides: "(1) Theft of property . . . [is] 
punishable: (a) as a felony of the second degree if the: . . . (iv) property is stolen from the 
person of another." Id. § 76-6-412(l)(a)(iv) (emphasis added). 
[31] *fn3 . Section 76-6-412( 1 )(d) provides: "(1) Theft of property . . . [is] punishable: . . . (d) as 
a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less than $300." Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-412(1 )(d)( 1999). 
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contained in this document? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Very well. Count one of the case ending 
0067 is burglary in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 
76-6-202, a third degree felony. The information alleges 
that you did, on or about October 21st, 2005, in Rich County, 
entered or remained unlawfully in a building, or any portion 
of a building, with intent to commit a felony, that is theft. 
In case 066 the allegation is vehicle burglary, alleged 
to have occurred here in Rich County, state of Utah, a class 
A misdemeanor, alleged to have occurred October 21st, 2005. 
It is therein alleged that you did unlawfully enter a vehicle 
with intent to commit a felony or theft. 
To those two counts how do you plead? 
THE DEPENDANT: Guilty. 
THE COURT: Mr. Preston, give us a factual basis for 
the two counts, please. 
MR. PRESTON: Your Honor, the auto burglary is a 
burglary of a automobile that was out by Mountain Fuel. A 
stereo was taken and later the stereo was destroyed because 
apparently Mr. Webb couldn't use it. It's one of those ones 
that have the detachable front. We have recovered the stereo 
presently and it is in evidence down in the sheriff's office. 
The defendant admitted to the burglary of that automobile. 
The other situation that he pled guilty to involving the 
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Page 12 
liR. PRESTON: Just a minute, please. 
iv (Pause in the proceedings.) 
| REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
i 
B* MR. PRESTON: 
Q. How did you determine the value of the property as it 
"relates to the theft? 
"A. Umm, a combination of characterization from the victims 
and my own reasonable best guess. 
Q. In your opinion what was the -- in your opinion did the 
property exceed $300 but was less than $1,000? 
MR. LAURITZEN: Objection. He's not qualified for 
that. 
THE COURT: Overruled. He may give his opinion. 
THE WITNESS: In my opinion, yes, it was in excess 
of 300 but less than a thousand. 
MR. PRESTON: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Mr. Lauritzen? 
MR. LAURITZEN: Nothing. 
THE COURT: Thank you. You may step down. Any 
other witnesses? 
MR. PRESTON: No. 
THE COURT: Mr. Lauritzen? 
MR. LAURITZEN: At this point I would move to 
dismiss. They haven't established that the burglary was to a 
residence. 
Transcript #7, Page 2 
Page 2 
1 THE COURT: The bailiff has handed me a statement of 
2 J defendant here, but I'd like you to verbalize for me, Mr. 
3 I Lauritzen, if you will, what your arrangements are, please. 
4 MR. LAURITZEN: Your Honor, regarding, and I don't 
5 I have the case numbers, the state does, the pending charges, 
6 J the state is going to dismiss some of them. They're going to 
7 I amend one of them. The one they're going to amend now 
8 J alleges a second degree felony. It will be amended to a 
9 J third degree felony. 
10 With regard to that, the defendant is reserving the issue 
11 I on appeal as to whether or not it should be sentenced as a 
12 J class A misdemeanor because of the interaction with the 
13 I automobile burglary statute. That appeal would come to 
14 naught, of course, and wouldn't be filed in if the court 
15 J decides ultimately to sentence it as a class A misdemeanor. 
16 I For that purpose, this is a Sari plea, which I believe is 
17 J the right term. It is a plea reserving the right to appeal 
18 I that sole issue, which is how the matter will be handled on 
19 J sentencing. The defendant realizes he could be charged and 
20 I tried on either auto burglary or burglary of a dwelling, but 
21 he contends in either case the sentencing would have to 
22 I proceed on the lesser, which would be the auto burglary 
23 (statute. That's his understanding. He's willing to press 
24 that matter to the Court of Appeals if necessary. 
25 I The state has agreed that the court should, in this case, 
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felony is that the owners of these camp trailers were located 
in Pole Canyon, which is immediately west of Randolph. They 
had been elk hunting and left their trailers locked and had 
[some personal property in the trailers. When they came back 
for the deer hunt, which was approximately seven days later, 
they found the windows broken, locks broken, and the doors 
open on each of the two trailers. They then provided the 
sheriff's office with a list of property missing. And the 
sheriff later found the missing property with the aid of a 
search warrant and with the aid of, actually, the defendant's 
mother. A substantial amount of the property taken from the 
trailers was returned to the owners, and identified by the 
owners. The defendant also admitted burglarizing these 
trailers. 
THE COURT: Mr. Webb, you heard the facts related to 
us by the prosecutor, Mr. Preston. Are you pleading guilty 
to the two counts because you committed them as he described 
them? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: The court will receive the guilty pleas, 
finding the same to be given freely and voluntarily. In so 
doing I will sign the order of statement of defendant and 
incorporate that into the record. 
Jp|-faMr. Preston, I note in observing this that you haven't 
igned the order, or signed the statement of defendant. If 
Transcript #9, Page 5,6 and 7 
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companion and, two, develop a new group of companions. I 
think with those two things in mind — I'm not going to go 
through the old saw of blaming things on his associations. I 
think he was as much as anyone throughout this thing to 
blame. He's been a real difficulty for law enforcement and 
for his parents. But I see some light at the end of the 
tunnel now and I appreciate the court taking that into 
consideration. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Input from the state? 
MR. PRESTON: Your Honor, I have in front of me an 
Adult Probation and Parole report. We get these reports as a 
result of a request by you to them for a report. They put a 
lot of time and effort into these reports. I've had occasion 
to read the report. I can't see that any judgment that I 
have in this case should do anything but to say that I concur 
with the recommendations in the report. 
THE COURT: Very well. It will be ordered on the 
burglary, the third degree felony charge, that the defendant 
serve not more than five years in the Utah State 
'.. That will be stayed and the defendant will be 
>ation*with' Adult Parole and Probation under the 
Editions. He's to serve six months in 
titogfreceive credit for the 4 9 days 
e&S'to serve 60 days and then 
el'ease at that point in time. 
2 
3 
A 
5 
6 
7-
8 
9 
Page 6 
s to pay a fine in the amount of $800. Pay 
restitution in the amount of $1,065 together with interest. 
M*-s* to complete a substance abuse evaluation and enroll in 
ahd complete recommended counseling, which shall include a 
minimum of two substance abuse counseling contacts per week. 
He's to complete a theft halt course as approved by his 
probation officer. 
He's to have a no alcohol clause. Mr. Webb, that means 
you can't consume any alcohol nor be where others are 
10 I consuming. No bars, taverns or even private parties. He's 
11 J to have no association with known criminals or criminal 
12 J types. 
13 He's to be profitably engaged at all times. That means 
14 I either in school or working full time or a combination 
15 J thereof. All the other standard terms and conditions of 
16 I probation will be in effect, including waiver of search and 
17 J seizure. 
18 I In case ending 066, burglary of a vehicle, a class B 
19 I misdemeanor, the defendant shall serve six months in the Ric 
20 County jail. That's to be consecutive to the above. 
21 However, the jail sentence will be stayed and he'll be plac< 
22 on probation as set forth previously. He's to pay a fine ii 
23 the amount of $800 in that case. 
24 I Counsel, do you want to handle that third matter now? 
25 Quite frankly, I would give him a concurrent sentence and 
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impose a fine in that case. 
MR. LAURITZEN: I would suggest he go ahead and 
plead guilty to it. I think we're prepared to enter a plea 
of guilty. I've thought through it and can't think of any 
defenses he might put up. Because it will be concurrent, I 
suggest that is probably the best way. Do you agree? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Webb, I previously gave you your 
rights when you entered a guilty plea to the other two 
charges, plus you were sitting here this morning when I 
explained the rights to the defendant which Mr. Orifici 
represented. You understand that you have those same rights? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: You understand that if you enter a 
guilty plea here today you give up or waive those rights? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: You also understand that the maximum 
penalty in this case could be six months in the jail and a 
fine of up to a thousand dollars plus an 85 percent 
surcharge? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
^COURT: Based on that is it your desire at this 
|guilty plea to the charge of unlawful 
&\ 
sumption of alcohol by a minor, a class B 
if? 
"ed^ to have occurred August 12th, 2006? 
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it's for. 
3k to me now. 
there is an auto 
confusing with the I 
Now I recall the circumstances. 1 
: Have I phrased 
To ai 
that 
\ dwelling, so it 
that 
d and assist you 
the trailer 
accurately? 
in negotiations, J 
would comply with a 
would qualify under the burglary 
statute. Now, does that aid and assist you in your 
negotiations at all? 
MR. LAURITZEN: No, it doesn't. Well, we'll never 
settle it on that basis. We'll have to have a trial. 
THE COURT: You've heard my inclination. If that 
helps you out, fine. 
MR. PRESTON: I have no objection to combining all 
four cases together and have a jury trial. That's fine with 
me. 
THE COURT: Do you want me to set it for a jury 
trial or for a pretrial settlement conference in view of my 
inclination of ruling? 
MR. LAURITZEN: We'll enter a plea of not guilty to 
the new charge. Let's set at least one for jury trial. 
Transcript #4, Pages 4-17 
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1 I THE COURT: Call your first witness. 
2 MR. PRESTON: Call Mark Lee. 
3 MARK LEE, 
4 I being first duly sworn, was examined and 
5 I testified as follows: 
6 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
7 BY MR. PRESTON: 
8 1 Q. State your name. 
9 J A. Mark Lee. 
10 I Q. And your address? 
11 A. Woodruff, Utah. 
12 Q. Occupation? 
13 J A. Deputy sheriff, Rich County. 
14 I Q. And how long have you been employed in that? 
15 I A. Fifteen years. 
16 I Q. Are you acquainted with the defendant in this case? 
17 I A. I am. 
18 I Q. Did you have occasion to receive a report of a burglary 
19 I involving this defendant? 
20 A. I did. 
21 Q. And what date did you receive that report? 
22 I A. I believe it was around the 22nd of October, 2005. 
23 Q. And who did the report come from? 
24 I A. It came from -- if I may refer to my notes because I 
25 Jdonft remember the name. (Pause.) The complainants were 
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Linda Himes and her husband Buddy. 
Q. And where are they from? 
A, They are from, I believe, the Wasatch Front area. 
Q. Did they file a report with the Rich County sheriff's 
office? 
A. They did. 
Q. And did you receive that report? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what was reported to you at that time? 
A. It was reported that two camping trailers tnat they had 
parked up Pole Canyon in Rich County had been broken into and 
items had been taken from them. 
Q. As a result of that report what did you do? 
A. I prepared a list based on their characterization of what 
was missing and itemized it and filed the report. And also 
broadcast an attempt to locate for the property. 
Q. And how did you come to suspect the defendant of being 
involved in this particular offense? 
A. It was while assisting in the investigation of another 
complaint based out of Wyoming. 
Q. And what happened in the investigation of the Wyoming 
complaint? 
A. In the process of assisting in that investigation, I 
concluded that it seemed like we had enough to prepare an 
affidavit for a search warrant, in which the defendant was a 
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suspect in that case also. 
Q. And was a search warrant prepared in the Wyoming case? 
A. It was. 
Q. Was it executed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And at the time of the execution of the search warrant — 
pardon me. Where did you execute the search warrant? 
A. We executed the search warrant on, I believe, two 
residences and one vehicle. 
Q. And residence number one, what residence was that? 
A. It was the residence of a juvenile that lives in 
Randolph. 
Q. And residence number two? 
A. The residence of the defendant and his parents. 
Q. And the vehicle that was searched? 
A. A vehicle that the defendant drove. 
Q. As a result of the execution of these search warrants, 
did you have occasion to locate any of the property that had 
been described by these individuals from the trailers in Pole 
Canyon? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. And would you describe to the court what occurred at that 
time? 
A. Yes. The property previously described by the 
complainants in the Pole Canyon case had included a hooded 
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sweat shirt that said ABC Roofing Supplies on it. That 
seemed to be somewhat unique to me. And there was some other 
property that was a little less easy to define. But also a 
blanket with a deer design on it, a deer print. And the 
blanket with the deer print, there was a blanket with a deer 
print and a hooded sweat shirt with ABC Roofing Supplies in 
the vehicle upon which we executed, in addition to some other 
property. 
Q. And where were these located? 
A. I believe in the trunk of the vehicle and in the back 
seat of the vehicle. This warrant was executed -- I'm sorry. 
Q. Can you give me a date? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I've got 10/26 of 2005. Does that sound about right? 
A. That sounds about right. 
Q. All right. And as a result of locating these items, were 
there also other items located there? 
A. There were. 
Q. And can you identify those items as being similar to the 
described items? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what were they? 
A. Ammunition, a gun cleaning kit. 
Q. As a result of the execution of this search warrant, did 
25 I you have occasion to speak with the defendant? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And when did that conversation take place? 
A. It occurred within the same hour as the servicing of the 
search warrant. 
Q. And that would be on the 26th? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who was present at the time of the conversation? 
A. Agent Bartchi from the Cache/Rich task force, myself, and 
the defendant. 
Q. Let me digress just a little bit. When you went up to 
the trailers in Pole Canyon, did you make any observations 
concerning entry into those trailers? 
A. I did. 
14 I Q. And what did you observe? 
15 
16 
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A. It appeared that entry had been forced. There was 
violence to the door. 
Q. Describe that if you will, please? 
A. It appeared that they had been pried open. 
Q. On both trailers or one trailer or what? 
A. Both trailers. 
Q. And was there any indication of wheel marks, tire marks, 
anything that would link those pry marks to the defendant? 
A. No. 
Q. So after execution of the search warrant you indicate 
that you had a conversation with the defendant? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 I Q. And those present were? 
3 I A. Agent Bartchi, myself and the defendant. 
4 I Q. And at the time of the execution of the search warrant I 
5 I believe one of the defendant's parents was present? 
6 I A. I don't recall whether or not a parent was present during 
7 I the interview or not, but she was present when we executed 
8 J the warrant, yes. 
9 I Q. All right. Now, then, would you describe what you said 
10 J and what the defendant said during the conversation? Well, 
11 I first of all, was he given a warning relative to his 
12 J constitutional rights? 
13 J A. He was. 
14 J Q. Did you read that or did you cite it verbatim? 
15 I A. I read it. 
16 I Q. And having read him his rights, did he indicate whether 
17 I or not he would like to speak to you? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. And what did he say? 
20 I A. He said he would speak with us. 
21 J Q. And at that time tell me what he said and what you said? 
22 I A. He was remorseful and described that he had been up in 
23 I the Pole Canyon area and had been involved with some other 
24 person, who he didn't wish to name at that time, in taking 
25 I property from two campers that substantially matched the 
Page 10 
1 I description of the campers which I had taken a look at. And 
2 J the property that he'd taken from those campers was in fact 
3 I the property that I had seized as a result of the search 
4 I warrant because it substantially matched the description of 
5 I the property taken from those trailers. 
6 I Q. Did he ever indicate the identification of the other 
7 I individual that what was with him? 
8 A. I believe he did later on in a subsequent interview. 
9 I Q. And how long did the interview last? 
10 I A. The first one I think lasted about ten minutes. It was 
11 I at his parents1 house. 
12 I Q. And did you have a subsequent interview? 
13 I A. Yes, we did. 
14 J Q. And where did that take place? 
15 J A. At the sheriff's office. 
16 Q. And who was present at the time of that interview? 
17 I A. Agent Bartchi and myself. And there was a lot of 
18 J activity. I think there were a couple of other officers that 
19 I came and went. 
20 I Q. And can you give me a date? 
21 J A. It was the same date. 
22 Q. And was the defendant readvised of his constitutional 
23 rights? 
24 I A. I don't know. I don't recall whether he was readvised. 
25 J Q. But the two conversations were the same day? 
Page 11 
1 J A. They were the same day. 
2 J Q. And what's the time element in between the two? 
3 I A. Probably about half an hour, 45 minutes. 
4 1 Q. What was said by you and what was said by him? 
5 I A. Essentially the same thing. He was attempting to be 
6 I compliant and fix what he'd done. 
7 I Q. Did he ask for this conversation or did you ask for this 
8 I conversation? 
9 J A. I think another officer asked for the conversation. 
10 Q. Other than the sheriff's officer? 
11 I A. Yes. It was a law enforcement officer from Cache County. 
12 J Q. Okay. Anything said in that subsequent conversation that 
13 I altered or changed the confession that he gave in the initial 
14 I conversation? 
15 A. No. 
16 I MR. PRESTON: You may cross. 
17 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
18 BY MR. LAURITZEN: 
19 I Q. Did you read the Miranda rights at the first interview 
20 from a card or something? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 J Q. Do you have that card with you? 
23 A. I do not. 
24 MR. LAURITZEN: That's all. 
25 THE COURT: Anything further, counsel? 
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1 I MR. PRESTON: Just a minute, please. 
2 J (Pause in the proceedings.) 
3 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
4 BY MR. PRESTON: 
5 J Q. How did you determine the value of the property as it 
6 J relates to the theft? 
7 J A. Umm, a combination of characterization from the victims 
8 land my own reasonable best guess. 
9 J Q. In your opinion what was the -- in your opinion did the 
10 I property exceed $300 but was less than $1,000? 
11 MR. LAURITZEN: Objection. Hefs not qualified for 
12 that. 
13 J THE COURT: Overruled. He may give his opinion. 
14 THE WITNESS: In my opinion, yes, it was in excess 
15 I of 300 but less than a thousand. 
16 J MR. PRESTON: No further questions. 
17 THE COURT: Mr. Lauritzen? 
18 MR. LAURITZEN: Nothing. 
19 I THE COURT: Thank you. You may step down. Any 
20 I other witnesses? 
21 MR. PRESTON: No. 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Lauritzen? 
23 I MR. LAURITZEN: At this point I would move to 
24 I dismiss. They haven't established that the burglary was to a 
25 I residence. 
Page 13 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. PRESTON: It isn't charged as a residence, it's 
charged as a building. 
MR. LAURITZEN: Or to a building as far as that 
goes. It doesn't classify as a felony burglary. 
THE COURT: Give me your argument for that, counsel. 
The testimony that the court heard was to a trailer and to a 
camper. 
MR. LAURITZEN: And they are motor vehicles. Under 
state law they are both motor vehicles, what was described. 
MR. PRESTON: A motor vehicle is a motor vehicle. A 
trailer is a trailer. The two are separate and distinct 
items. 
MR. LAURITZEN: I don't know why I have to put 
license plates on my trailers and register them and put 
insurance on them if that's the case. 
THE COURT: Your motion to dismiss is denied. You 
can raise that issue later by way of a written motion. The 
court will consider it then. 
MR. PRESTON: I'd like to see that motion. 
THE COURT: Closing arguments? 
MR. PRESTON: Submit it. 
MR. LAURITZEN: As will I. 
THE COURT: The court finds that the state has shown 
that there is probable cause to believe that the offense as 
described in the information were committed and that the 
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1 J defendant committed the same. 
2 J This is a probable cause hearing, Mr. Lauritzen. That's 
3 I on of the bases for denying your motion. You may have a 
4 I basis for that, but it would be more appropriate to bring 
5 J that by way of a written motion, either at or before the time 
6 J for arraignment. 
7 I Let's continue the matter for arraignment. I'll 
8 I designate that as a pretrial settlement conference. We'll 
9 I continue the other two cases to the same time. That is, 
10 J follow this case with the other two misdemeanor cases. 
11 J What about May 23rd? Mr. Lauritzen, are you planning to 
12 be here that day? 
13 MR. LAURITZEN: I'm not, but I don't see why I 
14 I couldn't come over. I'm open that day. 
15 J THE COURT: Okay. Becky, do we have a trial that 
16 day? 
17 THE CLERK: We're fine. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. May 23rd for all three cases. 
19 I Arraignment in case ending in 067 and also pretrial in the 
20 J other two cases as well. 
21 I MR. LAURITZEN: Your Honor, there's probably one 
22 I other matter we ought to address with Mr. Webb. The court 
23 I may recall, I was appointed to represent him in this matter 
24 J quite some time ago. Since then he's obtained employment. 
25 I Further, the court temporarily appointed me on the two cases 
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THE COURT: If that appointment should be extended 
to the other two? 
MR. LAURITZEN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Very well. Mr. Webb, I want you to 
complete another affidavit based on the representations of 
Mr. Lauritzen. Do that now and do it completely. I want to 
know your present situation, where you are working now and 
how much money you're making at this point in time. My clerk 
will provide with you that affidavit. Do that and then I'll 
call you back up after you've had an opportunity to complete 
that. And Mr. Preston apparently likes to scrutinize those 
more closely now. 
MR. PRESTON: I intend to. 
THE COURT: I'll give you an opportunity to 
cross-examine him if you wish. 
MR. PRESTON: I'd like to at least compare the two 
documents. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
(Other cases heard.) 
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THE COURT: Let's go back to the Webb case. Mr. 
Webb, after you've just seen what happened to Ms. Weston, I'm 
sure you will make certain representations here to the court 
in regards to your affidavit. You tell me you're employed by 
W.B.L. Construction? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: You've been there two weeks? 
THE DEFENDANT: Approximately. 
THE COURT: You make ten dollars per hour? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is that a 40 hour week? 
THE DEFENDANT: Sometimes a little over. Around 40, 
though. 
THE COURT: So you're going to be making somewhere 
around 16 to 18 hundred a month? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Now, with take home, you'll be down 
somewhere about 1400, is that what you anticipate? 
THE DEFENDANT: Approximately. 
THE COURT: You don't have any children you're 
supporting? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Mr. Preston, I'll allow you to examine 
the affidavit and, if you so desire, ask questions under oath 
25 I of the applicant, 
Page 17 
MR. PRESTON: Do you have a copy of the prior 
affidavit? 
THE COURT: I may have one here in the file, 
counsel. Let me see. 
(Pause in the proceedings.) 
MR. PRESTON: I have no questions. 
THE COURT: Very well. The court finds that the 
defendant is indigent and will appoint Mr. Lauritzen to 
represent him. 
One thing I did forget to do. Mr. Webb, stand up and 
raise your right hand. Do you swear that the information 
contained in this affidavit is true and accurate to the best 
of your information and belief, so help you God? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Very well. All right. We set up the 
schedule as relates to Mr. Webb earlier. The court will 
handle it in that fashion. 
(Hearing concluded.) 
